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thoughts in this relation terminate in this simple idea, sweetness, which is equally true of all the rest; though where they are compounded or decompounded, the simple ideas they are made up of are, perhaps, seldom taken notice of. V. g. when the word father is mentioned; first, there is meant that particular species, or collective idea, signified by the word man. Secondly, those sensible simple ideas, signified by the word generation: and thirdly, the effects of it, and all the simple ideas signified by the word child. So the word friend being taken for a man, who loves, and is ready to do good to another, has all these following ideas to the making of it up: first, all the simple ideas, comprehended in the word man, or intelligent being. Secondly, the idea of love. Thirdly, the idea of readiness or disposition. Fourthly, the idea of action, which is in any kind of thought or motion. Fifthly, the idea of good, which signifies any thing that may advance his happiness, and terminates at last, if examined, in particular simple ideas; of which the word good in general signifies any one, but, if removed from all simple ideas quite, it signifies nothing at all. And thus also all moral words terminate at last, though perhaps more remotely in a collection of simple ideas: the immediate signification of relative words, being very often other supposed known relations; which, if traced one to another, still end in simple ideas.

We have ordinarily as clear (or clearer) a notion of the relation, as of its foundation.

§. 19. Secondly, That in relations we have for the most part, if not always, as clear a notion of the relation, as we have of those simple ideas, wherein it is founded. Agreement or disagreement, whereon relation depends, being things whereof we have commonly as clear ideas, as of any other whatsoever; it being but the distinguishing simple ideas, or their degrees one from another, without which we could have no distinct knowledge at all. For if I have a clear idea of sweetness, light or extension, I have too, of equal, or more or less of each of these: if I know what it is for one man to be born of a woman, viz. Sempronia, I know what it is for another

man

man to be born of the same woman Sempronia; and so have as clear a notion of brothers, as of births, and perhaps clearer. For if I believed that Sempronia dug Titus out of the parsley-bed (as they used to tell children) and thereby became his mother; and that afterwards, in the same manner, she dug Caius out of the parsley-bed; I had as clear a notion of the relation of brothers between them, as if I had all the skill of a midwife: the notion that the same woman contributed, as mother, equally to their births, (though I were ignorant or mistaken in the manner of it,) being that on which I grounded the relation, and that they agreed in that circumstance of birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then in their descent from the same person, without knowing the particular circumstances of that descent, is enough to found my notion of their having or not having the relation of brothers. But though the ideas of particular relations are capable of being as clear and distinct in the minds of those, who will duly consider them, as those of mixed modes, and more detrminate than those of substances; yet the names belonging to relation are often of as doubtful and uncertain signification, as those of substances or mixed modes, and much more than those of simple ideas: because relative words being the marks of this comparison, which is made only by men's thoughts, and is an idea only in men's minds, men frequently apply them to different comparisons of things, according to their own imaginations, which do not always correspond with those of others using the same name.

The notion

of the rela

tion is the same, whe ther the rule any action is

§. 20. Thirdly, That in these I call moral relations, I have a true notion of relation, by comparing the action with the rule, whether the rule be true or false. For if I measure any thing by a yard, I know whether the thing I measure be longer or shorter compared to than that supposed yard, though perhaps be true or the yard I measure by be not exactly the false. standard; which indeed is another inquiry. For though the rule be erroneous, and I mistaken in it; yet the agreement or disagreement observable in that which I

compare

compare with, makes me perceive the relation. Though measuring by a wrong rule, I shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of its moral rectitude, because I have tried it by that which is not the true rule; yet I am not mistaken in the relation which that action bears to that rule I compare it to, which is agreement or disagreement.

CHA P. XXIX.

Of Clear and Obscure, Distinct and Confused Ideas.

Ideas some clear and distinct, others obscure and confused.

