FAITH AND ITS PSYCHOLOGY

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CHAPTER I

'FAITH' AS A RELIGIOUS TERM

(a) In the Bible

I PROPOSE to consider the first of the theological virtues, in order to determine, if possible, in what it consists. I will not begin by attempting a definition of 'Faith'; but a brief indication of the sense in which the word will be used in the course of the discussion seems desirable. Broadly speaking, when we use the word Faith, without special reference to religion, we mean, either the holding for true of something which is not already verified by experience or demonstrated by logical conclusion,1 or confidence in the wisdom and integrity of a person. In the former sense, the corresponding verb is believe,' in the latter it is trust.' In the former sense, the conception of Faith is independent of the character or quality of the thing believed. I may believe in a God or in a devil; in the habitability of Mars or in the man in the moon; or I may believe that if I make one of a party of thirteen at dinner it will be a good speculation to insure my life. The grossest superstition might be called Faith in this sense. But in religious language, to which the word more properly belongs, Faith has a more limited and a more dignified meaning. 'It is the general expression for subjective religion.' .2 It is used for conviction as to certain ultimate 1 Cf. Fechner, Die drei Motive und Gründe des Glaubens, p. 1.

• Dorner.

facts relating to the order of the universe and our place in it. And we shall see in the sequel that this conviction is not the result of a purely intellectual judgment, but has a more vital origin. It involves an eager and loyal choice, a resolution to abide by the hypothesis that the nature of things is good, and on the side of goodness. That is to say, Faith, in the religious sense, is not simply belief; it is inseparable from the sister virtues of hope and love.1

After this preliminary statement about the meaning of the word, I will proceed to sketch the historical growth of 'Faith' as a theological concept. For it is a complex idea and has a history.

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Let us take first the history of the Greek words TíσTɩs and πιστεύειν. Πίστις means the trust which we place in any person or thing, and the conviction, or persuasion, which we hold about any subject.2 Less frequently, it means fidelity, and so the pledge of fidelity, acquiring the meaning of promise, security. Eschylus (Frag. 276) has ouk ȧvdpòs ὅρκοι πίστις, ἀλλ' ὅρκων ἀνήρ; and πίστις became a common technical term for 'proof.' The word first occurs in Hesiod—πίστεις γάρ τοι ὁμῶς καὶ ἀπιστίαι ὤλεσαν avdpas, i.e. in money matters be neither confiding nor suspicious'; while Theognis has learned by experience that it is safest to trust nobody : πίστει χρήματ' ὄλεσσα, ἀπιστίῃ δ' ἐσάωσα. In the first-mentioned sense it is opposed to knowledge, and is thus almost a synonym of δόξα, though πίστις could never (like δόξα) be contrasted with ἀλήθεια, or νόησις, but only with ἐπιστήμη, οι γνῶσις. Very instructive is Plato (Rep. 10. 601): TOû avтoû äpa σκεύους ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς πίστιν ὀρθὴν ἕξει περὶ κάλλους τε καὶ πονηρίας, ξυνὼν τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀκούειν παρὰ τοῦ

1 On the connection between Faith and Hope, cf. Newman, Lectures on Justification, p. 256 n. 'Luther and Calvin both virtually grant that faith and hope are inseparable, or parts of one thing, though Luther (and perhaps Calvin) denies this of faith and love.' Cf. p. 15.

2 Cremer, Biblico-Theological Lexicon, p. 495. • Lightfoot, Galatians, p. 156.

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εἰδότος, ὁ δὲ χρώμενος ἐπιστήμην ( though the implement is the same, the maker will have only a correct belief about the beauty or badness of it whereas the user will have knowledge'). Пioris is not necessarily weak conviction, but it is unverified conviction. As, however, all conviction should seek to verify itself, it may be called incomplete science. Plato (Rep. 6. 511; 7. 533) gives us two divisions of the mind, intelligence (vónois) and opinion (Sóέa), each having two subdivisions. The four divisions thus produced are science (τýμn), understanding (Stávota), belief (or faith or persuasion—íσTIS), and the perception of images (eikaσía). And he says that as being is to becoming, so is intelligence to opinion; and as intelligence is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to the perception of images. Faith, for Plato, is a mental condition which still takes the visible and opinable for true; though it possesses a higher degree of clearness than eikaσía. It is a stepping-stone to true knowledge.

Пlíoris is used in classical Greek of belief in the gods; generally (e.g. Eur. Med. 414) of confidence in them rather than of belief in their existence; but examples of the other sense are not wanting. By the time of Plutarch, Greek thought was already familiar with the idea of 'Faith' as that which guards a traditional deposit of divine truth. Cf. Mor. 756 Β.: ἀρκεῖ ἡ πάτριος καὶ παλαιὰ πίστις, ἧς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν οὐδ ̓ ἀνευρεῖν τεκμήριον ἐναργέστερον. 'The ancient ancestral Faith is sufficient, than which it is impossible to mention, or to discover, anything clearer. If [he continues] this common foundation for the pious life is disturbed and shaken at any point, the whole becomes insecure and suspected.'

The verb TσTEVELV, when used in relation to persons, seems to have expressed a somewhat stronger emotion than the substantive ioris, and accordingly it was not much used in classical Greek of mere belief in the existence of gods. For this belief voμíšev was the regular word,

indicating acceptance of statutory beliefs rather than any warmer sentiment. At the beginning of the Memorabilia, Socrates is accused of not believing in' (voμífew) the gods whom the city worships, and Xenophon replies that since he certainly trusted in the gods, how can it be true that he did not believe in them? So a distinction is recognised which is of great importance in the history of Faith.

In the later Platonists, we have a doctrine of Faith which closely resembles that which I shall advocate in these lectures. The nature of God, says Plotinus, is difficult to conceive and perhaps impossible to define. But we are sure of His existence, because we experience, in our inmost being, expressible and definable impressions when we come near to Him, or rather when He comes near to us. The ardent desire with which we turn towards Him is accompanied by a pain caused by the consciousness of something lacking in ourselves; we feel that there is something wanting to our being. It must be by His presence in our souls that God reveals Himself to us, for we have no means of knowing things except by something analogous to contact. The light of God's presence is brighter than the light of science or reason. But none can see it who is not made like to God, and whose being is not, like that of God, brought to an inner unity. Elsewhere, Plotinus explains Faith as a kind of spiritual perception, as opposed to demonstration (áródeigis), which is the result of reasoning.1

In Hebrew, the verb 'trust' or 'believe' is connected with words meaning 'support' and 'nourish'; and the fundamental idea is stability, trustworthiness. 'Whatever holds, is steady, or can be depended upon, whether a wall which securely holds a nail (Isa. xxii. 23, 25), or a brook which does not fail (Jer. xvi. 18), or a kingdom which is firmly established (2 Sam. vii. 16), or an assertion which has

1 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, v. 5, 11; vi. 7, 24-26; vi. 9, 4.