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own; for, although precision is essential, his expressions are vague. He remarks (131) that

the wind was sufficiently east of north to rake the coast of Britain in the vicinity of Caesar's camp, and so to render it a lee shore in the full and proper acceptation of that term.

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What limit does he assign to "the vicinity of Caesar's camp"? I infer from both his articles that, although he does not expressly say so, he rightly locates the camp on the eastern coast of Kent, near Walmer. But surely he does not mean that those of the eighteen transports which he has in mind were off this coast when they "stood out to sea". If they were there, what becomes of Caesar's statement that 'they were driven down towards the lower and more westerly part of the island' (ad inferiorem partem insulae, quae est propius solis occasum deicerentur)? When they were first descried from Caesar's camp, they could not have got far, if at all, north of the South Foreland. If Mr. Wightman will not admit that they were driven to some point considerably west of that promontory, and therefore that, when they stood out to sea, they were somewhere off the southern coast of Britain, further argument is useless. But if they were there, it was not possible, unless they should be deliberately steered in the wrong direction, for the northeasterly wind to drive them ashore. I am not quite sure, however, that Mr. Wightman does not mean that they were off the eastern coast of Kent, between Walmer and the South Foreland. For after telling us (132) that "the point... towards which they were being impelled became one somewhere between their true course and the direction of their sag to leeward", he says (134),

Being nearer Britain, they (the shipmasters) were perhaps reluctant to put back, at least until they had stood in under the shore close enough to satisfy themselves whether any smooth water was to be found there. Finding none, and sensible that their position was momentarily becoming imperilled, they realized that there was nothing for them to do but to follow the example of their more prudent comrades, and to put to

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2Like Mr. Wightman (131), I "disclaim all intention of maintaining that the wind was exactly N. E." But the trend of the coast from the South Foreland to Pevensey is W. S. W. Therefore, unless the wind was between E. N. E. and E., it could not "rake the coast of Britain", between the Foreland and Pevensey at all, nor, unless it was due east, "at any considerable angle". In the former case there was no "danger point to leeward": in the latter, it would have been impossible for the transports to get back to Gaul anywhere near the point from which they had started.

"What is the essential difference between this statement and that which, after I had read Mr. Wightman's original article, seemed to me to represent his meaning, but which he now (134) repudiatesthe 'shipmasters', with their eyes open, allowed their ships to drift helplessly towards 'some danger point to leeward', but at last, when the danger of striking became imminent, woke up and put them on the other tack!"?

may assign to "the vicinity of Caesar's camp", he insists that the transports were driven towards "a danger point to leeward", although it was open to the shipmasters to stop that movement by following "the example of their more prudent comrades". To move deliberately in a gale towards "a danger point to leeward" in the groundless hope of finding smooth water near it—what would any competent 'shipmaster' think of such seamanship? But if, as Caesar's words imply, the shipmasters were in the Channel, westward of the Foreland, they must have abandoned the attempt to keep on their true Mr. Wightman (133) will not admit that the transports ran "before the wind at all". Does he admit that they were driven into the Channel? If so, what were they doing? Were they close-hauled, on the starboard tack (!)? What could they have done but run before the wind until their skippers (having, as I maintain, vainly anchored) resolved "to stand out to sea and make for the continent"?

course.

One question remains. In order to maintain his nautical theory, Mr. Wightman, in endeavoring to explain the words quae tamen ancoris iactis cum fluctibus complerentur, necessario adversa nocte in altum provectae continentem petierunt, is obliged to throw all the editors overboard. My published translation runs, "They anchored notwithstanding, but as they were becoming waterlogged, were forced to stand out1