§. 1. Hour ideas, and taken a view of HAVIN

JAVING shown the original of

their several sorts; considered the difference between the simple and the complex, and observed how the complex ones are divided into those of modes, substances, and relations; all which, I think, is necessary to be done by any one, who would acquaint himself thoroughly with the progress of the mind in its apprehension and knowledge of things: it will, perhaps, be thought I have dwelt long enough upon the examination of ideas. I must, nevertheless, crave leave to offer some few other considerations concerning them. The first is, that some are clear, and others obscure; some distinct, and others confused.

Clear and

obscure explained by

§. 2. The perception of the mind being most aptly explained by words relating to the sight, we shall best understand what is sight. meant by clear and obscure in our ideas, by reflecting on what we call clear and obscure in the objects of sight. Light being that which discovers to us visible objects, we give the name of obscure to that which is not placed in a light sufficient to discover minutely to us the figure and colours, which are observable in it, and which, in a better light, would be discernible. In like manner our simple ideas are clear, when they are such as the objects themselves,

from

from whence they were taken, did or might, in a wellordered sensation or perception, present them. Whilst the memory retains them thus, and can produce them to the mind, whenever it has occasion to consider them, they are clear ideas. So far as they either want any thing of the original exactness, or have lost any of their first freshness, and are, as it were, faded or tarnished by time; so far are they obscure. Complex ideas, as they are made up of simple ones, so they are clear, when the ideas that go to their composition are clear; and the number and order of those simple ideas, that are the ingredients of any complex one, is determinate and certain.

Causes of ob.

scurity.

§. 3. The causes of obscurity in simple ideas seem to be either dull organs, or very slight and transient impressions made by the objects, or else a weakness in the memory not able to retain them as received. For to return again to visible objects, to help us to apprehend this matter: if the organs or faculties of perception, like wax over-hardened with cold, will not receive the impression of the seal, from the usual impulse wont to imprint it; or, f like wax of a temper too soft, will not hold it well when well imprinted; or else supposing the wax of a temper fit, but the seal not applied with a sufficient force to make a clear impression: in any of these cases, the print left by the seal will be obscure. This, I suppose, needs no application to make it plainer. §. 4. As a clear idea is that whereof the Distinct and mind has such a full and evident percep- confused, tion, as it does receive from an outward object operating duly on a well-disposed organ; so a distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other; and a confused idea is such an one, as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different.

what.

Objection.

§. 5. If no idea be confused, but such as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it should be different; it will be hard, may any one say, to find any where a confused

H 4

idea.

ference to their names.

idea. For let any idea be as it will, it can be no other but such as the mind perceives it to be; and that very perception sufficiently distinguishes it from all other ideas, which cannot be other, i. e. different, without being perceived to be so. No idea therefore can be undistinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from itself: for from all other it is evidently different. i Confusion of §. 6. To remove this difficulty, and to ideas is in re- help us to conceive aright what it is that makes the confusion ideas are at any time chargeable with, we must consider, that things ranked under distinct names are supposed different enough to be distinguised, that so each sort by its peculiar name may be marked, and discoursed of a-part upon any occasion: and there is nothing more evident, than that the greatest part of different names are supposed to stand for different things. Now every idea a man has being visibly what it is, and distinct from all other ideas but itself; that which makes it confused, is, when it is such, that it may as well be called by another name, as that which it is expressed by: the difference which keeps the things (to be ranked under those two different names) distinct, and makes some of them belong rather to the one, and some of them to the other of those names, being left out; and so the distinction, which was intended to be kept up by those different names, is quite lost.

Defaults

§. 7. The defaults which usually occawhich make sion this confusion, I think, are chiefly these following:

confusion.

First, com

plex ideas, made up of

First, When any complex idea (for it is complex ideas that are most liable to confusion) is made up of too small a number too few sim- of simple ideas, and such only as are comple ones. mon to other things, whereby the differences that make it deserve a different name, are left out. Thus he that has an idea made up of barely the simple ones of a beast with spots, has but a confused idea of a leopard; it not being thereby sufficiently distinguished from a lynx, and several other sorts of beasts that are

spotted,

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