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against Gronov's alteration to the Infinitive which some editors prefer. This is a passage in which the variation between Present and Imperfect Subjunctives is interesting and has not been yet discussed. We are inclined to follow the theory which one of us has put forward (Livy II. Pitt Press, 1901, p. 187), and interpret the Present Subjunctives as representing Present Indicatives, and the Imperfects as representing Future Indicatives (habet, cernit, evit, attinebit). In any case it is foolish to alter the text. In 37. 5. 2 one of the two first-class authorities (Mogunt.) has attineret, which may again be quite well taken as representing attinebit. Exactly the same question arises in the passage now under discussion; but as there is no variation in the Subjunctive tenses, there is no external factor to incline the decision; either quid attinet or quid attinebit would make excellent sense. In any case we still think the balance of evidence favours our excision of rogitans.

We may add that Weissenborn's note (on 10. 13. 10), to which Dr. Postgate refers, shows his usual confusion of thought. He keeps rogitans, but defends retineret as if there were no rogitans to govern it, alleging that the Subjunctive 'represents a question addressed to the people for them to answer.' As if the Infinitive did not also represent a question addressed to them! No doubt he means that the question in the Infinitive represents a more confident demand than would one in the Subjunctive without rogitans; which shows that Weissenborn inwardly regarded attineret alone as good Livian Latin. Weissenborn's instinct for Livy's meaning generally deserves respect, though his own powers of thought and expression leave much to be desired. If rogitans is kept, the Subjunctive is of course necessary whatever the colour of the question.

X. 36. 9 On the subject of Livy's intransitive use of transitive verbs a reference should be added to Riemann, Étude (ed. of 1879), § 22.'-W. B. A. 'Cf. also mouisse 5. 55. 1.-J. P. P.

This use of adiuuare in particular is so frequent in Livy as hardly to need illustration; other cases are 2. 5. 4; 24. 16. 3; 24. 46. 4; 29. 1. 18.'—W. B. A.

X. 43. 13 I agree about the retention of conspecti; as does Luterbacher, for the sound reason that the subsequent narrative shows that the 8000 men turned to flight long before they were caught, a fate which befel only their rear-guard. And those who object to the seeming repetition must mutilate Caes. B.C. 1. 65. 1 quos ubi Afranius procul uisos cum Petreio conspexit,' where uisos is put in simply to give procul something to go with.

'But I am not convinced by the latter part of your note. Are you not reading into a particular verb what is nothing more than a shade of causal meaning which can be suggested by any participle, as in the English example which you quote of the participle sighted? In Caes. B.C. 2. 20. 7 ('tum uero omni interclusus itinere, ad Caesarem mittit') would you speak of the peculiar and interesting use of intercludor to mean I know that I am cut off' ?'—W. B. A.

This criticism seems to us wise and valuable, and to place the manuscript reading beyond all reach of attack. Yet we think still that the examples we have given of conspicior and conspectus, and others we might add of conspicuus (as when Horace writes 'late conspicuum tollere uerticem '), do show there was developed in this particular word an especially self-conscious colour.

LONDON,

MANCHESTER, July, 1918.

C. FLAMSTEAD WALTERS.

R. S. CONWAY.

'CADA,' NOM. PLUR.

6

MRS. DALL, in her article A Seventh-Century English Edition of Virgil (p. 176 infra), shows that Virgil glosses taken from marginalia in the same MS. of the poems often preserve something of their original coherence in the two kindred glossaries, Affatim and the Second Amplonian, in spite of all the reshuffling of these two collections. Thus a small group of Virgil items appears in Affatim on p. 491 of Goetz's apograph (in Vol. IV. of the Corpus Glossariorum Latinorum): (no. 2) Carecta, (no. 3) Crateras, etc. The second last of this Virgil cluster' (as Mrs. Dall calls it) is (C.G.L. IV. 491, 5) Cada: vasa vinaria. It appears also in Ampl. II. (C.G.L. V. 272, 63) Ca[t]da: vas <a> vinaria, and in (the cognate) Ampl. I. (C.G.L. V. 354, 75) Cada: vasa vinaria, and is apparently taken (by all three compilers), ultimately or immediately, from a marginal annotation on Aen. 1, 195 'uina bonus quae deinde cadis onerarat Acestes'; for in the Virgil Glossary printed by Goetz in C.G.L. IV. 427-470 we find (p. 432, no. 24) Cadis: vasis vinariis.

