and passions which convert the boasted seats of civi lization into scenes of horror and bloodshed. You profit by the folly and madness of the contending nations, and afford in your more congenial clime an asylum to those blessings and virtues which they wantonly contemn, or wickedly exclude from their bosom! Cultivating the arts of peace under the influence of freedom, you advance by rapid strides to opulence and distinction; and if by any accident you should be compelled to take part in the present unhappy contest, if you should find it necessary to avenge insult, or repel injury, the world will bear witness to the equity of your sentiments and the moderation of your views, and the success of your arms will, no doubt, be proportioned to the justice of your cause! I have now nothing more with which to trou ble the house; I am sensible, indeed, that at this advanced hour I have already detained them too long. But I was anxious to put the question upon its true footing, and to free it from that misrepresentation in which it has been so studiously involved. We have of late been to much accustomed to invective and declamation; addresses to our prejudices and passions have been substituted instead of appeals to our reason. But we are met here, not to declaim against the crimes of other states, but to con sult what are the true interests of this country. The question is not, what degree of abhorrence we ought to feel of French cruelty, but what line of conduct we ought to pursue, consistently with British policy. Whatever our detestation of the guilt of foreign nations, we are not called to take upon ourselves the task of avengers; we are bound only to act as guardians of the welfare of those with whose concerns we are immediately entrusted. It is upon this footing I have argued the question. Mr. Fox concluded by proposing an amendment, recommending to his majesty to treat for a peace with France upon safe and honourable terms, without any reference to its existing form of government.

MR. ADAIR.

On the introduction of Foreign Troops into the
Kingdom.

HE contended, that so far from the king being em powered to maintain foreign troops without the consent of parliament, he could at no period of the English history call out the native troops without that consent. During the operation of the feudal laws, the monarchs did not levy troops merely as kings, but as the territorial lords of the country. That at common law there exist ed no right in the crown to embody any armed force within the country, was clear from the first establish ment of the militia in the reign of Charles II. At that time the greater part of the feudal tenures were abolished, and the system of national defence founded upon them of course fell to the ground. In their stead, par. liament established a regular national militia, because they knew that the king by his prerogative had no pow. er to provide for internal defence. From that time a system had been gaining ground of having a regular body of forces, in the nature of a standing army, which had become in some degree a necessary measure. But this army must be annually voted by parliament, and a mu tiny bill yearly passed for its regulation. The jealousy of parliament on the prerogative of the crown to levy troops, commenced at a very early period, and was evinced by several acts and resolutions of parliament. In the reign of Edward III. an act was passed which enacted, that no person should be called out of the shire in which he lived, except in cases of insurrection or

invasion; and he could not conceive our ancestors would be guilty of such a solecism in politics as to prevent the drawing forth our native forces except in times of extraordinary danger, and yet leave to the crown the right of bringing into the kingdom an indefinite number of foreign troops whenever it pleased. The 25th of the same king restricts this military force to such as were bound by their tenure and possessions to defend the country. Respecting the militia, though composed of persons peculiarly interested in the welfare of the kingdom, the king is not by law wholly invested with the control of these troops: even in case of the utmost exigency, he is not empowered to call them out without first acEquainting parliament, if it is at that time sitting; and if not, it shall be convened within fourteen days, and the measures which had been adopted laid before it. If, however, his majesty was vested with the power of introducing what number of foreign troops he pleased into the kingdom, this jealous caution of the legislature was totally useless and inefficient. From the silence of the bill of rights respecting the prerogative of the crown in this instance, it would be wrong to suppose the existence of such a prerogative. As well might it be said, that several of the most valuable privileges of British subjects, which they hold under Magna Charta, and the Habeas Corpus act, did not exist, since they had not been recited in the bill of rights. The act of settlement, and the naturalization bill, clearly proved that this prerogative did not exist in the crown. Mr. Adair confessed himself no enemy to the ordinary prerogatives of the crown, which were known, defined, and legal; but the prerogative which appeared to him dangerous, was that prerogative which, if it at all existed, was unknown, undefined, and unascertained. With respect to what had been said by an honourable gentleman concerning the acquiescence of those who had framed the act of settlement in the subsequent introduction of foreign troops, this was at a time when there was an open

rebellion in the country; the present introduction of fo reign troops, he thought, might be fully justified on the grounds of necessity and humanity; and he should have considered that there was little cause for jealousy, had not the assertion of this prerogative proceeded from a quarter which gave occasion for more than common jealousy, when the question was between the preroga. tives of the crown and the law of the land.

MR. DUNDAS.

On a Motion for raising French Troops for the Service of Great Britain,

JUSTIFIED the war upon the reasons which have been so often detailed, and accused those gentlemen of in consistency, who objected to it as not just nor necessary, because they had pledged themselves in its support; and added to this the further inconsistency of opposing every measure adopted by the executive government for its maintenance. With respect to the present measure, he left it to the wisdom and discernment of the house to deeide, whether it was one which tended to facilitate the object of the war or not, and he would impartially abide by that decision. The present power of France was, he contended, held by the most precarious of all possible tenures; and he thought the great body of the people were far from attached to the present constitution; and in proof of this he mentioned the immense emigrations which had taken place, the massacres, and the insecu rity of life and property. Nothing but protection and

support was, he thought, wanting to induce the French to come forward, and raise their whole force against the convention. The usurpation of France was incompatible with the existence of other governments; and till we could overthrow their system of politics, we must not hope for peace or security. In this endeavour he thought it right to unite with us persons who had the same reasons with ourselves, and who called upon the British nation to give them arms. Whatever might be the advantages we derived from an insulated situation, we could not remain safe while such opinions were disseminated near us, and propagated by force of arms. The authority of books and the dictates of common sense established the maxim, that the government of one country might interfere with and subvert another under certain circumstances. This was a matter of speculative policy applicable to internal discords in time of peace; but in a state of warfare it would be ridiculous to say, we should not do every thing to distress and destroy the government with which we were at war. It was the part of ministers to consider the enemy as an enemy, and devise means to bring them either to reason or to ruin. The hon. gentleman (Mr. Fox) had, he said, dwelt with much plausibility upon the calamity of retaliation : this he said it had frequently been necessary to exercise, however painful the task. It lay with the emigrants to consider the probable effects of retaliation, and they had weighed it well and asked for arms. None could accuse government of compulsion in this instance; the emigrants had themselves adopted the measure, and none could deny the wisdom of their choice; no man of feeling or magnanimity could act otherwise. With respect to this measure having a tenden. cy to prolong the war, Mr. Dundas allowed, that the conquests we had made in the East and West Indies had not the same effect as conquests in France might have had; yet still, by crippling in some degree the resources of the war, they must accelerate peace. We could not however, he contended, hope for peace and security without a