to

4I cannot admit that, as Mr. Wightman says (130), Livy 21.49.6 (read 5) proves that "deici when applied to ships refers their being swept out of their course down upon some danger point to leeward". It simply refers to their being swept out of their course (whether there is a danger point or not); and verschlagen, which Mr. Wightman quotes as its German equivalent, does not necessarily imply a danger point. There is no evidence in the passage which he cites that the ships which were driven out of their course to the Aegatian Islands were wrecked, and, if they were, my argument is unaffected; if they had been merely driven through the Mediterranean, until the gale ceased, without reaching land, they would still have been deiectae; and so would the transports have been if the 'shipmasters' had found the "smooth water" which Mr. Wightman says (133) that they "perhaps sought". Nor is it true that, as Mr. Wightman says (133), Caesar would necessarily have used the phrase se vento dare of ships running before the wind. fleet of Antony, whose adventures are described in B. C. 3.26, was driven out of its course and ran before the wind; but Caesar describes its movement by the words praetervectos Dyrrachium magna vi venti; and the ships that were driven to the Aegatian Islands may, for aught we know, have run before the wind. Holmes", says Mr. Wightman (133), "sees in deicerentur a voluntary movement". If Mr. Wightman will think again, he will admit that, while running before the wind was a voluntary movement, the movement of men who, when it was open to them "to follow the example of their more prudent comrades and to put to sea", preferred first to stand "in under the shore close enough to satisfy themselves whether any smooth water was to be found there", was not less voluntary. What was involuntary was being forced out of their true course, which was in any case inevitable.

The

"Mr.

In regard to my translation of magno sui cum periculo I need only to refer to the passages which I cited in my edition (page 443, n. 1) and which Mr. Wightman ignores. To their great peril", he says (133), rather than 'in great peril' is the proper rendering because the point to be emphasized is that danger was consequent upon persistence on the part of the shipmasters in keeping on as they were going". Persistence would have been followed not by danger but by destruction; but, since it was certain that the shipmasters, being sane, would not persist, it would seem that, according to Mr. Wightman, the danger was nil. Why, then, did Caesar mention it? Why, if deici necessarily implies "a danger point", did he add the words magno sui cum periculo?

As I said in The Classical Journal 9.174, "Certainly to anchor was a blunder in the sense that it was an attempt which failed-a blunder which the 'shipmasters' committed because they clung to the hope of being able to achieve the object of their voyage by landing the cavalry, which Caesar was anxiously awaiting". When we read that these shipmasters put to sea adversa nocte, may we not infer that "their more prudent comrades" had done so considerably earlier, though Mr. Wightman apparently thinks that the second movement was separated from the first by only a short interval of time?

to sea in the face of the night and make for the continnent". Mr. Wightman, venturing, as he says (131), to suggest that "anchors were not thrown out at all", that "the ablative absolute here puts an hypothetical case merely", and that "the subjunctive complerentur . . . is one of Ideal Certainty", offers the following alternative: "And though they were to cast anchor, yet since then on the other hand they would fill, these latter, as their only recourse, standing out to sea even in the face of the night, headed for the continent". Now it seems to me that Caesar's contemporary readers would have understood both the ablative absolute and the subjunctive in the same sense as his modern editors, and that, since in the one or two passages in which he admittedly uses a subjunctive of Ideal Certainty his meaning is unmistakable, if he had intended to convey that the ships did not anchor, he would have expressed his meaning differently. "I do not hesitate", writes Professor Postgate, whose judgment in questions of Latin scholarship carries weight, "to say that in my opinion your interpretation of the Latin words 'ancoris iactis cum fluctibus complerentur <naves>' in Caesar B. G. IV 28.3 is correct and that of Mr. Wightman inadmissible".

T. RICE HOLMES.

MR. WIGHTMAN'S REJOINDER

Assume the Gallic sailors to have cast anchor where he will, Mr. Holmes cannot escape this fact-and a very untoward one it is, coming as the sequel to his theorythe fact, namely, that the anchorage picked out, so far from being even comparatively sheltered, was such a storm-swept position that the vessels must be got out forthwith, as the one means by which to save them from foundering on the spot. One of two things follows: either the shipmasters had blundered again in not drawing close enough in under the land to make the most of such partial shelter as the point seemed to offer, or else, during the run to leeward, there was no shelter whatever to be found.

Upon either supposition the situation confronting this division of transports, once they were anchored, became similar to that which confronted the fleet of eighty which arrived earlier. Therefore I reaffirm that, as any handling of these latter is expressly declared by Caesar to have been impossible, handling can hardly be conceived as possible in the case of the former, the more so as they were in a water-logged condition.