What authority then is there for the heteroclite Nom. Plur.? Absolutely none. The monastery-teacher who annotated this MS. of Virgil, or the monk who collected for glossary purposes its marginalia, or the compiler who recast these 'glossae collectae ' into dictionary form, laboured under the delusion that cadis belonged to a noun 'cadum.' That is the simple and obvious explanation.

How ludicrous then to find in the great Latin Thesaurus (s.v. Cadus, Vol. III. col. 37, 1. 23) ‘neutr. . . . plur.: cada GLOSS. IV. 491, 5, V. 272, 63. 354, 74’! And how misleading! One can imagine a writer of a Latin Grammar saying to himself: 'There seems to be some real authority here for a heteroclite plural. I had better put cadus in the same paragraph as locus.' There appears indeed almost as little authority in the intervening sentence: neutr. cadum CORP. IV. 2637, GLOSS. V. 173, 33. 34. 444, 13,' in so far as the glossaries are concerned. Just as 'cada' was a recasting of cadis, so may 'cadum' have been of 'cada' (or cadis), unless it is merely a confusion of the -dus and -dum symbols. Or it may be really Gen. Plur. cadum.

Not that the great Latin Thesaurus is to be blamed. It professedly takes its glossary information, direct and unaltered, from Goetz (who is not to be blamed either). But, as was said before (C.Q. XI. 200), until all these glossaries, their interrelations and sources, have been investigated, the wheat cannot be separated from the chaff.

I have spoken of the 'great' Latin Thesaurus; for great it undoubtedly is, so near perfection that one is glad to detect (and remove) any flaw. Even it however does not make special lexicons unnecessary. These will always have a value of their own. Professor Phillimore has given us a lexicon to Propertius. Will not Professor Housman give us a lexicon to Manilius, lexicographorum in usum ?

W. M. LINDSAY.

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THE Times Literary Supplement of November 8, 1917, contained, under the title of Socrates recognitus, a review of Plato's Biography of Socrates, a lecture delivered by Professor A. E. Taylor to the British Academy in the early part of last year. The opening sentence of the review is as follows: Next to the problem of the Gospels ranks that of the Platonic dialogues amongst those most vital to the history of the human spirit.' A little further down the reviewer says: 'It is much to the credit of British scholarship—and especially to that of the University of St. Andrews-that it should have attacked these problems with untiring energy, and propounded solutions which, although they run counter to most of the traditional tendencies of historical and philosophical criticism, have not only challenged attention, but are carrying conviction even to unlikely quarters.' And again, at the end of the article, we read this passage: 'It is scarcely to be thought that the ground won by the scholars of St. Andrews will be held without counter-attack; but this is slow to mature, and in the meanwhile such essays as the subject of this notice, with which we may couple the paper recently read to the British Academy by Professor Burnet on the Socratic doctrine of the soul, serve to buttress and consolidate the position.'

At the present time many scholars who might have been expected to make an effective response to the reviewer's call for counter-attacks have no leisure for such work. The aim of this article is to supply their place as far as possible.

Up to the year 1911 it was generally agreed among scholars that two portraits of Socrates have come down to us, together with a caricature and some sporadic references to his doctrine. The two portraits were drawn by Plato and Xenophon, both friends and disciples of Socrates, but one an infinitely more skilled artist than the other; the caricature was given to the world by Aristophanes in the Clouds, while Xenophon probably and Plato certainly were still in the nursery; and of the scattered remarks about Socrates by far the most important are those of Aristotle, who was not born until fifteen years after the death of Socrates, but through his residence at Athens had excellent opportunities of learning the content of the Socratic philosophy, treasured in the memory or the note-books of pious friends. Here and there a scholar, notably Schleiermacher early in the nineteenth century, had impugned the value of Xenophon as a trustworthy exponent of Socratic

teaching. Schleiermacher held that Xenophon himself was no philosopher-it does not need much critical acumen to see that-and therefore he was scarcely the man to understand Socrates, nor could Socrates ever have swayed his contemporaries and later ages as he has done had he been nothing more than the mild and garrulous old gentleman depicted by Xenophon. But with the appearance of Zeller's Philosophie der Griechen Schleiermacher received his quietus, and not much has been heard until recently of successors to him, though in Germany every now and again some one has come forward to deal out hard knocks to Xenophon. On the other hand Plato has also come in for a share of obloquy. Joel (1893-1901) maintained that no testimony but Aristotle's regarding Socrates was of any value-this theory would reduce the amount of our knowledge to a sorry figure; while Döring, also in the last decade of the nineteenth century, declared that Xenophon was the one and only source worth mentioning. But so far as I know these views have not met with wide acceptance.

