view of the matter is well stated by Hengstenberg in that passage which Dr. Fairbairn quoted. "Beyond all doubt," he says, "when the prophet denounces the divine judgments, he proceeds on the assumption that the people will not repent--an assumption which he knows from God to be true. Were the people to repent, the prediction would fail; but because they will not, it is uttered absolutely."

It might have been expected that the contradiction between this theory of the conditionality of all prophecy and the Mosaic criterion of a true prophet, would have opened Dr Fairbairn's eyes to the untenableness of his views. God, by the mouth of Moses, informed the people that if they should "say in their heart, How shall we know the word which the Lord hath not spoken?" the test was to be the following: "When a prophet speaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to pass, that is the thing which the Lord hath not spoken, but the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously: thou shalt not be afraid of him" (Deut. xviii. 21, 22). Now, if there be no predictions the accomplishment of which is certain and infallible beforehand-if all prophecy is conditional, depending for its fulfilment on the changeful conditions of men, how is this test to be applied? An impostor arises, utters a prediction, and confidently appeals to its fulfilment as a proof of the authenticity of his mission. The prophecy fails of accomplishment, and the irritated people lay hold of the deceiver to stone him according to the law. "Hold," he says; "notwithstanding appearances, my prediction is a true one-but for certain events which have occurred in the meantime, it would have been fulfilled; but all prophecy is contingent, and I am not to be charged as an impostor because in virtue of certain intervening circumstances my prediction has seemed to fail." No doubt it may be said that such a case might have occurred to Jonah, when his prophecy against Nineveh was not fulfilled. This is true, and therefore divines have endeavoured, with more or less success, to shew how true prophecies might be distinguished from those which were intended to be only threatenings of what God would do if there were no intervening repentance. Let it even be admitted that it is difficult to draw the line of distinction between the prophetia predestinationis and the prophetia comminationis, then how much more insoluble does the case become on Dr Fairbairn's theory, that all prophecy is contingent! The detection of an impostor might be difficult on the Calvinistic plan, but on Dr Fairbairn's it is absolutely impossible. This objection to his theory is noticed very slightly in his work. All he says regarding it is, that "the introduc

tion of a conditional principle might occasionally afford some excuse to a mere pretender for evading the condemnation due to him on the failure of his prediction, and might even sometimes render it a matter of doubt how far a divine prediction should be expected to have a fulfilment according to its terms" (Prophecy, p. 62). We submit that this is not by any means a sufficiently strong statement. The real effect of introducing the conditional element is, that no impostor could ever be convicted, and thus the test would become entirely nugatory.

Let us, however, proceed from the discussion of abstract principles to the examination of the particular instances which Dr Fairbairn brings forward. Here, if we mistake_not, the vindication of our views will be still more complete. Dr Fairbairn divides all prophecy into two classes, the first "having more especial reference to the divine purposes in behalf of men, and the other to the divine procedure towards men" (Prophecy, p. 62). This distinction appears to us to be no distinction at all. The divine purposes and the divine procedure must always go together. God's conduct towards men must ever be guided by His purposes in behalf of men; and it is impossible to separate the prophecies which relate to the one from those which belong to the other. Or if Dr Fairbairn intended in his first class to include such revelations as God has made of His intentions and purposes, and in his second such manifestations of His will as God may have been pleased to make in the way of promise, or rebuke, or exhortation, or threatening, then he has overstepped his own definition of prophecy, which applies only to the first class; and, moreover, his division is but a clumsy and inaccurate mode of expressing the distinction already adverted to between prophecy of predestination and prophecy of warning-a distinction which, when stated in the more precise and intelligible language of the older divines, he expressly repudiates in the work now before us.

Without further criticising his definitions, we shall now examine how his principles bear upon the prophecies regarding Christ, which Dr Fairbairn includes in the first of his two classes that is to say, the original promise-the promises to Abraham and to David; the predictions as to the person, work, and administration of the Redeemer, and the final results and triumphs of His kingdom. Our author's fundamental principle, that all prophecy is conditional, is thus applied to this class of predictions:-"The utmost that can be conceived of anything conditional," in respect to them, "is, that in the time and mode of their accomplishment they may in a degree have been made