Mr. Holmes cavils at the hypothesis which I put forward as a possible explanation of the fact that the one division of this flotilla of eighteen transports was not immediately handled in exactly the same manner as the other. Here he misconceives his adversary. I have not necessarily fallen into a dilemma because Mr. Holmes chooses so to represent me. The shipmasters in the division with which our discussion is concerned, in neglecting to tack on the instant, were, of course, so far acting deliberately. But my words cannot fairly be

construed to mean that they were at any time "deliberately moving in a gale towards a danger point to leeward in the groundless hope of finding smooth water near it". When they acted in the first instance, the danger consequent thereupon was not realized. There followed a brief interval during which, under overpowering pressure of wind and wave, they were being carried whither they would not. When next they acted deliberately, it was to turn their course away from the direction in which danger lay. That is, where deliberateness is present, danger so far as known is absent; when the element of danger appears, deliberateness as a factor disappears; when presently deliberateness reappears in the presence of danger, immediately the movement changes, and is directed not towards a danger point but away from it.

So easy it is to detect what is sophistical in Mr. Holmes's argument, and to show that what he fancied was a clear case against the seamanship for which I am answerable is, after all, wholly specious.

To the charge of vagueness, if vague I was, my answer is that Caesar himself had not seen fit at this point in his narrative to be so explicit as would seem to us to have been desirable, and I was resolved to heed the bounds of his reserve. Mr. Holmes, on the other hand, in determining to his own satisfaction the several positions successively taken by the transports off the coast, allows himself to do so with a circumstantiality which quite outruns the meagerness of the Latin text. Yet, for all that, his theory cannot be made to hold together. After putting the Gallic sailors in the light of blunderers, it caps the climax by attributing to them what is nothing short of an absurdity, and so wrecks itself utterly. Let us see. Mr. Holmes contends (Ancient Britain, 319) that the peril apprehended was that of 'broaching to' as the ships scudded before the gale. Eventually, according to Mr. Holmes, the ships were brought to anchor. Now before letting go anchors, they had, of course, to be put head to the wind or 'hove to' first, and this manoeuver, if it took place at all, must —as subsequently transpires—have taken place in the midst of a terrific seaway. Therefore, it would have been attended with the identical danger which, during the run to leeward, had lain in the possibility of 'broaching to', for the only difference between the two movements is that the latter would have been involuntary, whereas the former, that of 'heaving to', was purely voluntary. That is, Mr. Holmes's theory requires us to suppose that the shipmasters ended by deliberately doing what was essentially the very thing of which they had all along been so apprehensive, and against which, so far as watchful steering would avail, they had up to this moment studiously guarded.

To differ from the editors is, in the eyes of Mr. Holmes, a grave offense at least for anyone but himself. He forgets-what I was at pains to point outthat, whereas all the editors are in complete agreement upon two essential details, (1) the meaning of deicerentur, and (2) the nature of the peril intimated in magno

sui cum periculo, he has set up a theory which necessitates his breaking with them at both points. It was he, then, who first felt it necessary "to throw all the editors overboard", while I, finding Mr. Holmes himself no more satisfactory as a pilot than his predecessors, merely dropped him in addition over the taffrail.

As to my translation of the ablative absolute, I am persuaded, that, whatever else may be said against it, it involves no inherent impossibility. If hoc uno interfecto (Cicero, Cat. 1.30) taken in connection with posse, which is future in sense, is seen to be a disguised future protasis, why should not, by a perfectly logical extension, an ablative absolute when linked with a Subjunctive of Ideal Certainty become the equivalent of a forward looking clause introduced by etiam si? Certainly it would be very difficult for anyone to show that it could not. "Inadmissible", then, must be set down as a somewhat categorical pronouncement, even though it comes from so eminent a Latinist as Professor Postgate.

Nor is it of any avail for Mr. Holmes to argue that “if he (Caesar) had intended to convey that the ships did not anchor he would have expressed his meaning differently". This sort of reasoning presupposes that Caesar's language elsewhere is always unequivocal; and that is not true. Is priores, for instance (B. G. 7.82.4), substantive or adjective? Schneider holds the former to be true; Mr. Holmes (in his annotated edition) the latter.

