Administrators of JOHN COMPTY, deceased, against DEBT on bond, 1,000. Verdict for plaintiffs. Motion for new trial. Columbia, 1802. Where bondi assigned to defendant, was offered in a This action was brought upon a bond given by defendant discount to plaintiffs' intestate. Defendant pleaded the general given by him gainst one to the plain tiffs' intes 8 re tate, issue, and gave notice that he meant to offer in discount, a bond assigned him by William Cunnington, for a sum equal in amount to the amount of the bond sued for, viz. 1,000. given by the intestate in his life-time to the said William Cunnington. Upon the trial, this bond from Compty to Cunnington ceipt or acwas produced, with a regular assignment to Alken, the de- any kind, is fendant in this case. To this bond, however, the plaintiffs objected, alleging that it had been paid off; and for that purpose, offered a receipt to the full amount of the bond offered in discount, to the following effect: "Received May the 20th, 1794, of John Compty, sundry goods by Richard Bolan, to the “ amount of 2007. also some time before, a note of Cornelius "Vanderhorne, før 600l. also an order on John Rutledge, for 200l. which I shall be accountable for. (Signed,) "William Cunnington." Mr. Falconer, for defendant, contended, that this re ceipt not being on the bond, nor specifying on what account these goods and the note and order were delivered to Cunnington, they could not be considered in any other light than as an open account against Cunnington, and as such, the whole was barred by the statute of limitations. For that purpose he quoted Espinasse's N. P. 239. where it is laid down, that a debt barred by the statute of limitations, could not be admitted in discount, and the plaintiff might assigned bond had been paid off. A re quittance of not barred by the statute of limitations, as it is an extinthe debt pro guishment of tanto, and ought not to be assimilated to open ac count. Compty Alken. Admr's of object to it on the general issue. That although Alken was not plaintiff in this action, yet as this receipt went to de-, stroy his discount, he ought to be considered as standing in the shoes of a plaintiff, in rebutting any discount set up against the bond he offered in evidence against the present plaintiffs' claim. He next contended, that a discount could not be set off against a discount. That the act never contemplated any such kind of transactions, only mutual demands between the parties litigant. In reply to this, it was urged on the part of the plaintiffs, that this receipt was evidence of payments made to the amount of the bond offered in discount, and was to be considered as made for the express purpose of satisfying this bond, as no transaction whatever appeared between the deceased in his life-time, and Cunnington, who assigned this bond, excepting the one under consideration. It was admitted that the statute of limitations would bar open accounts, but that the statute never could run against payments, or discharges given by a man who has a demand against another. The presiding Judge, (BAY,) in his charge to the jury, told them, that there was a great difference between open accounts and discharges or acquittances. The former as well as notes of hand, might be barred by the statute of limitations, but that act could never operate against a release or acquittance, because so much as was mentioned in a release or a discharge was an extinguishment of the debt or demand pro tanto. That every receipt was a release in law, and extinguished a debt or demand as effectually as a release under hand and seal. That in the present case, the receipt was for the whole amount of the bond, and as it did not appear, that there were any other transactions between the parties, it was fair to presume that the sums mentioned in the receipt produced, were paid in discharge of the bond offered in discount. And that if the jury should be of his opinion, and there was nothing to justify a contrary one, it would be their duty to reject the bond offered in discount, as having been paid off and discharged. That this could not be considered as a discount against a discount, which would be an absurdity, but evidence of payment of a debt offered in discount, for it had been frequently determined that a bona fide debt transferred to a defendant, might be set off against a plaintiff's demand. That it was, therefore, surely consistent with every principle of law and justice, for the plaintiff, if he could shew that the debt assigned was paid off by him, to give evidence to rebut the defendant's discount offered against him. The Jury, agreeably to the Judge's charge, found a verdict for the plaintiffs, and rejected in toto the defendant's discount. This was a motion for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection, and the verdict being against law. When, after argument, the Judges refused the motion and ordered the rule to be discharged, holding, that a receipt or acquittance of any kind, was not within the intent or meaning of the statute of limitations, and that the construction given by the presiding Judge in his charge to the jury, was perfectly consistent with the rules of law. Present, GRIMKE, WATIES, BAY, JOHNSON, and TRE ZEVANT. BREVARD absent at the time of the argument, Admr's of Y. Alken. Where all the TRESPASS to try title to land in Chester District. witnesses to a will, in or- Verdict for plaintiff. Motion for new trial. der to pass lands are In this case the brief stated that the plaintiff claimed dead, or out under a devise from his father, John Hopkins, deceased. of the state, the hand wri- The will was produced, but all the subscribing witnesses tings, or sig the three natures of all were dead. The hand-writings of two of them were witnesses to proved by a witness produced, but the signature of the third its execution proved, should be either was not, or could not be proved. Upon this proof, however, the presiding Judge (BREVARD) thought proper to send the cause to the jury, who found a verdict for the plaintiff. This was, therefore, a motion to set aside this verdict on the ground of misdirection, and as being against law. Hopkins V. Albertson. When, after hearing counsel in support of the motion, the court was of opinion that there should be a new trial. As the statute expressly requires, that there should be three witnesses to every will to pass lands; consequently, they should be produced, if alive, or within the jurisdiction of the court; if not, then their hand-writings should be proved; for if only the hand-writings of two of them are proved, it does not come up to the meaning and intent of the statute; for the name of the third witness, for aught that appears to the court, may have been forged; in which case, it would only be witnessed by two witnesses, which is not an execution of a will according to the requisitions of the statute, which requires three witnesses; though one credible witness may prove the signatures of all the three witnesses, as was determined in the case of Hopkins and De Graffen- See this case, ante, p. 441. reid. Rule for new trial made absolute. Present, WATIES, BAY, JOHNSON, TREZEVANT, and BREVARD. MATHEW COLEMAN ads. The Guardian of a free Negro Columbia, MOTION for a new trial, in a case tried in Camden, An exemplifi and verdict for plaintiff. This case was tried before Mr. Justice JOHNSON, at Camden, in the District of Kershaw, in order to try the free dom of the plaintiff's ward, a negro named Ben. On the cation of judgment of a court in Virginia, sufficient to esta blish the free dom of a negro in this state. This court is not to examine into the regularities of proceedings of a sister state, although they may at first appear to be irregular; but are bound to presume they are regular and proper, agreeable to the laws of the state from whence they are transmitted. Two years time enough to procure testimony from the state of Virginia, or even less, if due diligence had been used for that purpose, |