to turn upon the course of things in the world" (Prophecy, p. 63). Why is this the utmost that can be conceived? Why may the contingency not extend further than to time and mode of accomplishment? Because, says Dr Fairbairn, they are "matters entering into the very core of the divine government of the world, and are the settled results of the eternal principles on which all was to proceed." Because "the ultimate ground and reason of these purposes must be in God himself" (p. 62). We shall inquire presently whether these reasons are sufficient to justify the limitations; but in the meantime we must remark, that in such prophecies regarding Christ as are here referred to, God has either announced the mode and time of their accomplishment, or He has not. If He has not, there is obviously no ground for imagining any contingency as affecting the time and mode of their fulfilment. If He has announced the time and mode, there is still no room for supposing any contingency, unless the time and mode announced have failed to correspond with the accomplishment of these predictions. This last alternative, then, is the one which Dr Fairbairn must intend; and mark whither it leads us. God has declared the time and mode in which a certain event is to come to pass, and yet it has not come to pass at that time, or in that manner. Either, then, God has announced what was not His decree or intention; or, if His announcement was His intention, then that intention must have been changed, for it has not come to pass. Thus the conditionality of the announcement involves the conditionality of the decree, so far at least as time and mode are concerned. We now return to the question, whether there is any sufficient reason for limiting this conditionality, as our author does, to the time and mode of the fulfilment of these predictions. The reasons given for this limitation amount to this, that in what is essential the principles of God's government are unchangeable, but that in matters not essential, such as time and mode, they are contingent, or subject to change. But who shall say what is essential or what is non-essential in the plans of the divine procedure? This is a distinction unknown to Calvinists, who have always maintained that in all respects the decrees of God are absolute. He has foreordained all things, even time and mode. On the other hand, it could be easy to produce from the works of Arminians, writing in defence of their theory, statements perfectly identical with those which Dr Fairbairn has here put forward. And while we do not believe, and have no wish to assert, that Dr Fairbairn is disposed to repudiate the Westminster Confession, we do affirm that he has laid down principles, which, if pressed to their

legitimate consequences, do subvert the great doctrine that God has absolutely decreed whatsoever comes to pass.

It may perhaps appear to our readers that it is impossible that views so suspicious could have been put forward by one who maintains his orthodoxy as tried by the Westminster Confession. They will think that we must have misunderstood him. We wish we could believe this to be possible, but unfortunately the statements with which we are dealing are too explicit to leave room for uncertainty. The example which he gives to illustrate his views, places the matter beyond the possibility of doubt. The prophecies regarding the second coming of Christ are selected by him as instances of what he means. They are absolute, he says, in regard to the fact of His coming, but contingent in regard to the time and mode of His advent. The fulfilment of these predictions has "been protracted beyond what the natural import of the language night have seemed to indicate, on account of the forbearance of God. There has been the operation of a contingent element, to the effect of delaying longer than the original predictions might have led us to expect the actual occurrence of the event predicted" (Prophecy, pp. 63, 64). Such language, or rather we should say, such opinions, however expressed, are wholly inconsistent with any intelligent apprehension of the doctrines of Calvinism.

We now come to the consideration of the other class of prophecies-those "which have respect to the divine procedure towards men." The characteristic of these, when compared with the former class, is, that in them" the conditional character of prophecy has often been prominently exhibited, and must always virtually, if not formally and expressly, enter into its announcement of things to come" (Prophecy, p. 66). We have already ventured to hint that this distinction between the two classes is not very clearly defined; and the more closely we examine the features of this latter class, as drawn by Dr Fairbairn, the more convinced are we that it answers to the prophetia comminationis-the prophecies of warning-of the older divines. The leading example which he gives of this class is the case of Nineveh, which is also the instance commonly quoted by these divines. In these prophecies, he says, "the conditional character is often prominently exhibited, and must always virtually enter into its announcements." Such exactly is the fact with "prophecies of warning," as in the cases of Nineveh and Hezekiah. Dr Fairbairn accounts for this prominent exhibition of conditionality, by calling our attention (firstly) to the moral aim of these prophecies; that is, we suppose, God's intention by means

of warnings and threatenings to lead men to repentance. Here also, then, the identity is conspicuous. And (secondly) the anthropomorphic manner of these prophecies is put forward to account for their conditionality; that is to say, God "addresses the subjects of His threatening or promise more from a human than from a divine point of view". a sentence in which Dr Fairbairn seems himself to admit that the class of prophecy with which he is dealing is, in fact, that which is known by the name of prophetia comminationis. Let us remind our readers that he repudiates this distinction of the older divines, with a certain lofty assumption of superiority, as unsatisfactory to his "exegetical conscience" (Manual, p. vii.); and we think they will admit with us, that that exegetical conscience is peculiar which can allow the distinction between such prophecies as enter into the very core of the divine government of the world, and are the settled results of the eternal principles on which all was to proceed," and such prophecies as are "directed to an ethical aim," and in which God "addresses the subjects of threatening or promise more from a human than a divine point of view;" and yet cannot, for such reasons as Dr Fairbairn specifies, admit the distinction between such prophecies as are the revelations of the divine decree, and such as contain warnings and threatenings conditional upon man's conduct. We do not mean that Dr Fairbairn has entirely adopted our distinction, but that he has adopted a distinction which, as we think, shews that there is no valid reason why his "exegetical conscience" could not have gone a little further. As it is, it cannot be doubted that for want of proper discrimination, he has confounded the whole subject with which he deals. We have seen that in treating his first class, the prophecies which "enter into the very core of the divine government," he demands for them a conditionality, which, if granted, necessarily affects the decrees of God, of which these prophecies are the revelation; and so also when dealing with this second class, of which the conditionality is unquestionable, he gives them that relation to the divine decrees which belongs only to the first class; thus a second time bringing together the two ideas of contingency and of the divine purposes. Such alterations, he says, "so far from bespeaking God to be capricious in His ways, and changeable in the principles of His government, rather serve to manifest Him in what alone is essential as unalterably the same." It is only in essential things, therefore, that God is unchangeable! If this statement be consistent with Calvinistic doctrines, then do we admit that we have done injustice to Dr Fairbairn.