could do Ireland no real good, while it would prove greatly disgusting to England. Mr. Pownall upon this withdrew his

motion.

Mr. BURKE, with much warmth, declared he never thought the noble lord negligent in his parliamentary duty. The great Lord Chatham, than whom no minister was ever more vigilant in his office, never had attended parliament as he had done. Nor had any minister before acquired so great an influence. But had that influence been employed to any good purpose? If it had, it was an influence every one would wish to see encouraged; but it was procured and established for the sole purpose of subverting the freedom of that House, and the rights and interests of the people. The noble lord had talked much of personal invectives. What personal abuse had there been? Had he concerned himself with him any further than as to his public conduct? That was the only point he had touched upon. As to the noble lord's pretended affection for Ireland, how had he shewn it? There were places, indeed, on the Irish establishment formerly given to Englishmen that were now given to Irishmen; but why were not the pensions themselves taken away? What right, too, had the noble lord, in the name of common sense, to pretend to any care of Ireland? Were there not at this very moment 11,000 landforces actually under arms in Ireland without any kind of subordination upon government, or any member thereof? Was this a fact or not? If it was a fact (and if it was not he desired he might be contradicted) how had the noble lord shewn a regard for Ireland, when she was so miserably supported by the state, as to be obliged to submit to have a body of 11,000 men in arms, neither in the pay or controul of that minister, who had boasted, with such effrontery, of the vast care he had taken of her? These were circumstances that called, indeed, upon the spirited interference of the House. Not that he blamed those soldiers. Both the officers and the men he was sure deserved every compliment that could be paid them. But was

it possible for that House to sit tamely under such a fact? For his part, he was determined not to sit down before he had sifted the matter to the bottom. With respect to the influence of the noble lord, if it produced any thing at all, it was one eternal scene of anarchy and confusion. But what, alas, was that compared with the anarchy that the noble lord had raised, throughout the whole continent of America? Even with the ministry themselves, what but anarchy and confusion was to be seen amongst them? To give the House a recent instance: the noble lord at the side of the noble lord in the blue ribbon (Lord Beauchamp) had taken a principal part, if not the lead, in the Irish business, but though both the noble lords were in administration, and sat together at the same board, yet was the noble lord opposed by the minister in his laudable endeavours in the cause of Ireland.

The Speaker now rose to inform Mr. Burke that he could not suffer him to proceed unless he had some motion to offer to the House. Mr. Burke thereupon proposed, "That an enquiry be made into the fact of there being 11,000 men now under arms in Ireland unknown to government." Lord North did not rise again, and the motion was withdrawn.

MR. DUNNING'S MOTION RESPECTING THE POWER OF THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY TO GRANT OR REFUSE COURTSMARTIAL.

March 15.

THIS day Mr. Dunning, after a very able speech, moved,

"That it is the duty of the lords commissioners of the admiralty, upon charges exhibited to them of naval offences, to direct, refuse, or delay the holding of courts-martial, as, upon consideration of the circumstances of the case, and a due exercise of a sound discretion, there shall be occasion." If this

resolution should meet the approbation of the House, as he doubted not it would, he gave notice, that he would follow it by another, which would bring the question into discussion relative to the good or bad conduct of the admiralty-board, in ordering Admiral Keppel to be tried on an accusation made by Sir Hugh Palliser. That board would then have a full opportunity of vindicating their conduct in the face of the nation, and declaring fairly and openly whether they acted through ignorance or design. He then read his second motion, which was, "That the conduct of the lords commissioners of the admiralty, on the 9th of December last, in coming to an immediate resolution to direct a court-martial for the trial of the honourable Admiral Keppel, commander-in-chief of a fleet of his majesty's ships of war, (on a charge exhibited against him on that day by Vice-Admiral Sir Hugh Palliser, a member of that board,) was, as far as it proceeded upon the ground of a supposed want of discretionary power to refuse or delay that direction, unwarranted by the letter or spirit of the said act of parliament, contrary to the antecedent practice of the Admiralty, and would, if admitted, establish a principle injurious to the service, and detrimental to the state; and that the measure is, upon any other ground, indefensible, under the actual circumstances of the case." After the motion had been supported by Lord Howe and Mr. Thomas Townshend; and opposed by Lord Mulgrave, Mr. Hans Stanley, and Mr. Attorney-General Wedderburn,

