and privileges of persons of European or Caucasian race, as it had been sustained under the British imperial power; except as it might be sustained internationally or quasi-internationally between the States, operating as public and private law. And, if there had been any national law affecting the condition of other persons to whom the common law of England did not apply as a personal law, it also ceased to have a national extent on the occurrence of the same events; or had, thereafter, only such effect as was derived from the international provisions of the Constitution.

Hence, whether there would have been a common law in each State which, in the absence of a State Constitution, could have been judicially recognized as a check on the legislature, would be, in each State, before and after the adoption of a State Constitution, a question of the same sort as that of the effect of common law in England against the power of parliament.

§ 484. But though the common law or every national law of the rights of persons may have ceased to have any continuing basis in a national authority, it is plain that, on the principle of the continuous existence of laws, the distinction of two races and of two personal laws applying to those races would continue to be recognized by the judicial tribunals of each State, in the same degree as before, until changed by the thereafter several and independent legislative power thereof; and that the laws which before were received in the State, as personal laws applying to aliens and as private international law, would continue to be recognized; until changed by the State for its own limits, or by the national power held by the general Government over this class of persons in all the States.

§ 485. The fourth of the Articles of the Confederation of November 17, 1777, may have been intended to secure in the several States some international allowance of rights and obligations which had before had a personal and national extent in all the colonies as parts of the British empire. But the effect of this Article on personal condition does not seem to have ever been made a subject of judicial inquiry during the existence of the Confederation. The Article may be thought to have the

form of private law, that is, law which of itself maintains the existence of legal rights in private persons. But since the enacting power was not represented by a general administrative Government, organized with an investiture of the three functions of sovereignty for the purpose of applying municipal (internal) law, the rights declared by that Article had no national guarantee available for the private persons by whom they might have been claimed ; and the Article must have depended on the several juridical will of each State for its coercive effect, having in that respect only the force of a public international compact. It would appear, therefore, that until the formation of the present Constitution of the United States the only restriction on the legislative power of the several States, in reference to persons domiciled in other States of the Union, would (irrespectively of restrictions in the Constitutions of these States themselves) have been these treaty provisions in the Articles of Confederation, and the undetermined force of common law to preserve itself, in its own courts, against the action of a legislating Government.

§ 486. The sum of all sovereign powers to affect private persons in any part of the United States may, or may not, have been exercised, during the Revolutionary period or during the Confederation, in a different manner, or according to a somewhat different distribution of those powers, from that existing under the present Constitution. But, for the present purpose, it is enough to know that the powers vested in the Continental Congress or in the Congress of the Confederation were certainly not greater, in any respect, than those now vested in the present national Government, and did not, in legislation, act so directly on private persons within the limits of the several States. No change, therefore, could have been made in the status or condition of private persons within the several States by the national legislation of the United States anterior to the present national Constitution.

§ 487. Since the provisions of the Constitution of the United States which create or maintain relations of private persons do not determine the possession of individual rights, except inter

nationally or quasi-internationally, and the powers of the national Government over persons and things within the limits of the several States can determine only certain relative rights not primarily entering into the relations of legal status or condition,' the laws affecting individual rights and relations incident to conditions of freedom or its contraries within the States must

2

1 Ante, p. 483.

The expression "freedom and its opposites," has been used repeatedly in previous chapters. A note in Coleridge's Church and State, p. 24, has suggested that the term contrary should have been employed instead of opposite. "Let me call attention to the essential difference between opposite' and 'contrary.' Opposite powers are always of the same kind, and tend to union, either by equipoise or by a common product. Thus the and poles of the magnet, thus positive and negative electricity are opposites, sweet and bitter are contraries. The feminine character is opposed to the masculine; but the effeminate is its contrary. Even so in the present instance, [the topic which he here considers,] the interest of permanence is opposed to that of progressiveness; but so far from being contrary interests, they, like the magnetic forces, suppose and require each other."

In some recent defences of negro slavery the argument is based on the idea that freedom and slavery are not contraries, but opposites; or that they "suppose and require each other." A prominent example is found in the speech of Senator Hammond, of South Carolina, in the recent debates on the Kansas question, in the U. S. Senate, March 4, 1858. "In all social systems there must be a class to do the menial duties, to perform the drudgery of life. That is, a class requiring but a low order of intellect and but little skill. Its requisites are vigor, docility, fidelity. Such a class you must have, or you would not have that other class which leads progress, civilization, and refinement. It constitutes the very mud-sill of society and of political government; and you might as well attempt to build a house in the air, as to build either the one or the other, except on this mud-sill. Fortunately for the South, she found a race adapted to that purpose to her hand. A race inferior to her own, but eminently qualified in temper, in vigor, in docility, in capacity to stand the climate, to answer all her purposes. We use them for our purpose, and call them slaves. We found them slaves by the common consent of mankind,' which, according to Cicero, 'lex naturæ est,' the highest proof of what is Nature's law. We are old-fashioned at the South yet; it is a word discarded now by ears polite.' I will not characterize that class at the North with that term; but you have it; it is there, it is everywhere, it is eternal.

