late editions of Mr. Locke's works are already clogged with too many of that kind; however I fhall give one of thefe for a fpecimen, on raising the value of coin, as the fame method which he there recommends, viz. of weighing it, has of late been practifed. See the letter in Vol. IX. of this edition, p. 320. The two letters from lord Shaftesbury and fir Peter King, will speak for themselves.

II. It may likewife be observed, that our author has met with the fate of moft eminent writers, whofe names give a currency to whatever paffes under them, viz. to have many spurious productions fathered on him. Befide those abovementioned, there is a Common-place Book to the Bible, first published in 1693, and afterwards fwelled out with a great deal of matter, ill digefted, and all declared to be Mr. Locke's; but whatever hand he might be fuppofed to have in the original book itself, it is plain he had none in that preface, which is neither fenfe nor english. A puerile edition of Efop's Fables has likewife his name prefixed to it, and was in all probability afcribed to him for no better reason than the frequent mention_made of that book in his Thoughts on Education. The title runs thus Efop's Fables in english and latin, interlineary, for the benefit of those who, not having a master, would 'learn either of thofe tongues. The fecond edition, with sculptures. By John Locke, gent. Printed for A. Betterworth, 1723.'

12. But it is high time to conduct the reader to Mr. Locke's more authentic and capital productions, the conftant demand for which shows that they have stood the test of time, and their peculiar tendency to enlarge and improve the mind, muft continue that demand while a regard to virtue or religion, science or common fense remains amongst us. I wish it were in my power to give fo clear and just a view of thefe as might ferve to point out their proper uses, and thereby direct young unprejudiced readers to a more beneficial ftudy of them. The Effay on Human Understanding, that most distinguished of all his works, is to be confidered as a fyftem, at its first appearance abfolutely new, and directly oppofite to the notions and perfuafions then eftablished

blished in the world. Now as it feldom happens thatthe perfon who first suggests a discovery in any science is at the fame time folicitous, or perhaps qualified to' lay open all the confequences that follow from it; in fuch a work much of courfe is left to the reader, who must carefully apply the leading principles to many cafes and conclufions not there fpecified. To what elfe but a neglect of this application fhall we impute it that there are ftill numbers amongst us who profefs to pay the greatest deference to Mr. Locke, and to be well acquainted with his writings, and would perhaps take it ill to have this pretenfion queftioned; yet appear either wholly unable, or unaccustomed, to draw the natural confequence from any one of his principal pofitions? Why, for inftance, do we ftill continue fo unfettled in the first principles and foundation of morals? How came we not to perceive that by the very fame arguments which that great author used with so much fuccefs in extirpating innate ideas, he most effectually eradicated all innate or connate fenfes, instincts, &c.. by not only leading us to conclude that every fuch sense muft, in the very nature of it, imply an object correfpondent to and of the fame ftanding with itself, to which it refers [as each relative implies its correlate], the real existence of which object he has confuted in every fhape; but alfo by fhowing that for each moral propofition men actually want and may demand a reafon or proof deduced from another science, and founded on natural good and evil; and confequently where no fuch reafon can be affigned, these fame fenfes, or instincts, with whatever titles decorated, whether ftyled fympathetic or sentimental, common or intuitive, ought to be looked upon as no more than mere habits; under: which familiar name their authority is foon difcovered, and their effects accounted for.

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See a very accurate explanation of Mr. Locke's doctrine on this head and fome others, in a Philofophical Difcourfe on the Nature of Human Being, prefixed to fome Remarks upon bp. Berkley's Treatifė, on the fame fubject. Printed for Dodsley, 1776.

From

From the fame principles it may be collected that all fuch pompous theories of morals, however, feemingly diverfified, yet amount ultimately to the fame thing, being all built upon the fame falfe bottom of innate notions; and from the hiftory of this fcience we may fee that they have received no manner of improvement (as indeed by the fuppofition of their innatenefs they become incapable of any) from the days of Plato to our own; but muft always take the main point, the ground of obligation, for granted: which is in truth the fhorteft and fafeft way of proceeding for fuch felftaught philofophers, and faves a deal of trouble in feeking reafons for what they advance, where none are to be found. Mr. Locke went a far different way to work, at the very entrance on his Effay, pointing out the true origin of all our paffions and affections, i. e. fenfitive pleasure and pain; and accordingly directing us to the proper principle and end of virtue, private happinefs, in each individual; as well as laying down the adequate rule and only folid ground of moral obligation, the divine will. From whence alfo it may well be concluded that moral propofitions are equally capable of certainty, and that fuch certainty is equally reducible to ftrict demonftration here as in other fciences, fince they confift of the very fame kind of ideas, [viz. general abstract ones, the true and only ground of all general knowledge]; provided always that the terms be once clearly fettled, in which lies the chief difficulty, and arc conftantly applied (as furely they may be) with equal fteadiness and precifion: which was undoubtedly Mr. Locke's meaning in that affertion of his which drew upon him fo many folicitations to fet about fuch a fyftematic demonftration of morals.

