does not declare himself in it against Noetus, for then he would not have concluded the matter so briefly; but he intends merely to defend himself against those consequences, which some might be prone to deduce from the expression oaoxovels that he had employed, viz. that the Aoyos had obtained merely a body by his birth of the virgin, and not a soul also.

Consequently one cannot well conclude, that Noetus had no knowledge of two natures in Christ; and the more so, in case he says (as Hippolytus acknowledges)* that Christ means the Son of God as to his human nature, while the Logos is not named Son by John, who says only that he was with God. Thus it would seem, that he acknowledged both the human and the divine in Christ; and therefore he, as well as his opponents, could speak of two natures in him: unless indeed one should assert, that the distinction into persons first occasioned the expression nature [in a like sense] to be applied to the divine Being; for in this particular sense Noetus would no doubt have denied to Christ a divine nature.

In the mean time, in case many an unfounded accusation or supposition can be laid aside, and several points be more definitely cleared up, still it would seem, that Noetus had explained himself no more definitely than Praxeas did, upon the point, how God united himself with the man Jesus, and wherein the distinction of his being in Christ definitely consisted. Theodoret, indeed, and the authorities to which he makes his immediate appeal, appear to have had knowledge of further developments which the doctrine of Noetus experienced by means of Callistus; but of these no relic has reached our times.

Let us now turn to Hippolytus, and inquire how he defended a plurality of persons against Noetus. In him we see the same strong leaning to the Arian schism, and anon the same approaches to Tritheism, as in Tertullian. The same difficulty exists, moreover, in respect to the separation of the Father as a person from the avroveos as the Unity, so as to constitute a Trinity; which separation, however, is imperiously demanded by the doctrine of a personal Trinity in the unity of the divine Being.

while Dr. S. maintains, that he says this to avoid a misconception which might be attached to his use of the word σaqxwɛis. TR.]

* The Greek text is disturbed here, and needs to be corrected by the translation.

Hippolytus avers, that the Son, as well as other things, can bear no comparison with the Father.* He represents him as first coming forth out of the Father when he first uttered his voice [at the creation of the world]. Sometimes he speaks of one God and two persons; and then again, of one Father and two persons; not ranking the Spirit with them in either of these passages, although in one of them he mentions him, but still, almost with a direct intention, declines to call him a пооσшлоv. In fact the unity of the Godhead is with him so indefinite, (so strenuously does he contend for plurality of persons), that he reduces it to harmony of sentiment and cooperation; and strictly understood, he even denies that the Father, Son, and Spirit are substantially one.§

* Πρὸς γὰρ τὸν πατέρα τις λογισθήσεται; Cont. Noetum, V. [ Who can be brought into comparison with the Father ?']

a

+ Ον (λόγον) ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀόρατον, ὁρατὸν ποιεῖ προτέραν φωνην qeyyóuevos; ibid. X. ['Who, having the invisible (Logos) in himself, makes it visible when he utters the first sound."] If any one should construe ógatóv лоιεй and лойжɛ as not designed to assert eternal generation, but only incarnation, he must explain in the manner of Sabellius or of Beryll; but this would be directly against the design of Hippolytus.

† Δύο μὲν οὐκ ἐρῶ θεούς, ἀλλ ̓ ἕνα· πρόσωπα δὲ δύο, οἰκονομίαν δὲ τρίτην, τὴν χάριν τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος. [I do not speak of two Gods, but one; of two persons, however, and of a third oixovouia, the grace of the Holy Spirit.'] Here plainly the Spirit is not comprised among the two ngóσona; and the Father is not the one God, but one person. Immediately after he adds: Πατήρ μὲν γὰρ εἰς, πρόσωπα δὲ δύο, ὅτι καὶ ὁ υἱός· τὸ δὲ τρίτον, τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα. [ The Father indeed is one, but there are two persons, for there is also the Son; the third is the Holy Spirit.'] This I can explain in no other way than as follows; viz., that there are two persons, because there is a Son besides the Father; and the Holy Spirit is moreover added as a third; for the dέ admits of no other explanation. Hippolytus appears to have arranged his expressions so as designedly to convey the idea, that the Father is not derived from the one God, the autódeos, the Movάs, and to distinguish the Son and the Spirit by the fact, that they are derived from the source of the Father.

§ Μὴ πάντες ἓν σῶμά ἐσμεν [not ἐστι, as the text wrongly is] κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ; Ἢ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ διαθέσει τῆς ὁμοφρονίας ἓν γινόμεθα; Τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ὁ παῖς, ὁ πεμφθεῖς ὡμολόγησεν εἶναι ἐν [ἓν ?] τῷ пaτgì dvváμa, dia éσɛ, cap. VII. ['Are we all one body as to substance? Or are we one in respect to power and unanimity? In like

