but still it was given within the year. All the cases quoted from 3 Black. Com. are strong in point, and prove that leav ing a chasm in the proceedings, without regular continuances from time to time, will amount to discontinuance. But the lapse of seven years, is so great a laches on the part of the plaintiff in this action, that nothing on her part can cure it. Present, GRIMKE, TREZEVANT and BREVARD. WATIES and BAY afterwards accorded with the other Judges in this adjudication. Columbia, 1802. In cases of violent and un CHANELLOR against Vaughn. ASSAULT and battery from Sumter district. Verdict provoked as- for plaintiff. Motion for a new trial. saults, the This appeared from the report of the judge who tried the court will not grant a new cause, to have been a very violent and outrageous assault, trial on ac count of high and without provocation on the part of the plaintiff, in which damages, but Jet violent and the jury gave heavy damages, to wit, dollars; and the racters take present was a motion for a new trial, on the ground of ex turbulent cha the consequenees of their own rude and offensive behaviour. cessive damages. But the Judges unanimously refused it, on the ground that wherever an assault was wantonly committed upon the person of a peaceable citizen, without provocation, as appeared from the report of the judge who tried the cause, it was a very proper case for the consideration of the jury, as it went home to the feelings of every orderly, sober-minded man in the community. It was their province to weigh well and consider all the circumstances of the case, and to assess such damages as they thought would be commensurate with the nature of the injury, and such as would effectually check such an evil. In the present case, however, they did not think the damages excessive. Let the defendant take the consequences of his violent and outrageous conduct; he is entitled to no indulgence from this court, nor will it ever interfere in such cases, unless the damages are unreasonable beyond measure. The peace and good order of the community depended very much on making proper examples of such disorderly and turbulent men as the de fendant appeared to be. Rule for new trial discharged. All the Judges present. Chanellor V. Vaughn. DOUGLASS against FRIZZLE. MOTION to set aside a nonsuit. Columbia, 1802. Where a plaintiff isprevented by accident attending to support his cause on the call of the docket, and his witnesses Upon the call of the docket at the circuit court at Lancaster district, the plaintiff was not ready with his witnesses to go to trial, whereupon he was nonsuited. The day following the order for nonsuit, the plaintiff moved to have his cause reinstated on the docket for trial at the next court, upon sundry affidavits, stating that the plaintiff himself was accidentally prevented from going to court in time to sup- according to port his cause, on the call of the docket, and that several of his witnesses who had promised to attend did not, owing, as he conceived, to a heavy fall of rain, which had raised several of the water-courses so as to make them impassable; but the court below did not think these sufficient reasons, especially as many causes had been very frequently put off, under very frivolous pretences. This was, therefore, a motion to set aside this nonsuit. The Judges, after hearing the reasons for and against this motion, said, that they had very frequently observed do not attend promise, &c. these are reasonable grounds for setting aside a nonsuit or dered for not being ready to proceed to trial. Douglass V. Frizzle. causes postponed on very trifling pretences, and therefore it' was necessary to attend strictly to the call of the dockets in the district courts, as many shameful delays had been experienced in them. But in this case it would be hard to cut the plaintiff off from a chance of justice, as he swears he was prevented by unavoidable accident from attending himself, and that several of his witnesses had promised to attend, but were prevented by a heavy fall of rain and freshes from attending. And although the promise of a witness to attend without a subpæna is not a good ground for putting off a trial, yet, when connected with the other circumstances in this case, it appears to be a reasonable ground within the discretion of the court. Nonsuit set aside. All the Judges present. Columbia, 1802. A person sedu eingaway from her father's THE STATE against EDWARD FINDLAY. MOTION in arrest of judgment. The defendant was indicted on the statute of 5 Philip house a maid and Mary, c. 8. made of force in this state, for taking away under sixteen years of age, a girl under sixteen years of and deflower ing her after wards, with sent of parents statute of 5 ry, c. 8. made of force in this state. age, out the consent of her parents. age and deflowering her, with This statute enacts, that "if any person above the age of fourteen years, shall unlawfully convey or take away any woman child unmarried within the of sixteen years, from the possession and against the will of the father, mother, guardians or governors of such child, he shall be imprisoned two years, or fined, at the discretion of the justices; and if he de"flowers her, or without the consent of her parents contracts matrimony with her, he shall be imprisoned five years, or "fined, at the discretion of the justices; and she shall for "feit all her lands to the next of kin during the life of her "husband." It appeared, from the report of the judge who tried the cause, (TREZEVANT,) that the parents of the girl were poor people, and upon observing too great a degree of familiarity between the defendant and their daughter, forbad him their house, and desired him to have no kind of intercourse with her, as she was a child incapable of judging for herself, and much too young to think of matrimony. That the defendant, however, contrary to their injunctions, still came about the house, as he alleged, to pay his addresses to her, and at length seduced her to go off with him, and had lived openly with her ever since, but whether married or not there was no proof; the parents however believed, and the presumption was, that they were not married. That in frequent conversations with different persons who censured him for his improper conduct in seducing away a child from her parents, he declared, and indeed in some degree boasted, that she was old enough, or woman enough for him, with other expressions of the same import. Upon this testimony, the jury, without any hesitation, found him guilty of the offence stated in the indictment. The present was a motion in arrest of judgment, upon the ground that the indictment did not, upon the face of it, state this young woman to be a maid of the description and quality that the statute was meant and intended to protect; and, therefore, that the defendant was not subject to the pains and penalties of the act. Mr. Egan, in support of the motion, argued, that the statute of Philip and Mary was made for the protection of heiresses and young ladies of fortune, who were in possession or in expectancy of lands and tenements, or other estates of great value, and to prevent their being taken off or married to persons of an inferior degree or condition in life; and that it was not meant or intended to extend to other persons than those mentioned in the preamble of the statute, to wit, heiresses and young ladies of quality. The State V. Findlay. The State V. Findlay. Mr. Stark, the state-solicitor, observed, that to give the statute under which the defendant had been indicted the construction contended for, would be to subject a very large portion of the young women of our country to the seductive arts of lewd and unprincipled men; to the destruction of the peace of families, and the ruin and misery of the unhappy objects themselves, who have been or may be hereafter seduced and deceived. That it was to redress and prevent this great and growing evil, that the statute was made, which should not be confined to the wealthy and opulent alone, but extended to the poorer classes, who needed the aid of the law more than those in opulent circum stances. The Court, after hearing the arguments, was of opinion, that there was not the least ground to arrest the judgment under this conviction. That the act in question was a wise and salutary one, well calculated to preserve the peace of families, to check and punish loose and disorderly men, and to promote the security and happiness of young inexperienced females of all descriptions, whether poor or opulent. That when this act, which had so long stood the test of experience and wisdom in another country, was extended to Carolina by our ancestors,* they could never have intended to discriminate or confine its operation to heiresses or persons of quality only, as there were then but few, comparatively, of that description in this quarter of the world. And although the preamble of the statute seems to relate to that class of young women more than any other, yet when the enacting clauses come to be attentively considered, they are sufficiently broad and extensive to include and protect all the young women of our country, of every degree and condition whatever. * The act of assembly of South Carolina, extending the British statutes to this country, and among others the acts of 5 Philip and Mary, c. 8. passed in 1712, nearly a century ago. |