My original impulse to discuss this passage came from conviction that the interpretation of it common to our School editions involved a violation of first principles of seamanship, that the situation had not been greatly improved by this later theory of Mr. Holmes, and that, therefore, neither the interpretation given by earlier editors nor Mr. Holmes's own could be retained unless we purposed to charge the Gallic seamen with a very lubberly performance, the shipmasters with incapacity, and Caesar himself with unwonted inadvertency to blundering on the part of his subordinates. To this I, for one, was-and am-averse. PHILLIPS ACADEMY, EXETER, N. H.

ALFRED R. WIGHTMAN.

I agree with Mr. Holmes that the vessels about which he, Mr. Wightman, and Mr. King (THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 9.167-168) have been writing did in fact anchor: to take ancoris iactis as equivalent to a conditional clause is to convict Caesar, more fully even than is necessary, of writing here without regard to clear

ness.

In reaching this conclusion I attach much weight to a word to which neither Mr. Holmes nor Mr. Wightman has given any attention-tamen (in the group quae tamen ancoris iactis, etc.). On either Mr. Holmes's or Mr. Wightman's view of ancoris iactis the position of tamen before these words is extraordinary. Even the tendency of the Romans to set tamen early in its clause

does not account for the position of the word here. Emphasizing the position of tamen as pointing a contrast to something exp essed or implied in the preceding clause, and taking ancoris iactis as equivalent to an adversative clause, I interpret the passage as follows:

no one of these ships could hold its course, but some were swept back to their starting-point, others to the lower (western) part of the island <so that at last they tried anchoring>, but since nevertheless, in spite of anchoring, they found that the billows were filling them, they of necessity, in the teeth of the night, put out toward deep water, and made for the continent.

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in this clause, perhaps because the inclusion of such a sed-clause within a sed-clause would be awkward. At any rate, the position of tamen proves to me that, before he wrote quae, Caesar had in mind the fact that the vessels under discussion did in fact anchor, as a last desperate resort. It is to this idea of anchoring that tamen is opposed; it is this idea of anchoring that ancoris iactis repeats.

I wonder that neither Mr. Holmes nor Mr. Wightman has noted the proof so clearly supplied by 4.29.1 that the Roman shipmasters were none too clever; they knew nothing about a very important fact connected with the tides in Oceano! It would be easy to do such shipmasters too much honor. Caesar, of course, had allowed himself none too much time to gather information about Britain and its surroundings; he tells us, also, in 4.20, that there was practically no information to be had, at least from the Gauls. In his campaign against the Veneti, also, he had to get his information in the school of experience1.

One point more may be discussed. Neither Mr. Holmes nor Mr. Wightman is exactly right about magno (sui) cum periculo. As cum shows, Caesar's idea is that the peril was a concomitant of the condition represented by deicerentur. A similar example is Cicero, Cat. 1.33:

Hisce ominibus, Catilina, cum summa rei publicae salute cum tua peste ac pernicie cumque eorum exitio, qui se tecum iunxerunt, proficiscere.

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REVIEWS

Lucian's Atticism: The Morphology of the Verb. By Roy J. Deferrari. Princeton University Dissertation. Princeton: Princeton University Press (1916). Pp. ix + 85.

As "the first results of an extended study of Lucian's language", Dr. Deferrari has classified and presented a large amount of material bearing upon verb-forms in Lucian. The work appears to have been well and carefully done, and its results should be of great value to future editors. In addition to full collections of evidence, the author has worked out a solution of certain knotty textual problems, such as those presented by yi(y)voμa、 and yɩ(y)vwσkw (pages 36 ff.) and by the confusion between εἶμι and ἔρχομαι (61 f.).

The canons thus established throw some light upon the question of the authenticity of certain pieces in the Lucianic corpus. The author thinks that his new evidence is by itself almost enough to condemn as spurious the Longaevi, Soloecista, Iudicium Vocalium, Asinus, and Amores. It would be safer to suspend judgment until the rest of the evidence is in, especially in the case of the Iudicium Vocalium, from which only two Hellenistic forms are cited.