It is particularly worthy of note, when we compare the manner in which Hippolytus contradicts the argument drawn by Noetus from John 10: 30,* with that by which Tertullian endeavours to overthrow the argument of Praxeas deduced from the same passage, how each contradicts his antagonist by appealing to different considerations or views of this text. Tertullian refutes Praxeas by an appeal to the v [one substance] in John 10: 30, which he considers as meaning something very different from what would have been designated by eis, [which might mean one person or one individual hypostasis]; but he says nothing against Praxeas which is drawn from the use of the plural ouév there employed. Hippolytus, on the other hand, leaves the v untouched, because he apprehends that Noetus might take shelter behind it, and he employs only ouέv to make out his argument. Hippolytus then must fairly concede to Tertullian, his coadjutor in the contest, that the plural ouév does not stand in the way of Noetus; and Tertullian must in like manner concede to Hippolytus, that the neuter & may be easily reconciled with the views of Noetus. The interpretation of Scripture, however, is not that in respect to which the developments of these contests appear to most advantage. Least of all can we expect any thing of particular excellence here, in those who are wedded to particular creeds; for then the extraneous influence of these creeds would act upon them, as we may naturally suppose; and so the interpretation of Scripture would manner the Son who was sent, confesses himself to be one [according to the emendation v] with the Father, in respect to power and condition.' [The last clause, according to the text as it now stands, would run thus: In like manner the Son, who was sent, professes himself to be in the Father, with respect to power and condition;' which scarcely makes any sense.] Still, I would deduce nothing more from this, than that the mode of representation, so destitute of simplicity and so intricate, has so confused the idiom, that in this case ovoia is used in the same sense in which vлagsis and vnóσraσis are elsewhere employed.

Not less remarkable is the expression: οἰκονομίας συμφωνία συνάγεTai ris Eva Dróv; cap. XIV. [The harmony of the economy (i. e. of the three persons in the Godhead) brings about a union in respect to the one God']. Here the Unity would seem to be represented as arising from the harmonious combination of the Trinity; much in the same way as the personal unity of Christ is represented as consisting in the entire coincidence of his two wills.

* Εγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἓν ἐσμέν.

become wavering through the influence of polemics, which are so apt to occasion partiality and prevent the exercise of candour. The consequence of all this usually is, the introduction of an arbitrary and artificial method of interpretation; and this once introduced by party zeal, usually proceeds so far in the sequel, that one is at length compelled to seek for some established principles of exegesis.

§ 5. Sentiments of Beryll, bishop of Bostria.

[Or Beryll, bishop of Bostria a well known town in Arabia, (flor. 230-244), very little is known with certainty, excepting his conference with Origen. That he was a man of learning, the author of letters and other writings, is sufficiently vouched for by the testimony of antiquity. Eusebius says he had inspected many of his writings in the library at Jerusalem; Ecc. Hist. VI. 20. But all his writings are lost; and we know him only by the history which his opponents have given of his senti

ments.

Eusebius (Ecc. Hist. VI. 33) charges Beryll with having held, that our Lord and Saviour did not exist as a distinct person, before the incarnation; and that the divinity of the Father (not his own) dwelt in him.' The bishops in his neighbourhood, it seems by his account, had many conferences with Beryll, but were unable to convince him. At length a Synod was convened, at which Origen was invited to be present. He succeeded, as the statement is, by his learning and eloquence, in winning Beryll over to his favourite hypostatical views. Eusebius says that the acts of this Synod were extant in his time. Jerome (de Vir. Illus. c. 60) says, that the Letters of Beryll were extant in his time; and among them a letter of thanks to Origen for his efforts in correcting his errors. The genuineness of this is not generally admitted, at the present time.

What the real sentiments of Beryll were, has been greatly contested; inasmuch as the accounts of him are very imperfect, and Eusebius and Jerome do not seem to agree in their statement concerning him. They are, however, most amply and ably developed in the following remarks of Dr. Schleiermacher. The sources to be consulted, besides those already named, are Socrates, Hist. Ecc. III. 7. Gennadius, de Dogmat. Ecc. c. 3. Modern sources; Walch, II. p. 126 seq. Ceiller, Hist.

des Auteurs Ecc. III. p. 280. Bull. Judic. Ecc. Cathol. p. 28. Lardner, Credibil. of Gosp. Hist. III. p. 199 seq. TR.]

If now Noetus so managed as to escape the difficulties and dangers that are naturally consequent upon the admission of a plurality of persons in the Godhead, (one may call this personality either υπόστασις, οι ύπαρξις, or πρόσωπον) ; and yet, after all, expressed himself as indefinitely as Theodoret supposes, respecting the difference of the two states or modes of the existence of the divine Being, viz., that of concealment within himself and that of disclosure to the world; granting, in the meantime, that he disclaimed ever so strenuously all expressions which would assign to this state of disclosure some definite relation to space and time; yet still, the method of Noetus' representation would easily give occasion to the supposition, that Christ made only a transitory development of himself, which, being dependent on and arising from the will of God, might again change and cease. Such a view, now, of the Redeemer's person would by no means satisfy the demands of Christian faith; for his regal dignity and governing power as Son, must endure at least until that undefined period, when all enemies shall be put under his feet. Thus much cannot be dispensed with.

The adding of this important circumstance to the view of Noetus, and thus supplying a want that was previously felt by Christians, appears to have been particularly accomplished by Beryll of Bostria. That he afterwards abandoned his opinion, through the influence of Origen, whose credit and personal superiority gave him great weight, can be no good ground for neglecting to examine that opinion, nor even for undervaluing it.

Should we concede that no historical connection between Beryll and Noetus can be traced, because our information respecting the times of the latter and his school is so scanty and uncertain; still, a connection in regard to opinion remains certain. If Beryll did not draw from Noetus, or even if he knew nothing of him, still his opinion discloses the same views. I could not say, with Martini, that Beryll entertained an opinion like to that of Noetus, but yet somewhat discrepant;* for p. 149.

* Pragmat. Geschich.