exercise that charity, which is not puffed up, is not easily provoked, which endureth all things and hopeth all things. If this be so, and those who have had much experience of life, will acknowledge, that, though there are exceptions, it is true, as a general position, if intercourse with others through a life of active and extensive business, be a good discipline for the moral nature, if it teach a man to command himself, to respect others, to do them justice, and exercise towards them charity, then of course it fails not of a rich reward though it be overwhelmed in temporal failure, and ill-success. It helps to form the character for Heaven, to fit it for a life of higher action, greater responsibilities, nobler duties. If it has made a man faithful over the few things committed to his charge here, it will fit him to become ruler over many things hereafter. S. K. L. RELIGIOUS DISPUTES. "I WISH people would not dispute about religion," exclaimed a gay young friend of mine lately; "if they do not agree in their sentiments, I wish they would not talk on the subject at all." "Why so?" asked I. "Why, what good does it do? Neither party ever convinces the other." “Not often, I confess; yet if the disputers are seeking truth rather than victory, good must come of it." "But they get angry; and good never can come of that.” the fault of the individuals, not People who are naturally amiable, or who have brought their tempers under government, may and do discuss religious as well as other exciting topics with calmness." 66 Very true; but the anger is of the subject they discuss. A long conversation followed; and when my young friend left me to a twilight reverie, I could not help remembering the time when I indulged the same feelings she had just expressed. I too had been prejudiced against religious discussions between those of opposite sentiments. I had seen people maintain their different opinions with warmth and acrimony, and had asked myself, "is it possible these men are talking of Relig ion ?" In my youth and inexperience, I did not discriminate between the frailties of the individuals and the spirit of their employment. I thought the spirit of that employment was strife. Now, late in life, I see wherein my want of discrimination led me astray; and realize that to controversy I have myself been under great obligations. Surrounded by those professing the Unitarian faith, accustomed to attend from childhood at a Unitarian church, and having seldom perused any sermons or treatises on doctrinal points, I was little acquainted with any tenets but those of the friends in whose judgment and piety I had implicit confidence. I was not absolutely ignorant in what respects our faith differed from that of some with whom we associated; but sure, I hardly knew why, that I was in the right path, these differences did not interest me or excite any speculation in my mind. Consequently I was not aware of the whole beauty, simplicity, and strength of the faith I held. In process of time, a family with whom I was intimate began to waver in their faith, and finally avowed themselves orthodox. During the period of their doubts they often stated to me the impressions which were influencing them. I could not sympathise with these impressions. They told me what doctrines they were learning to believe; I could not believe in them too; and it was necessary that I should say why I could not. I often found that I could not readily tell why, because I was unprepared. I had in fact gone unawares and unarmed upon the field of religious disputation, and my feelings were engaged in it before my prejudices were alarmed. The consequence was, that I was led to read, study, and reflect; and became anxious to be satisfied, as to the truth of that which I had always believed without investigation. And I was satisfied. I saw too that it is proper for every human being to ascertain as far as he has opportunity and ability, what he believes to be religious truth, and why he believes it to be so. I would urge upon the young of every denomination to take no religious opinions entirely upon trust, not from the most learned and devout of pastors or parents. The knowledge a man has gained by his own studies and reflections will be held fast. He will know how to defend a belief whose foundation is laid in his own heart; the consciousness that it has been well-studied, will afford him a peculiar satisfaction; and enable him to discuss opposite sentiments with self-possession and calmness. Let no one then shrink from conversing on religious topics with those of different opinions; it is one way—when not abused of keeping alive interest on the subject within these worldly hearts of ours. But let no man open his lips in such argument unless he can command his temper, unless he means to be candid. And above all, let no young person enter upon it, unless he is willing to study the Scriptures much and reflect deeply; then will the discussion give precise objects to his investigations, and tend to make him better understand and enjoy his faith. L. J. P. FROM THE GERMAN. The day of life is not all desolate ; Are bright when Love confideth. E. N. T. NOTICES OF BOOKS. THE THEORY AND USES OF NATURAL RELIGION: Being 1839. Boston: THIS Discourse exhibits the argument for the being of a God, examines some of the atheistic theories, treats of each of the attributes of the divine nature and character, attempts the reconcilement of foreknowledge with free will, and of infinite goodness with the existence of evil, discusses the degree of certainty which the light of nature alone gives to the doctrines of immortality and retribution, and explains the proper uses and improvement of the principles of natural religion. We have heard it objected that it undertakes too much. It may be but we think the execution furnishes as complete a justification of the design as the case admits of. A profitable hearing of this discourse must have severely tasked the attention of the hearers; but the effort required is such as is demanded by the inherent abstruseness of the subject; no unnecessary requisitions are made by the manner in which the argument is presented, which is remarkably lucid. The author is enabled to get over so much ground, by saying at once under every topic the thing most to the point that is to be said. so; The reasoning by which the solution of that knotty problem, the reconcilement of the omniscience of God with the free agency of man is attempted, does, we must confess, like all the reasoning we have ever met on the subject, fail of satisfy ing us. It is said, in brief, that the actions of one being are not dependent upon, or determined by, the belief of another being respecting those actions; that a sagacious man can often form a judgment of the future actions of another, which is verified by the event, and yet had no influence on the will of the agent, and was wholly unknown to him; that this faculty may be supposed to be absolutely perfect in God, who may thus unerringly foresee all the acts of all his intelligent creatures, and his foreknowledge cannot be said, any more than in the case of finite sagacity, to determine the event which it foreknows. We cannot regard the admission of these propositions as decisive of the whole question. Foreknowledge may have no physical influence on the acts of an intelligent agent, and yet if such foreknowledge exists, it may follow by logical necessity, that those acts cannot be free. The action may not be performed because it is foreknown, but the fact that it is with any degree of certainty foreknown, can depend only on the fact that it is to some extent determined by invariable and calculable laws, and so far subject to necessity. If there is a being who foreknows the future acts of an agent with the certainty with which an eclipse can be predicted, it can only be because those acts are governed by as fixed laws as those which regulate the phenomena of an eclipse. In the argument we are considering, an analogy is drawn between the divine foreknowledge and human sagacity in judging of the future actions of men; but the analogy fails in two important particulars. The judgments of men in such cases often prove fallacious, and even when they have been subsequently verified by the event, they were felt when formed to be conjectures, to have by no means the degree of certainty which belongs to events depending on known physical laws. Whence this difference ? Does it arise solely from the imperfection of human faculties, or from the inherently contingent and unknowable nature of voluntary actions? If we suppose the former, we deny free agency; if the latter, then God cannot, any more than men, foreknow the future |