Mr. BURKE rose. He was severe on the reasoning of the learned attorney-general. He approved much of his candour and explicit conduct, in reprobating the absurd ideas of his friends, which he had so warmly espoused before Christmas; and lamented that he had not pushed both a little further, and applied them fully on the present occasion. The honourable and learned gentleman, he said, had given up two points without reserve. He acknowledged, that the present board of admiralty possessed every substantial power enjoyed by their predecessors since early in the reign of Charles II., and that the powers so possessed amounted to discretionary powers; but, says the learned gentleman, though a discretion is lodged in the board, they

must not be told that they have it, particularly by this House. When the power is spoken of at first, it is extremely necessary to deny its existence, with a reserve, however, of acknowledging it hereafter, when it can be no longer defended. But attend to the manner and further purpose of this concession: it is acknowledged, that this power exists, but sooner than resolve one way or the other, the honourable and learned gentleman has proposed the previous question. By this means, as well in form as effect, the honourable and learned gentleman, the first law-officer of the crown, tells you, that the admiralty-board were merely ministerial; he tells you now, that he retained a reserve within his own breast of recanting his first opinion, and thereby retaining his credit and integrity. Well, what is the effect of all this? He divides his discourse into three parts; in the first he states the discretion contended for on this side of the House; in the next, that it does not partake of the discretion exercised by grand juries and the court of king's bench, in granting or withholding informations; and, thirdly, because it is not such a species of discretion, and because it is limited, it amounts to no discretion at all. Thus, whether the discretion exists or does not exist, forms no part of the question; for if it does, it arises not from "the circumstances of the case ;" and if it does not exist precisely in that manner, it cannot be exercised.

The learned gentleman continues but a very short time of the same opinion; for, after labouring a great deal to prove that the discretion contended for on this side of the House bears no resemblance to any other species of legal discretion whatever, he spends above half an hour in argument to prove, that though the admiralty-board had a discretionary power, they could not properly exercise it, according to the "circumstances of the case;" the very words in the motion with which he has quarrelled, and his motives for withholding his assent, and getting rid of the motion by the previous question. The vice-admiral was an officer of high rank in the service, of great reputation in his profession, possessing considerable posts and emoluments under government, the loss of which he hazarded on

the truth or falsehood of the accusation preferred by him against his superior officer. Now, by any rule of common sense or deduction, what are all these but the circumstances of the case? Did not the board deliberate and determine upon those circumstances? If they did, then the learned gentleman's ground of objection falls instantly; if they did not, they acted ignorantly and criminally in not exercising that discretion which the law had vested in them.

The learned gentleman finding himself bewildered, however, in endless mazes of intricacy and contradiction, has recourse to a most curious and novel mixture of fact, supposition, and argument. He takes it for granted that Sir Edward Hughes, now destined for the East Indies, should the House come to the proposed vote, will unfortunately go out possessed with the preposterous idea, that he is justified by this vote to exercise a broad discretion. What next? Why, as soon as Sir Edward passes the line, so fate hath decreed it, he will take up some great law authority to peruse, and having perused it, he will then and there find contained in the said law-book, that discretion is the law of tyrants. What then is the conclusion? That Sir Edward will not know in the world what to do. If he disobeys the vote of this House, he will be guilty of a breach of privilege, or at least a breach of duty: if he does not disobey it, then comes his conscience accusing him, reminding him that he has preferred discretion, the tyrant's law. So that if he does not act discretionally, which the law impowers him to do; or if he acts merely ministerially, which the law forbids him to do, according to the concessions of the learned gentleman himself, Sir Edward is sure to remain in doubt and uncertainty, and when he is acting perfectly right, according to his own judgment and opinion, he must be persuaded he is acting perfectly wrong, and contrary to his conscience.

He was willing, however, not to shock the learned gentleman's understanding, by tracing an analogy between the proceedings of the admiralty-board and our courts of criminal and common law. He would acknowledge, that the board had no right to examine witnesses ex parte upon