LETTER XVII.

TO THE PRINTER OF THE PUBLIC ADVERTISER.

SOME of the less skilful or more pertinacious advocates for the decision of the House of Commons on the Middlesex election, were disposed to overlook every thing in the contest, but the turpitude of Wilkes's moral character, the turbulent refractoriness of the freeholders of Middlesex, the indefinite extent of the privilege of parliament, and the unreasonableness of exciting discontent throughout the nation, vn account of a single act of doubtful legality by its representatives. A quotation from a pamphlet by one of these advocates of the ministry, and a letter by another, had appeared in the Public Advertiser, since the publication of JUNIUS's last Letter. The object of the present Letter, is, to refute what those persons had advanced.

He finds little difficulty in maintaining what he had before, indeed, sufficiently evinced; that it was law, not general reason nor expediency, by which alone the contest might be decided; and that the House of Commons could possess, under the right of privilege of parliament, no authority but what was, at least, either expressed in statutes, or established by a train of clear, unexceptionable precedents. He urges, that the ministry themselves did not presume to maintain that, if there were even usefulness or equity in the annihilation of the votes of the obnoxious electors of Middlesex, the House of Commons could, by a simple resolution, make it law. He deprecates the recurrence of any similar exercise of an usurped authority by that House; and expresses a wish that, if it be thought necessary to endow the representatives of the Commons with such a power, it should at least be conferred by one regular and solemn. act of the whole legislature.

This Letter is less masterly than that which immediately precedes it; but the purpose for which it was written, was comparatively slight. It appears as an auxiliary epistle from PHILO-JUNIUS.

SIR,

1. August 1769.

IT will not be necessary for JUNIUS to take the trouble of answering your correspondent G. A. or the quotation from a speech without doors, published in your paper of the 28th of last month. The speech appeared before JUNIUS's Letter; and, as the author seems to consider the great proposition, on which all his argument depends, viz. that Mr. Wilkes was under that known legal incapacity of which JUNIUS speaks, as a point granted, his speech is in no shape an answer to JUNIUS, for this is the very question in debate.

As to G. A. I observe, first, that if he did not admit JUNIUS's state of the question, he should have shewn the fallacy of it, or given us a more exact one ;-secondly, that, considering the many hours and days which the ministry and their advocates have wasted, in public debate, in compiling large quartos, and collecting innumerable precedents, expressly to prove, that the late proceedings of the House of Commons are warranted by the law, custom, and practice of parliament, it is rather an extraordinary supposition, to be made by one of their own party, even for the sake of argument,

A point granted-in no shape an answer.] Even from the pen of JUNIUS, this phraseology is not to be approved as elegant or pure. It is evidently vulgar; and the use of-in no shape-is indefensibly

incorrect.

that no such statute, no such custom of parliament, no such case in point, can be produced. G. A. may, however, make the supposition with safety. It contains nothing but literally the fact, except that there is a case exactly in point, with a decision of the house diametrically opposite to that which the present House of Commons came to in favour of Mr. Luttrell.

THE ministry now begin to be ashamed of the weakness of their cause; and, as it usually happens with falsehood, are driven to the necessity of shifting their ground, and changing their whole defence. At first we were told, that nothing could be clearer than that the proceedings of the House of Commons were justified by the known law and uniform custom of parliament. But now, it seems, if there be no law, the House of Commons have a right to make one; and if there be no precedent, they have a right to create the first:-for this, I presume, is the amount of the questions proposed to JUNIUS. If your correspondent had been at all versed in the law of parliament, or generally in the laws of this

The necessity of shifting their ground.] JUNIUS, with good reason, supposed the ministry to be willing to urge, in defence of the obnoxious decision of the House of Commons, all arguments, whether good or bad, that might have any weight with any understandings. This induced him to discuss and refute, not only their capital arguments, but even the weakest they could produce with any shew of plausibility; since there were none so weak as not to influence some minds.

country,

country, he would have seen that this defence is as weak and false as the former.

THE privileges of either House of Parliament, it is true, are indefinite; that is, they have not been described or laid down in any one code or declaration whatsoever: but, whenever a question of privilege has arisen, it has invariably been disputed or maintained upon the footing of precedents alone *. In the course of the proceedings upon the Aylesbury election, the House of Lords resolved, "That "neither House of Parliament had any power, by any vote or declaration, to create to themselves any new privilege that was not warranted by the "known laws and customs of parliament." And to this rule the House of Commons, though otherwise they had acted in a very arbitrary manner, gave their assent; for they affirmed,, that they had guided themselves by it, in asserting their privileges. Now, Sir, if this be true with respect to matters of privilege, in which the House of Commons,

* This is still meeting the ministry upon their own ground; for, in truth, no precedents will support either natural injustice, or violation of positive right.

The privileges of either House, &c.] The privileges of the House of Commons were, afterwards, not a little restricted, by the con ̧ tention between that House and the City Magistrates; and, at last, by the rescinding of the obnoxious resolution in regard to the Middlesex election.

Now, Sir, if this be true with respect to matters of privilege, &c.] This is a very accurate distinction, most seasonably made. When a third party, of such importance as the freeholders of the whole kingdom,

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Commons, individually and as a body, are principally concerned, how much more strongly will it hold against any pretended power in that house, to create or declare a new law, by which not only the rights of the house over their own member and those of the member himself, are included, but also those of a third and separate party, I mean the freeholders of the kingdom! To do justice to the ministry, they have not yet pretended, that any one, or any two of the three estates have power to make a new law, without the concurrence of the third. They know that a man who maintains such a doctrine, is liable, by statute, to the heaviest penalties. They do not acknowledge that the House of Commons have assumed a new privilege, or declared a new law. On the contrary, they affirm, that their proceedings have been strictly conformable to, and founded upon, the ancient law and custom of parliament. Thus, therefore, the question returns to the point at which JUNIUS had fixed it, viz. Whether or no this be the law of parliament. If it be not, the House

of

kingdom, was interested; that limitation of the privileges of the House of Commons, could not but be highly obligatory, which was acknowledged even in matters of mere order and regulation in which only the House and some second party had a concern.

Whether or no this be the law of parliament ?] This was the only question. If his opponents might be confined to the discussion of this question, JUNIUS was sure of victory. The partizans of the ministry, though pretending to argue only concerning the law of

parliament;