reason of those who heard him. It was an easy thing, and to the ears of most Englishmen a very satisfactory one, to boast of the magnanimity and the spirit of this country. Such arguments caught the passions, and while they proved nothing, tended to lead astray the judgment and bewilder the senses. Until it was made evident to his understanding, that with thirty millions of debt, which we had incurred by the American war, we were richer than before, and until he was convinced that we could do more with a small force than we had been able to effect with a large army-the best appointed that the world had ever he would not agree, that this was a moment for us to pursue the same system which had put us in such peril, or to continue a war in America, where all our schemes of conquest had been defeated, and where so much of our treasure, and so much of our national force, had been sacrificed

seen

and thrown away. He contended, that great as our resources might be, it was the certain way to exhaust them altogether, to apply them to the furtherance of a design, which experience ought long since to have taught us, it was impossible for us to accomplish.

With regard to avowing the independency of America, gentlemen looked at the position in a wrong point of view, and talked of it merely as a matter of choice, when, in fact, it was now become a matter of necessity. It was in this latter light only that he regarded it-in this latter light only that he maintained that it was incumbent on Great Britain to acknowledge it directly. On the day that he first heard of the American states having claimed independency, it made him sick at heart; it struck him to the soul, because he saw it was a claim essentially injurious to this country, and a claim which Great Britain could never get rid of: never! never! never! It was not, therefore, to be thought that he wished for the independency of America. Far from it. He felt it as a circumstance exceedingly detrimental to the fame, and exceedingly detrimental to the interest of his country. But when, by

more.

much, it was right for him to make the most of the game as it then stood, and to take care that he did not lose This was our case at present; the stake already gone was material, but the very existence of our empire was more, and we were now madly putting that to the risk. The argument of the honourable gentleman was in other words this: "I have lost my Lincolnshire estate— I have lost my coal-mines in Northumberland, and my tinmines in Cornwall, but I have still left a goose-common and a duck-decoy, and I have great magnanimity." It was exactly the language held by those who had gained the estates of minors by dice and hazard -"You lost your estate at the gaming-table-go there again; there it is that you must look for another estate!"

He adverted to what had fallen from Governor Johnstone, relative to the folly of giving up the independency of America, and the still remaining power of this country to conquer and recover her. The honourable gentleman had declared, that the majority of the people of America were still at heart the friends of this country; that they longed most ardently to avow their sentiments of loyalty, and return to their allegiance. The honourable gentleman had said further, that the congress were not chosen by the united voices of the people of America; that they held their situation by force, and that their tyranny was intolerable; and the honourable gentleman had mentioned, that the vote of independency was carried by a majority of two only; and that in the province of Pennsylvania where he was, there he was sure we had 30,000 friends. If these things were so, how happened it, that when we had at Philadelphia an army, the finest ever seen, of 18,000 men, to support the 30,000 provincials, who wished so well to Great Britain, that the 30,000 did not avow their loyalty to Great Britain, and did not deny the authority of the 600 tyrants who formed the monster called Congress, which held them in such oppressive subjection? If 30,000 dared not oppose the usurped power of congress, with such a powerful support at their back, was it likely that they

should hereafter do it, when we were not in the heart of them? The honourable gentleman had also said, that in Massachuset's Bay, which was originally the centre of opposition to Great Britain, as it was the head-quarters of rebellion, the people were divided into powerful factions, equally conducive and promising to the interests of this country; one party opposing congress generally, and the other opposing congress particularly, on account of the alliance they had made with France. Surely, if this had been as the honourable gentleman stated, his majesty's commissioners would have been more successful! The proposals they had made were sufficiently humiliating on the part of Great Britain, sufficiently advantageous on the part of America.

After dwelling for some time on the argument he had been now commenting on, Mr. Burke turned to the subject of resource. Enterprize and spirit, he observed, were good qualities in the field, but bad ones in the cabinet. Prudence and a calm review of the financial powers of a country, were the first objects of a satesman. It was a mad appeal to the passions of a people, whose resources were visibly decaying, that would carry them through where almost every thing depended upon the real sinews of war-men and money. He proceeded to shew, that we had exhausted thirty millions in the progress of the war hitherto; that we should have occasion for nine millions for the service of the ensuing year; and that we had already voted a land-tax of four shillings in the pound. He compared this with the financial situation of France, introducing the conduct of M. Neckar, and the words of the edict lately registered by the parliament of Paris; from which it was evident, that France, to put her navy on a respectable footing, only wanted 800,000l., and that she could raise that sum with the greatest ease, and without imposing any new tax upon her subjects. He compared the different necessities of the two kingdoms, and the different objects of attention, in the eyes of each, giving

LIMITED SERVICE IN THE ARMY.

February 22. 1779.

the order of the day for going into a committee on the mutiny bill, Colonel Barré moved, "That it be an inaction to the said committee, that they have power to receive ause or clauses, for limiting and ascertaining the time of ice of such non-commissioned officers and soldiers as are eady enlisted, and of such persons as shall hereafter be Tisted in the army." After the motion had been supported

Sir William Howe, Sir P. J. Clerke, and General Conway; nd opposed by Mr. Jenkinson, secretary at war, and Colonel Stuart,

Mr. BURKE declared he was never more astonished in his life than he had been at the arguments brought against the present motion. The soldiery, it had been insisted upon, were not in a state of slavery. The question, in his opinion, would be to see whether they were in slavery or not, and if they were, to examine if it was necessary and expedient, for the good of the service, to keep them in that state. What he conceived of a slave was to be compelled to serve at the will of another for life. That he thought was a state of slavery. And was it necessary? Was it expedient? Not one single reason had been advanced in support of it; while, on the other hand, the limiting the servitude of a soldier was proved to be fraught with consequences the most beneficial to the army, as well as honourable to the constitution of this free country. One great use it would have, would be to prevent desertion, as no one would think it worth while to run the risk of losing his life, when he might have but a few years to continue in the army. For what was it that made the life of a soldier so terrible, but his being obliged to serve as such for ever? That "ever" was the dreadful word