it arises from the disorder of inflamed passion, than when per sonal interest is its object; how then allege that to be the principle of virtue which would dishonor vice itself!'

1 In Bentham's work on Legislation, published, or rather illustrated, by M. Dumont, there are several arguments on the principle of utility, which agree in many respects with the system of morals founded upon personal interest. The well-known anecdote of Aristides making the Athenians reject a project of Themistocles, by simply telling them it was advantageous but unjust, is quoted by M. Dumont; but he refers the consequences which may be drawn from this trait of character, as well as many others, to the general utility admitted by Bentham as the basis of all our duties. The advantage of each individual, he says, ought to be sacrificed to the advantage of the whole; and that of the present moment to futurity, by taking one step in advance: we may confess, that virtue consists in the sacrifice of time to eternity, and this sort of calculation will certainly not be condemned by the advocates for enthusiasm; but whatever effort so superior a man as M. Dumont may make, he never will be able to render utility and self-devotion synonymous. He asserts, that pleasure and pain are the first motives of human actions; and he then supposes that the pleasure of noble minds consists in voluntarily exposing themselves to the sufferings of real life, in order to obtain enjoyments of a higher nature. Doubtless, we may make out of every word a mirror to reflect all ideas; but, if we are pleased to adhere to the natural signification of each term, we shall perceive, that the man who is told that his own happiness ought to be the end of all his actions, will not be prevented from doing the evil which is expedient for him, except by the fear or the danger of punishment;-fear, that passion braves; danger, that ingenuity hopes to escape.Upon what will you found the idea of justice or injustice, it may be said, if not upon what is useful or hurtful to the greater number? Justice, as to individuals, consists in the sacrifice of themselves to their families; as to families, in their sacrifice to the state; as to the state, in the respect for certain unchangeable principles which constitute the happiness and the safety of the human species. Doubtless, the majority of the generations of men, in the course of ages, will find their account in having followed the path of justice; but, in order to be truly and religiously honest, we ought always to keep in view the worship of moral beauty, independently of all the circumstances which may result from it. Utility is necessarily modided by events; virtue ought never to be liable to this influence.

CHAPTER XIII.

OF ETHICS FOUNDED ON NATIONAL INTEREST.

Not only do the ethics founded on personal interest introduce into the mutual relations of individuals calculations of prudence and selfishness, which banish sympathy, confidence, and generosity; but the ethics of public men, of those who act in the name of nations, must necessarily be perverted by this system. If it is true that the ethics of individuals may be founded upon their interest, it is because entire society tends to order, and punishes those who violate it; but a nation, and especially a powerful state, is an isolated existence, to which the laws of reciprocity cannot be applied. It may be said, with truth, that at the end of a certain number of years unjust nations succumb to the hatred which their injustice inspires; but several generations may pass away before these great crimes are punished; and I know not how we could convince a statesman, under all circumstances, that an action, blamable in itself, is not useful, and that political wisdom and morality are ever in accord: this point, therefore, is not proved; and, on the contrary, it is almost a received axiom, that the two objects cannot be united.

Nevertheless, what would become of the human race if ethics were nothing but an old woman's tale, invented to console the weak, until they become stronger? How should it be honored in the private,relations of life, if the government, upon which all turn their eyes, is allowed to dispense with it? and how should this not be allowed, if interest is the foundation of morals? Nobody can deny that there are contingencies, in which those great masses called empires, those great masses which are in a state of nature with relation to each other, find a momentary advantage in committing an act of injustice; and what is momentary with regard to nations, is often a whole age.

Kant, in his writings on political ethics, shows, with the greatest force, that no exception can be admitted in the code of duty. In short, when we rely upon circumstances for the justification of an immoral action, upon what principle can we stop at this or that point? Would not the more impetuous of our natural passions be of much greater power than the calculations of reason, if we admitted public or private interest as an excuse for injustice?

When, at the most bloody era of the Revolution, they wished to authorize all crimes, they gave their government the name of the Committee of Public Safety; this was to illustrate the received maxim, that the safety of the people is the supreme law. The supreme law is justice. When it shall be proved that the earthly interests of a nation may be promoted by an act of meanness or of injustice, we shall still be equally vile and criminal in committing it; for the integrity of moral principles is of more consequence than the interests of nations. Individuals and society are answerable, in the first place, for that divine inheritance which ought to be transmitted to the successive generations of mankind. Loftiness of mind, generosity, equity, every magnanimous sentiment, in a word, ought first to be preserved, at our own expense, and even at the expense of others; since they, as well as we, are bound to sacrifice themselves to their sentiments.

