SERM. I. ly Father. The Unthinking may be carried away with Appearances, instead of Realities; but the Judicious should confider Things intrinfically, and think him the greateft, who ftrives, as much as in him lyes, to make others happy by his Benevolence, good by his Example, and wife by his Inftructions.

Do we value ourselves upon our Power? No; what is remarked by fome Body or other, is a great Truth, viz. That there is no Good in Power, but merely the Power of doing Good: Upon our worldly Prudence? Thofe, who are acquainted with Hiftory know, how often the beft-laid Defigns have proved abortive. Among all the Maxims of worldly Prudence, this is one of the best, viz. That we fhould endeavour to discover the reigning Paffion in every Man, whom we would manage; and when we have found out that, we have got a Handle to turn him, which Way we please. But then every Man, befides his reigning Paffion, has his particular Caprice or Humour, which will make our Meafures often mifcarry. Befides, no one Paffion is perhaps the perpetual Dictator: No, our Heart is rather a little Commonwealth;

where

where they govern us with an alternate SERM. I.. Sway, and fometimes our Ambition, fometimes our Anger, fometimes our Fear or some other Affection is uppermoft.

Human Policy therefore must be uncer tain, because Man, who is the Subject of it, is fo uncertain, wavering and inconstant; and there can be no fixed and stated Maxims to pleafe and manage fo changeable and inconfiftent a Creature: But we may by certain and unchanging Rules gain the Love of that Being, with whom there is no Variableness, neither Shadow of Turning. No Prudence therefore but the Spiritual, viz. To please him who is the fame yesterday, to-day, and for ever, can be

certain.

Are you proud of your distinguished Vir tue? He who is proud of diftinguished Abilities, Learning and Wealth, is not the lefs able, learned and wealthy, because he is proud of them. But he, who is proud of distinguished Virtue, ceafeth to be virtuous, by his being fo. For the Man that is pleased with any Degree of Virtue, merely because it is uncommon, would be forry, if what he values himself upon, as a fingular Mark of Diftinction, fhould become

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SERM. I. common, and all Mankind fhould rife to the fame Eminence as himself in Morality. Now this Temper argues a Want of Benevolence, and, confequently, of Virtue. It fhews a mean, narrow, selfish Turn of Mind, to triumph in any extraordinary Attainment, folely because it is peculiar to us, or confined to a felect Few: A truly generous, benevolent, and virtuous Spirit would wish, that All were not only almoft, but altogether fuch as he is'; and be the happier in himself, if the Bulk of Mankind were Partakers of that Happiness which refults from Virtue.

Befides, thofe, who feldom act or think nobly, may be proud of what they fo feldom think or act. But to thofe, who conftantly entertain great Thoughts, and do noble Actions, to them they are become fo familiar, that they make no great Impreffrons upon them. At the fame Time, that they rife above the common Level of Action, they think they do nothing but what is common; because nothing but what is commonly done by them. The Favours, which you cannot receive without warm Emotions of Joy and Gratitude, they can - bestow with great Coolness and Unconcernednefs.

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edness. Because, though to receive fuch SERM. I. Favours is something unusual to you; yet to do them is nothing new to them.

The more virtuous any Man is, the more modest and unpretending he must be. He must be fenfible of the numerous Diforders which lurk within, of his fickly Appetites, and the Corruption of his Heart; and how often the precarious Light of Reafon, that Candle which God has lighted up in his Mind, has been put out by fome fudden Guft of Paffion. If a Child could read those foolish, vain, wicked Imaginations, which the best of us have fometimes indulged; we fhould be afhamed to look him in the Face, and be out of Conceit with ourselves: And yet we do not fometimes ftifle them immediately; though we know that He, whofe tremendous Majesty fills the whole Compafs of Heaven and Earth, cannot but be privy to them, and difcern the fecret Meditations of our Heart. The Knowledge of the Greatest of Beings, who understandeth our Thoughts long before, hath lefs Influence, than that of the fillieft of Mortals would have, fuppofing he could know the inward Workings of the Soul. We are not worthy to approach

SERM. I. Him, who dwelleth in unapproachable Glo

ry, but through the Merits of our Redeemer. We could not expect any Instances of Goodness from a Being less than infinitely good.

And yet, notwithstanding our many Imperfections, I queftion whether, upon a Suppofition that all of us were to be the Judges and Rewarders of our own Merits; this World would be half large enough, that every one might take a little. other Words must be taken in, to recompense us, as we think, fully, and adjust the Rewards to our imaginary Deserts.

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He who thinks, that he has no Weakneffes to fubdue, either wholly or in Part; no virtuous Habits to acquire, or, at least, to improve and perfect; he who, in short, thinks himself quite good enough; proves, by the very Thought, that he is not fo. Then our Salvation is moft in Danger, when we dismiss all Apprehenfions about it.

But if Virtue (human Virtue) affords no juft Grounds for Pride; much less does human Knowledge, which bears no Proportion to our Ignorance. The greatest and the leaft Objects equally baffle our Enquiries. Too great and difproportioned an

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Object