"The Senator from New York said, yesterday, that the whole world had abolished slavery. Aye, the name, but not the thing; all the powers of the earth cannot abolish that. God only can do it when he repeals the fiat, the poor ye always have with you;" for the man who lives by daily labor, and scarcely lives at that, and who has to put out his labor in the market, and take the best he can get for it; in short, your whole hireling class of manual laborers and 'operatives,' as you call them, are essentially slaves. The difference between us is, that our slaves are hired for life and well compensated; there is no starvation, no begging, no want of employment, among our people, and not too much employment either. Yours are hired by the day, not cared for, and scantily compensated, which may be proved in the most painful manner, at any hour, in any street in any of your large towns. Why, you meet more beggars in one day, in any single street of the city of New York, than you would meet in a lifetime in the whole South. We do not think that whites should be slaves either by law or necessity. Our slaves are black, of another and inferior race. The status in which we have placed them is an elevation. They are elevated from the condition in which God first created them, by being made our slaves. None of that race on the whole face of the globe can be compared with the slaves of the South. They are happy, content, unaspiring, and utterly incapable, from intellectual weakness, ever to give us any trouble by their aspirations. Yours are white, of your own race; you are brothers

rest on the exercise of the powers held by the several people of each State since the period of the independent existence of the United States, subject only to the international provisions of the Constitution, and also, though in a different sense of subjection, to that international rule which is law in an imperfect sense only when states are spoken of as its subjects.

§ 488. According to the view herein before taken of the powers of the national Government over the Territories of the United States, the District of Columbia, &c., Congress, in the exercise of the legislative power of the United States, stands in the same relation, towards persons and things in those several jurisdictions, which the several State Governments occupy in reference to persons and things within the limits of their respective States, and is controlled only by the provisions of the Constitution operating as public or as private law, and, perhaps, also by a "common law," identified with the juridical will of the people of the United States.1

§ 489. The question how far any one of the State Governments, or the national Government legislating in and for the Territories, &c., has power to determine the existence of conditions of freedom or its contraries within one of these several jurisdictions, is properly to be made a separate question under the local law of each. There is, however, an inquiry which may be considered generally with reference to all these Governments, which is this: it being assumed that the legislative power held by any one such Government is limited by constitutional provisions having the effect of private law; or, in other words, by those provisions in the Constitutions which, like the English bills of rights and the colonial charter guarantees, secure rights

of one blood. They are your equals in natural endowment of intellect, and they feel galled by their degradation. Our slaves do not vote. We give them no political power. Yours do vote, and being the majority, they are the depositaries of all your political power. If they knew the tremendous secret, that the ballot box is stronger than "an army with banners," and could combine, where would you be? Your society would be reconstructed, your government overthrown, your property divided, not as they have mistakenly attempted to initiate such proceedings by meetings in parks, with arms in their hands, but by the quiet process of the ballot box. You have been making war upon us to our very hearth stones. How would you like for us to send lecturers and agitators North, to teach these people this, to aid in combining, and to

lead them ?"

Compare ante, § 481, note.

to private persons,' and it being also assumed that like clauses, having like effect, may be found in all these Constitutions, including the Constitution of the United States, whether the Governments organized under such Constitutions are thereby restricted either in establishing, or in abrogating, conditions either of freedom or of its contraries; or in their power to establish, or to abrogate, relations incident to conditions of freedom or of bondage.2

§ 490. In this inquiry it is proper first to refer to whatever juridical authority may exist on this topic, and afterwards to

3

1 That is, written guarantees, distinguished from that indefinite restriction which may or may not exist by reason of the fact that the organized Government is not the ultimate possessor of the sovereign powers exercised by it. Ante, § 481.

On the principle of the continuation of laws, it has already been insisted that rights and obligations, incident to relations existing under previous laws, would continue after the establishment of the new Governments, until changed by their authorized legislation. It is needless to refer to judicial action, under both the national and the State Governments, maintaining conditions of freedom and its contraries under preexisting laws. These Constitutions might however contain enacting provisions alterative of pre-existing laws. It will be shown hereinafter that in Massachusetts a declaration in the Constitution of 1780, that the enjoyment of "natural rights" is one of the ends of Government, and attributing to all persons certain rights, as natural, which are inconsistent with a condition of slavery, was taken by the courts to be a legislative abrogation of slavery. See Parsons, C. J., in 4 Mass. R. 123. In other States, whose Constitutions contain declarations very similar, the same effect has never been attributed to them. See H. St. George Tucker, President, in the Court of Appeals of Va., in Betty et al. v. Horton, (1833,) 5 Leigh's R. 622. The question here is of the personal extent of the law attributing rights, as described in the second chapter, or whether it has universal extent or not (ante, §§ 87, 88). In this connection it is a question of internal law, though it is similar to that distinction of laws of universal extent which arises in applying the rule of comity in private international law,

But such constitutional provisions as guarantee individual rights as existing rights, without attributing them to all persons, more than is done in the clause "no man shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law," have never been held to operate as a legislative abrogation of slavery or institution of freedom.

* This juridical authority may be distinguished into two portions; 1, judicial decisions of particular cases, in the determination of which the topic is supposed to be involved: 2, juristical opinion; and in this may be included legislative practice, as being an assertion of public law by persons who, from their position, must be supposed to be conversant with the subject.

And it may here be observed, that a rule or principle of law is never established by judicial action alone. This proposition may not be readily accepted, but it nevertheless appears, from the nature of the judicial function, that a decision by a judicial tribunal binds private persons only as to the rights and obligations involved in the particular case. In every science rules are derived by induction, and to this, there must be a collation and comparison of a number of otherwise unconnected instances or cases, corresponding to experiments in physics. In jurisprudence, general rules are thus obtained by juristical action. In England and America this juristical deduction takes place principally in the reported judicial opinions, and hence, in these countries it is very common to speak of a rule as depending on some decision of a case, in which this juristical action has been exhibited. In continental Europe the judges confine themselves more to a simple decision of the case before them. But the juristical de