Of more general interest is the demonstration that Lucian wrote a comparatively pure Attic style. Whereas some scholars have thought that many Atticisms in our manuscripts were due to an Atticising recension of the text, the truth is that "Lucian was more Attic, not less Attic, than as we know him". We cannot, however, share the author's opinion that practically all variations from the Attic norm "are the results of a definite purpose, not of ignorance". Probably such a statement as this would not be true of any writer of a dialect no longer spoken; the task which the Atticists set themselves was beyond human ability as well as utterly foolish.

The first three chapters (on Tт oг σσ, σμ oг μ, and Moveable) do not properly belong to a treatise on the morphology of the verb. They are matters of phonology, and call for treatment from the point of view of the history of sounds. The chapter on or σσ is particularly unsatisfactory. No clear distinction is made between literary (originally Epic) words such as áváσow and words which belonged to the Attic or Hellenistic vernacular. Neither is σ from ŋ (in κopúoow) distinguished from a representing earlier . In this connection we note that reference is made to old editions of Brugmann's and Hirt's Grammars, and that there is no mention of Buck's Introduction to the Study of the Greek Dialects, of Thumb's works on the dialects, the κown, and the modern language, or of Nachmanson's works on Hellenistic Greek.

Grace of style is scarcely to be expected in a statistical dissertation-even in one devoted to the study of style; but there is no excuse for such phrases as "the final in the spoken language was audibly pronounced", "the general run of Atticists", "the futuristic sense".

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

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E. H. STURTEVANT.

WORK IN CAESAR

In many Caesar classes all thought of the story has been made subordinate to drill on forms. Study of forms, however, should be only the means to the end, reading of Latin. The Caesar class of my own School days called for translation first and drill on forms following that. As a result, all interest was centered on the getting of the translation and immediately thereafter each pupil sat back hoping that no chance question would fall to his lot. When it did, there was a grand scramble, a guess, and it was all over until the next shot, without our feeling the last part of the class had any connection with the first.

To all pupils Caesar should be a real man with all the qualities and the characteristics ascribed to him in Professor Lodge's article (THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 10. 106-110). The best place for the consideration of these points is the class and the work can best be done when the material is new. I have tried a method very successfully-sight translation before the advance lesson is assigned. This makes the drill on forms a vital part of the work; the analysis of the sentence, the case-constructions and the word-order must be considered. Likewise, here is the opportunity for interpretation by the pupil as the new words and additional details come to his attention and he is forced to take notice of them by the teacher. Enthusiasm is generated by the very use of new material. Besides, the method produces an ability to read more rapidly. The sight work in class carries with it all the fun and joy of solving a puzzle. The recitation lesson is really a review. The real studying of Latin is done in class under direct supervision.

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THE CLASSICAL CLUB OF PHILADELPHIA

The 131st meeting of The Classical Club of Philadelphia was held on Friday, March 2. Professor A. J. Carnoy, of the University of Pennsylvania (late of the University of Louvain) spoke on The Classics in Belgium-the development of classical study in Belgium, the history of the University of Louvain, the great scholars connected with it, the development of State education in Belgium down to 1914, and the priceless literary treasures destroyed in the burning of Louvain, not by shell fire but by deliberate incendiarism officially ordered.

Professor Stephen Langdon, of the University of Oxford, spoke of English classical training, and of its thoroughly practical results in the work accomplished by England's classically trained statesmen, soldiers and colonial administrators. As a personal friend of Mr. Asquith and Lord Kitchener, he told how the former could turn unhesitatingly from brilliant ex tempore speech in English to brilliant ex tempore speech in Latin, and how the latter could quote with ease from a wide range of Latin and Greek authors. B. W. MITCHELL, Secretary.

NOCTES ATTICAE

Noctes Atticae, the Classical Society of Trinity College, Washington, D. C., meets bi-weekly. It is studying Roman antiquities-Children, Education, Parental Authority, the House, A Roman Day, Festivals, and Trade. The Society, now in its fourth year, has had a flourishing existence. Its activities include Latin plays in the original, dramatic readings from Plautus, Terence, and Theocritus, and discussions of articles in THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY.