Injustice always sacrifices one portion of society to another. According to what arithmetical calculation is this sacrifice enjoined? Can the majority dispose of the minority, if the former only exceeds the latter by a few voices? The members of one and the same family, a company of merchants, nobles, ecclesiastics, whatever may be their numbers, have not the right of saying that every thing ought to yield to their several interests; but when any assembly of men, let it be as inconsiderable as that of the Romans in their origin; when this assembly, I say, calls itself a nation, then it should be allowed to do any thing for its own advantage! This term Nation would thus become synonymous with that of Legion, which the devil assumes in the Gospel; but there is no more reason for giving

up the obligations of duty for the sake of a nation than for that of any other collective body of men. It is not the number of individuals which constitutes their importance in a moral point of view. When an innocent person dies on the scaffold, whole generations attend to his misfortune, while thousands perish in a battle without any inquiry after their fate. Whence arises this astonishing difference which men make between an act of injustice committed against an individual, and the death of numbers? The cause is, the importance which all attach to the moral law; it is of a thousand times more consequence than physical life in the universe, and in the soul of each of us, which also is itself a universe.

If we make morals only a calculation of prudence and wisdom, a species of economical management, there is something like energy in not wishing to possess it. A sort of ridicule attaches to persons of condition, who still maintain what are called romantic maxims, fidelity in engagements, respect for the rights of individuals, etc. We forgive these scruples in the case of individuals who are independent enough to be dupes at their own expense; but when we consider those who direct the affairs of nations, there are circumstances in which they may be blamed for being just, and have their integrity objected to them; for if private morals are founded upon personal interest, there is much more reason for public morals to be founded upon national interest; and these morals, upon occasion, may make a duty of the greatest crimes: so easy is it to reduce to an absurdity whatever wanders from the simple grounds of truth. Rousseau said, "that it was not allowable for a nation to purchase the most desirable revolution with the blood of one innocent person : these simple words comprehend all that is true, sacred, divine, in the destiny of man.

It assuredly was not for the advantages of this life, to secure some additional enjoyments to some days of existence, and to delay a little the death of some dying creatures, that conscience and religion were bestowed upon man. It was for this, that veings in possession of free-will might choose justice and sacri fice utility, might prefer the future to the present, the invisible

VOL. II.-11

to the visible, and the dignity of the human species to the mere preservation of individuals.

Individuals are virtuous when they sacrifice their private interest to the general good; but governments in their turn, are individuals, who ought to sacrifice their personal advan tages to the law of duty: if the morals of statesmen were only

1 "If the good is that alone which must be the most useful to the greatest number, where can the good be found, and who can discern it? In order to know whether such an action, which I propose to myself to do, is good or bad, I must be sure, in spite of its visible and direct utility in the present moment, that it will not become injurious in a future that I do not yet know. I must seek whether, useful to mine and those that surround me, it will not have counter-strokes disastrous to the human race, of which I must think before all. It is important that I should know whether the money that I am tempted to give this unfortunate who needs it, could not be otherwise more usefully employed. In fact, the rule is here the greatest good of the greatest number. In order to follow it, what calculations are imposed on me? In the obscurity of the future, in the uncertainty of the somewhat remote consequences of every action, the surest way is to do nothing that is not related to myself, and the last result of a prudence so refined is indifference and egoism. Supposing you have received a deposit from an opulent neighbor, who is old and sick, a sum of which he has no need, and without which your numerous family runs the risk of dying with famine. He calls on you for this sum-what will you do? The greatest number is on your side, and the greatest utility also; for this sum is insignificant for your rich neighbor, while it will save your family from misery, and perhaps from death. Father of a family, I should like much to know in the name of what principle you would hesitate to retain the sum which is necessary to you? Intrepid reasoner, placed in the alternative of killing this sick old man, or of letting your wife and children die of hunger, in all honesty of conscience you ought to kill him. You have the right, it is even your duty to sacrifice the less advantage of a single person to much the greater advantage of a greater number; and since this principle is the expression of true justice, you are only its minister in doing what you do. A vanquishing enemy or a furious people threaten destruction to a whole city if there be not delivered up to them the head of such a man, who is, nevertheless, innocent. In the name of the greatest good of the greatest number, this man will be immolated without scruple. It might even be maintained that innocent to the last, he has ceased to be so, since he is an obstacle to the public good. It having once been declared that justice is the interest of the greatest number, the only question is to know where this interest is. Now, here, doubt is impossible; therefore, it is perfectly just to offer innocence as a holocaust to public safety. This consequence must be accepted, or the principle rejected."-(Cousin Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, pp. 267, 268.)-Ed.