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few ascents in lineâ præ

apt to misapply that word, as long as he retains that idea; which when he has quite lost, he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he understands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of simple ideas to be put together, which makes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes; nor a supposed, but an unknown real essence, with properties depending thereon, the precise number whereof is also unknown, which makes the difficulty in the names of substances. But, on the contrary, in simple ideas the whole signification of the name is known at once, and consists not of parts, whereof more or less being put in, the idea may be varied, and so the signification of name be obscure or uncertain. 5. Simple

§. 16. Fifthly, This farther may be obideas have served concerning simple ideas and their

names, that they have but few ascents in

lineâ prædicamentali (as they call it) from dicamentali.

the lowest species to the summum genus. The reason whereof is, that the lowest species being but one simple idea, nothing can be left out of it; that so the difference being taken away, it may agree with some other thing in one idea common to them both; which, having one name, is the genus of the other two: v. g. there is nothing that can be left out of the idea of white and red, to make them agree in one common appearance, and so have one general name; as rationality being left out of the complex idea of ir.an, makes it agree with brute, in the more general idea and name of animal : and therefore when to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend both white and red, and several other such simple ideas, under one general name, they have been fain to do it by a word, which denotes only the way they get into the mind. For when white, red, and yellow are all comprehended under the genus or name colour, it signifies no more but such ideas as are produced in the mind only by the sight, and have entrance only through the eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general term, to comprehend both colours and sounds, and the like simple ideas, they do it by a word that siguifies all


such as come into the mind only by one sense : and so the general term quality in its ordinary acceptation, comprehends colours, sounds, tastes, smells, and tangible qualities, with distinction from extension, number, motion, pleasure and pain, which make impressions on the mind, and introduce their ideas by more senses than one.

§. 17. Sixthly, The names of simple 6. Names of ideas, substances, and mixed modes have simple ideas also this difference; that those of mixed

not at all ar. modes stand for ideas perfectly arbitrary;

bitrary. those of substances are not perfectly so, but refer to a pattern, though with some latitude; and those of simple ideas are perfectly taken from the existence of things, and are not arbitrary at all. Which, what difference it makes in the significations of their names, we shall see in the following chapters.

The names of simple modes differ little from those of simple ideas.



Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations.



§. 1. THE names of mixed modes her Thex stand

, , as has been shown, for sorts or species of things, ideas, as each of which has its peculiar essence. The

other general essences of these species also, as has been showed, are nothing but the abstract ideas in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus far the names and essences of mixed modes have nothing but what is common to them with other ideas: but if we take a little nearer survey of them, we shall find that they have something peculiar, which perhaps may deserve our attention.


they stand

The ideas

§. 2. The first particularity I shall ob

serve in them, is, that the abstract ideas, for are made or, if you please, the essences of the several bythe under. species of mixed modes are made by the standing

understanding, wherein they differ from those of simple ideas : in which sort the mind has no power to make any one, but only receives such as are presented to it, by the real existence of things operating upon it. 2. Made ar

$. 3. In the next place, these essences of bitrarily, the species of mixed modes are not only and without made by the mind, but made very

arbitrapatterns. rily, made without patterns, or reference to any real existence. Wherein they differ from those of substances, which carry with them the supposition of some real being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But in its complex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly. It unites and retains certain collections, as so many distinct specific ideas, whilst others, that as often occur in nature, and are as plainly suggested by outward things, pass neglected, without particular names or specifications. Nor does the mind, in these of mixed modes, as in the complex idea of substances, examine them by the real existence of things; or verify them by patterns, containing such peculiar compositions in nature. To know whether his idea of adultery or incest be right, will a man seek it any where amongst things existing? Or is it true, because any one has been witness to such an action ? No: but it suffices here, that men have put together such a collection into one complex idea, that makes the archetype and specific idea, whether ever any such action were committed in rerum natura or no. How this is

. 4. To understand this right, we must condone. sider wherein this making of these complex

ideas consists; and that is not in the mak, ing any new idea, but putting together those which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does these three things : first, it chooses a certain number: secondly, it gives them connexion, and makes them into one idea :

thirdly, thirdly, it ties them together by a name.

If we examine how the mind proceeds in these, and what liberty it takes in them, we shall easily observe how these essences of the species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the mind; and consequently, that the species themselves are of men's making.

§. 5. No-body can doubt, but that these Evidently ideas of mixed modes are made by a vo. arbitrary, in

that the idea luntary collection of ideas put together in

is often be. the mind, independent froin any original fore the ex. patterns in nature, who will but reflect iftence. that this sort of complex ideas may be made, abstracted, and have names given them, and so a species be constituted, before any one individual of that species ever existed. Who can doubt but the ideas of sacrilege or adultery might be framed in the minds of men, and have names given them; and so these species of mixed modes be constituted, before either of them was ever committed ; and might be as well discoursed of and reasoned about, and as certain truths discovered of them, whilst yet they had no being but in the understanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently a real existence? Whereby it is plain, how much the sorts of mixed modes are the creatures of the understanding, where they have a being as subservient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge, as when they really exist: and we cannot doubt but lawmakers have often made laws about species of actions, which were only the creatures of their own understandings; beings that had no other istence but in their own minds. And I think no-body deny, but that the resurrection was a species of mixed modes in the mind, before it really existed. §. 6. To see how arbitrarily these es

Instances ; sences of mixed modes are made by the

murder, inmind, we need but take a view of almost any of them. A little looking into them bing. will satisfy us, that it is the mind that combines several scattered independent ideas into one complex one, and, by the common name it gives them, makes them the essence of a certain species, without regulating itself by N4



cest, stab.

any connexion they have in nature.

For what greater connexion in nature has the idea of a man, than the idea of a sheep, with killing; that this is made a particular species of action, signified by the word murder, and the other not? Or what union is there in nature between the idea of the relation of a father with killing, than that of a son, or neighbour; that those are combined into one complex idea, and thereby made the essence of the distinct species parricide, whilst the other make no distinct species at all? But though they have made killing a man's father, or mother, a distinct species from killing his son, or daughter; yet, in some other cases, son and daughter are taken in too, as well as father, and mother; and they are all equally comprehended in the same species, as in that of incest. Thus the mind in mixed modes arbitrarily unites into complex ideas such as it finds convenient; whilst others that have altogether as much union in nature, are left loose, and never combined into one idea, because they have no need of one name. It is evident then, that the

. mind by its free choice gives a connexion to a certain number of ideas, which in nature have no more union with one another, than others that it leaves out: why else is the part of the weapon, the beginning of the wound is made with, taken notice of to make the distinct species called stabbing, and the figure and inatter of the weapon left out? I do not say, this is done without reason, as we shall see more by and by; but this I say, that it is done by the free choice of the mind, pursuing its own ends; and that therefore these species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the understanding: and there is nothing more evident, than that, for the most part, in the framing these ideas the mind searches not its patterns in nature, nor refers the ideas it makes to the real existence of things; but puts such together, as may best serve its own purposes, without tying itself to a precise imitation of any thing that really exists. But still sub- §. 7. But though these complex ideas, servient to or essences of mixed modes, depend on the the end of

mind, and are made by it with great liber, language. ty; yet they are not made at random, and


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