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is past doubt, there must be some real constitution, on which any collection of simple ideas co-existing must depend. But it being evident, that things are ranked under names into sorts or species, only as they agree to certain abstract ideas, to which we have annexed those names: the essence of each genus, or sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract idea, which the general, or sortal (if I may have leave so to call it from sort, as I do general from genus) name stands for. And this we shall find to be that which the word essence imports in its most familiar use. These two sorts of essences, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, the one the real, the other nominal essence.

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16. Between the nominal essence and Constant the name, there is so near a connexion, that connexion` the name of any sort of things cannot be between the attributed to any particular being but what name and nominal eshas this essence, whereby it answers that abstract idea, whereof that name is the sign.

sence.

to §. 17. Concerning the real essences of cor- Supposition, poreal substances, (to mention these only) that species there are, if I mistake not, two opinions. guished by The one is of those, who using the word ther real essence for they know not what, suppose a essences, certain number of those essences, according useless. }^ to which all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and so become of this or that species. The other, and more rational opinion, is of those who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown constitution of their insensi ble parts; from which flow those sensible qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another, according as we have occasion to rank them into sorts under common denominations. The former of these opinions, which supposes these essences, as a certain number of forms or moulds, wherein all natural things, that exist, are cast, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed the knowledge of natural things. The frequent productions of monsters, in all the species of animals, and of changelings, and other

strange issues of human birth, carry with them difficulties, not possible to consist with this hypothesis: since it is as impossible, that two things, partaking exactly of the same real essence, should have different properties, as that two figures partaking of the same real essence of a circle should have different properties. But were there no other reason against it, yet the sup position of essences that cannot be known, and the making of them nevertheless to be that which distinguishes the species of things, is so wholly useless, and unserviceable to any part of our knowledge, that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by, and content ourselves with such essences of the sorts or species of things as come within the reach of our knowledge: which, when seriously considered, will be found, as I have said, to be nothing else but those abstract com plex ideas, to which we have annexed distinct general

names.

Real and nominal essence the same in

simple ideas

different in

§. 18. Essences being thus distinguished into nominal and real, we may farther observe, that in the species of simple ideas and modes, they are always the same; but and modes, in substances always quite different. Thus a figure including a space between three substances. lines, is the real as well as nominal essence of a triangle; it being not only the abstract idea to which the general name is annexed, but the very essentia or be ing of the thing itself, that foundation from which all its properties flow, and to which they are all inseparably annexed. But it is far otherwise concerning that parcel of matter, which makes the ring on my finger, wherein these two essences are apparently different. For it is the real constitution of its insensible parts, on which depend all those properties of colour, weight, fusibility, fixedness, &c. which are to be found in it, which constitution we know not, and so having no particular idea of, have no name that is the sign of it. But yet it is its colour, weight, fusibility, fixedness, &c. which makes it to be gold, or gives it a right to that name, which is therefore its nominal essence: since nothing can be called gold but what has a conformity of quali

ties to that abstract complex idea, to which that name is annexed. But this distinction of essences belonging particularly to substances, we shall, when we come to consider their names, have an occasion to treat of more fully.

§. 19. That such abstract ideas, with Essences innames to them, as we have been speaking generable óf, are essences, may farther appear by and incorwhat we are told concerning essences, viz. ruptible. that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the real constitutions of things which begin and perish with them. All things that exist, besides their author, are all liable to change; especially those things we are acquainted with, and have ranked into bands under distinct names or ensigns. Thus that which was grass to-day, is to-morrow the flesh of a sheep; and within a few days after becomes part of a man: in all which, and the like changes, it is evident their real essence, i. e. that constitution, whereon the properties of these several things depended, is destroyed and perishes with them. But essences being taken for ideas, established in the mind, with names annexed to them, they are supposed to remain steadily the same, whatever mutations the particular substances are liable to. For whatever becomes of Alexander and Bucephalus, the ideas to which man and horse are annexed, are supposed nevertheless to remain the same; and so the essences of those species are preserved whole and undestroyed, whatever changes happen to any, or all of the individuals of those species. By this means the essence of a species rests safe and entire, without the existence of so much as one individual of that kind. For were there now no circle existing any where in the world, (as perhaps that figure exists not any where ex actly marked out) yet the idea annexed to that name would not cease to be what it is; nor cease to be as a pattern to determine which of the particular figures we meet with have or have not a right to the name circle, and so to show which of them by having that essence, was of that species. And though there neither were nor had been in nature such a beast as an unicorn, or

such a fish as a mermaid; yet supposing those names tó stand for complex abstract ideas that contained no in consistency in them, the essence of a mermaid is as intelligible as that of a man; and the idea of an unicorn as certain, steady, and permanent as that of a horse. From what has been said it is evident, that the doctrine of the immutability of essences proves them to be only abstract ideas; and is founded on the relation established between them, and certain sounds as signs of them and will always be true' as long as the same name can have the same signification.

Recapitulation.

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§. 20. To conclude, this is that which in short I would say, viz. that all the great business of genera and species, and their essences, amounts to no more but this, That men making abstract ideas, and settling them in their minds with names annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves to consider things, and discourse of them as it were in in bundles, for the easier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge; which would advance but slowly, were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars.

Names of simple

ideas, modes, and substances," have each something peculiar.

CHA P. IV.

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Of the Names of Simple Ideas. ar3 913 10

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§. 1. THOUGH all words, as I have shown, signify nothing immediately but the ideas in the mind of the speaker ; yet upon a nearer survey we shall find that the names of simple ideas, mixed modes, (under which I comprise relations too) and natural substances, have each of them something peculiar and different from the other. For example: 1. Names of §. 2. First, The names of simple ideas simple ideas and substances, with the abstract ideas in and sub the mind, which they immediately signify,

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intimate also some real existence, from stances inti which was derived their original pattern. mate real

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But the names of mixed modes terminate

existence.

in the idea that is in the mind, and lead not the thoughts any farther, as we shall see more at large in the following chapter.

§. 3. Secondly, The names of simple 2. Names of ideas and modes signify always the real as simple ideas well as nominal essence of their species. and modes But the names of natural substances signify ways both signify alrarely, if ever, any thing but barely the no- real and minal essences of those species; as we shall nominal esshow in the chapter that treats of the names of substances in particular. §. 4. Thirdly, The of simple s. Names of ideas are not capable of any definition; the simple ideas names of all complex ideas are. It has undefinable. not, that I know, been yet observed by

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names

sence.

any body, what words are, and what are not capable of being defined; the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the occasion of great wrangling and obscurity in men's discourses, whilst some demand definitions of terms that cannot be defined; and others think they ought not to rest satisfied in an explication made by a more general word, and its restriction, (or, to speak in terms of art, by a genus and difference) when even after such definition made according to rule, those who hear it have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the word than they had before. This at least I think, that the showing what words are, and what are not capable of definitions, and wherein consists a good definition, is not wholly besides our present purpose; and perhaps will afford so much light to the nature of these signs, and our ideas, as to deserve a more particular consideration.

dig. 5. I will not here trouble myself to If all were prove that all terms are not definable from definable, it that progress in infinitum, which it will would be a visibly lead us into,if we should allow process in infinitum. that all names could be defined. For if the term of one definition were still to be defined by

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