In the fame plain and popular introduction, when he has been proving that men think not always, [a pofition which, as he obferves, letter to Molyneux, august 4, 1696, was then admitted in a commencement act at Cambridge for probable, and which few there now adays are found weak enough to question] how come we not to attend him through the genuine confequences of that proof? This would foon let us into the true nature

of

of the human conftitution, and enable us to determine whether thought, when every mode of it is fufpended, though but for an hour, can be deemed an effential property of our immaterial principle, or mind, and as fuch infeparable from fome imaginary fubftance, or fubftratum, [words, by the bye, fo far as they have a meaning, taken entirely from matter, and terminating in it] any more than motion, under its various modifications, can be judged effential to the body, or to a purely material fyftem *. Of that fame fubftance or fubftratum, whether material or immaterial, Mr. Locke has farther fhown us that we can form but a very imperfect and confufed idea, if in truth we have any idea at all of it, though custom and an attachment to the established mode of philofophifing ftill prevails to fuch a degree that we scarcely know how to proceed without it, and are apt to make as much noife with fuch logical terms and diftinctions, as the schoolmen used to do with their principle of individuation, fubftantial forms, &c. Whereas, if we could be perfuaded to quit every arbitrary hypothefis, and truft to fact and experience, a found fleep any night would yield fufficient fatisfaction in the prefent cafe, which thus may derive light even from the darkest parts of nature; and which will the more merit our regard, fince the fame point has been in fome measure confirmed to us by revelation, as our author has likewife fhown in his introduction to the Reasonableness of Chriftianity.

re tha

The abovementioned effay contains fome more refined fpeculations which are daily gaining ground among thoughtful and intelligent perfons, notwithstanding the neglect and the contempt to which ftudies of this kind

* Vide Defence of Locke's Opinion concerning Perfonal Identity. Appendix to the Theory of Religion, p. 431, &c. and note 1. to abp. King's Or. of E. Sir Ifaac Newton had the very fame fentiments. with thofe of our author on the prefent fubject, and more particularly on that state to which he was approaching; as appears from a conver fation held with him a little before his death, of which I have been informed by one who took down fir Ifaac's words at the time, and fince read them to me.

are

are frequently expofed. And when we confider the force of bigotry, and the prejudice in favour of antiquity which adheres to narrow minds, it must be matter of furprife to find fo fmall a number of exceptions made to fome of his difquifitions which lie out of the common road.

That well-known chapter of Power has been termed the worst part of his whole effay *, and feems indeed the leaft defenfible, and what gave himself the leaft fatisfaction, after all the pains he and others took to reform it; [v. Letters between him and Molyneux and Limborch. To which may be added note 45 to King's Or. of E. p. 220, 4th edit.] which might induce one to believe that this moft intricate fubject is placed beyond human reach; fince fo penetrating a genius confeffes his inability to fee through it. And happy are those inquirers who can difcern the extent of their faculties! who have learnt in time where to stop and fufpend a pofitive determination! If you will argue,' fays he, for or againft liberty from confequences, I will not undertake to answer you; for I own freely to you the weakness of my understanding, that though it be unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God our maker, yet I cannot make 'freedom in man confiftent with omnipotence and om'nifcience in God, though I am as fully perfuaded of 'both as of any truths I moft firmly affent to; and therefore I have long left off the confideration of that queftion, refolving all into this fhort conclufion: that if it be poffible for God to make a free agent, then man is free; though I fee not the way of it.' Letter to M. jan. 20, 169.

13. Connected in fome fort with the forementioned effay, and in their way equally valuable, are his tracts on Education and the early Conduct of the Understanding, both worthy, as we apprehend, of a more careful perufal than is commonly beftowed upon them, the latter more especially, which feems to be little known and lefs attended to. It contains an eafy popular illuf

Biogr. Brit. though others are pleased to ftyle it the finest.

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