On the whole then the world had settled down into a comfortable belief first, that Xenophon had considerable personal knowledge of Socrates and had reported what he remembered faithfully, if in a somewhat unexhilarating manner; secondly, that Plato, with a fervent admiration for Socrates, had independently set down his personal recollections, which harmonized very well with those of Xenophon, if allowance were made for the fact that one study of Socrates was produced by a writer of very ordinary literary calibre, the other by a genius with a unique power of description and characterization. Thirdly, it was believed that Plato, in affectionate reverence for his master, had placed in the mouth of Socrates philosophical developments, which grew naturally indeed out of the doctrines that we call Socratic on the authority of Xenophon, but were in reality the work of Plato himself, or at any rate derived by Plato from Pythagorean or non-Socratic sources. Fourthly, Aristotle was thought to be a useful umpire in cases where we found it difficult to reconcile the accounts of Plato and Xenophon, or to distinguish Platonic superstructures from the foundations laid by Socrates.

In 1911 this tranquillity was overwhelmed by the two surprise attacks from St. Andrews. Professor Taylor's book, Varia Socratica, preceded Professor Burnet's edition of the Phaedo by a short time, and on p. xiv of his Introduction Professor Burnet remarks that, although he cannot accept all Professor Taylor's conclusions, nevertheless he is in substantial agreement with his colleague. The five essays in Varia Socratica are a first instalment. Their titles are: The Impiety of Socrates, The Aristotelian Socrates, The Sioooi Móyo, The Phrontisterion, and The words eidos, idéa in Pre-Platonic literature. The Foreword shows that a definite purpose, virtually the same as Professor Burnet's, links the whole set. Since the appearance of these two books Professor Burnet has published his volume Greek Philosophy, Part I. Thales to Plato (1914), wherein he seems to look upon his theory as a chose jugée, which commends itself urbi et orbi without further question. Both Professors have also addressed the

British Academy, Professor Taylor in the discourse above mentioned, and Professor Burnet in one entitled The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul, delivered as the Hertz Lecture, 1916. The two writers bring so great a wealth of illustrative learning and command of language to bear upon their thesis that (as a German reviewer has remarked with regard to Professor Taylor) it is only with difficulty and close attention that a reader can shake himself free from the spell cast by their eloquence and enthusiastic convictions.

The main objects are, briefly, to uphold the following points:

I. Plato is the source of all or nearly all statements made by Xenophon and Aristotle concerning Socrates. The three ordinarily recognized authorities are therefore reduced to one, namely Plato. It follows that if Socrates as described by Xenophon or Aristotle appears to teach a simpler and less metaphysical philosophy than the Platonic Socrates, we must take Plato's account as our standard, and explain the deviations from it as best we may. In the case of Xenophon, we may say with Professor Burnet that he was not really very well acquainted with Socrates. He might have been about twenty-five at the time of Socrates' death, and had spent most of his grown-up life in military service away from Athens, including his prolonged absence on the Anabasis expedition. Therefore his conversations of Socrates are not in any great degree due to his personal recollections, but are hashed-up versions of Platonic and pseudoPlatonic discourses made with a view to defending the memory of Socrates. Like most hashes the dish is considerably inferior to the one originally served, and it is worth remark that Xenophon has refrained from telling us anything whatever of the teaching deemed by both the Professors to be most characteristic of the real Socrates. Professor Taylor has an explanation of this omission which we must consider later; apart from this we are driven to suppose that Xenophon's limited intellect shied at reproducing the loftier flights of the Platonic Socrates. With regard to Aristotle, however, we can hardly attribute mental obtuseness to him. If any passages in his works have been held to show that the historical Socrates differed from the Socrates of Plato, then we must show that that the accepted interpretation is wrong.

2. Much that is taught by the Platonic Socrates, including the whole Theory of Ideas, the immortality of the soul, mystical views of religion, and the importance of mathematical and physical science, can be traced to Pythagorean, Orphic, and Eleatic sources. All these doctrines accordingly were, in the opinion of our authors, held by the historical Socrates in their entirety, and were taken over by him from Pythagorean, Orphic, or Eleatic teachers.

3. Socrates in the Clouds of Aristophanes is, according to Professors Burnet and Taylor, exactly what a comic picture of Socrates, if he were really such as Plato has described him, ought to be. He is a mathematician, a biologist, and a member of an ascetic and mystical religious body, 'a contemptuous rejecter of the tutelary divinities of the city of Athens, and a devotee of kaivà daiμóvia (Taylor, V.S. p. 167).

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