KATHLEEN R. EAGAN, Secretary.

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Entered as second-class matter November 18, 1907, at the Post Office, New York, N. Y., under the Act of Congress of March 1, 1879

VOL. X

CAESAR, B.G. 2.8

NEW YORK, MARCH 26, 1917

In October, 1912, Mr. C. R. Jeffords, of the Boys' High School, Brooklyn, wrote me as follows:

I was much interested in the review of T. R. Holmes, Caesar's conquest of Gaul2, by Professor Dennison (THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 6.30-31). I have never been able to understand how the words in Caesar, B. G. 2.8, ab utroque latere eius collis transversam fossam obduxit, can be interpreted to fit the map generally given to illustrate this part of Caesar's narrative. That map represents the trenches at one end of the hill. Aside from the wording of the description, it seems odd that these trenches should extend in front and in back of the

No. 21

I find myself in complete accord with Mr. Holmes's two excellent discussions of this battle, and the preparations Caesar made for it. When will students of the Classics learn that, to find the meaning of a passage, they must, to use a scientist's term, sterilize that passage, that is, they must first of all examine the ipsissima verba of the passage, without regard to what has been written about it? This Mr. Holmes has done. Whoever does it, will conclude, as Mr. Jeffords saw, that there was a trench on each flank of Caesar's army. If Colonel Stoffel's excavations do not agree with Caesar's

right flank, as usually represented, instead of in front of description, it is plain that Colonel Stoffel was digging

both left and right flanks. If you have a copy of Holmes's book handy, I should be obliged for information as to how the new map on page 71 represents these trenches.

In some way this letter was mislaid, and did not come to light till lately. On looking up the map, and comparing (or, rather, contrasting) it with Caesar's words, I found myself sharing Mr. Jeffords's doubts. In one of the most recent editions of Caesar, that by Dr. A. L. Hodges (Macmillan, 1905), the map is given in connection with the text, on page 95, without comment. The single comment in the Notes on the map (pages 317-318), however, shows that Dr. Hodges was troubled by the map:

pro castris: the front of a camp should be the side towards the enemy. A glance at the plan shows that here no side exactly fronted the Belgian lines, but it seems pretty certain that Caesar meant by the front the part facing westward.

Turning now to Holmes, Caesar's Conquest of Gaul2, one finds that, to face page 71, Mr. Holmes gave a plan labelled "Operations on the Aisne (According to Col. Stoffel)". But it is clear from page 73, and still more from pages 659-661, that Mr. Holmes did not accept this plan. In his annotated edition of the De Bello Gallico (Oxford, 1914)1, Mr. Holmes gives the same map, to face page 73, but again, on pages 74-75, he makes it plain that he does not accept the plan. It is most unfortunate that he did not, in each of his books, indicate clearly, on the plan itself, that it was, in his judgment, incorrect, and not in accord with Caesar's words. Many will look at a map or a plan who have not time or patience to read through what is said about

it.

Reviewed by Professor Lodge, in THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 9. 37-39.

in the wrong place. Some one who has the ability to draw should give us a plan of this battle based on what Caesar actually says.

After writing the above, I looked at the note in Meusel's annotated edition of De Bello Gallico 1-4

Kraner-Dittenberger. Weidmann, Berlin, 1913). He rejects Colonel Stoffel's view that the battle was fought near Berry-au-Bac (Mauchamp):

Hat die Schlacht wirklich dort stattgefunden, wofür ja allerdings manches spricht, so muss man mancherlei Ungenauigkeiten in Caesars Bericht annehmen.

In looking back at the sixteenth edition of this book, I found that as long ago as 1898 Dittenberger had taken issue squarely with Stoffel's conclusions, and had insisted that there was a trench at each side.

Sollten die Befestigungen, welche bei den Napoleonischen Ausgrabungen <conducted by Colonel Stoffel> aufgefunden worden sind

wirklich

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