WILLIAM LINING against JAMES BENTHAM, a Justice of the Peace for Charleston District. MOTION for a new trial. This was a special action on the case, against defendant, for oppression in the execution of his office, as a justice of the peace, by committing the plaintiff to prison, and depriving him of his liberty, &c. &c. It came out in evidence, on the trial of this cause, that Charleston, A justice of the peace, may commit for a con tempt in his presence, and his warrant of commitment under hand and seal, is the best evi dence of such contempt. ble in a spe on the case, one James Duncan had been guilty of a breach of the peace; and that upon an application to Mr. Bentham, as a He is not liamagistrate, by the person injured, he issued his warrant cial action against the offender, in order that he might be apprehended, for what he and bound over to answer for the offence; and in the mean does in his judicial сараtime, to be of good behaviour. That Duncan was taken city, though by virtue of this warrant, and carried before the defendant, as a justice of the peace; who ordered him to enter into a he may be punished on if he acts oppressively. an indictment Lining V. Bentham. recognisance with good security for his appearance at the then next court of general sessions of the peace, &c. for Charleston district, and also for his good behaviour. The plaintiff, William Lining, was present, and offered himself as surety for Duncan, but not being a freeholder in the district, or even a householder in the city; and being perfectly unknown to the defendant, he refused to accept of him; upon which the plaintiff got into a violent passion, and accused the defendant with gross partiality, and abuse of power, in his office as a magistrate, accompanied with very abusive and disrespectful language to his face, and in the presence of a number of by-standers. Whereupon the defendant immediately committed him to the common gaol of the district of Charleston, for this contemptuous behaviour; it was, therefore, for this supposed injury that this suit was commenced. On the trial, Duncan, the first aggressor, was called upon as a witness by the plaintiff, in order to extenuate his conduct, and to shew that he had not behaved in so disrespectful a manner, as to justify the defendant in committing him to gaol, which was objected to by defendant's counsel on two grounds: 1st. Because it would be forming a precedent for two culprits to confederate together, in order to overturn and destroy the power and authority of a magistrate, in the due execution of his authority, in preserving the peace of the community; and, 2dly. Because it would be allowing parol testimony, to contradict the proceedings of a judicial officer, plainly and distinctly set forth in the warrant of commitment, and the facts contained in it as the reasons and grounds for the exercise of such a necessary act of power. It was further urged on behalf of the defendant, that the superior courts of law were bound to protect magistrates and the inferior tribunals established in the country, for the maintenance of peace and good order, unless they were guilty of flagrant abuses of power, for the purposes of oppression. For the plaintiff, in reply, it was contended, that if the testimony of witnesses, who were present at the time and place where the supposed contempt was offered to the magisterial authority of defendant, was refused, and the record or commitment alone, was to be conclusive evidence of the contempt; it would put the citizens of this country very much in the power of magistrates, who might deprive them of their liberties, without the possibility of guarding against the imprisonment of their persons, and that, too, in the most summary and expeditious manner, before they could have an opportunity of vindicating themselves; and although they might afterwards be discharged from such imprisonment, they must in the first instance, be compelled to undergo the ignominy and disgrace, of being confined within the walls of a prison. GRIMKE, J. who tried this case, observed, that he considered it as an important one, involving in it the power and authority of the justices of the peace, throughout the state, on the one hand; and the personal liberty of the citizen, on the other. That unless magistrates were treated with respect, and their authority supported against high handed offenders, the public peace could not be maintained; while at the same time he was bound to say, that the liberty of the citizen was one of the primary objects of the laws of our country. To distinguish, therefore, correctly between the abuse of power, and a proper and well-timed exertion of it, would require the good sense and sound discretion of the jury on this occasion. That every man who was taken before a magistrate, was bound to behave himself with respectful deference to his authority, and to submit to his decisions, (until he could have redress, if injured, from higher authority,) and no man was justifiable in flying in the face of the magistrate's authority, and treating him with contumely and abuse; even if he was mistaken in his opinion, upon any subject of which he had jurisdiction. That, if magistrates, however, under colour of office, should injure or oppress their fellow citizens, they were liable to be punished in a criminal court for their mis conduct. Lining V. Bentham. Lining V. Bentham. That as soon as Duncan was carried before the defendant, it was clearly within his province, to determine whether to bail, or commit him for want of bail. It was also within his province, to determine who was, or was not, a proper person to be accepted as bail; and having done so, it was the duty of the parties to submit to the defendant's decision. With respect to the admission of Duncan, who was the original aggressor, as a witness, he was of opinion, that on strict principles of law, the objection was a good one; as it was easy to foresee, that it would be enabling and encouraging confederates, in opposition to lawful authority, to swear for each other; yet he thought it better on the whole, to let such witness be sworn and leave his credibility to the jury, than to reject him on the ground of incompetency; with liberty to defendant to move for a new trial, in case a verdict should be against him. Duncan was then sworn, and substantially contradicted every thing which had been alleged by the defendant, as a justification for his conduct; after which, the jury retired, and soon after returned into court with a verdict 31. sterling, for the plaintiff, and costs of suit. The present was, therefore, a motion to set aside this verdict, and for a judgment of nonsuit, or a new trial. The grounds taken on this motion, were nearly the same as those taken on the trial of the issue. But it was now further contended on the part of the defendant, 1. That as he acted in his judicial capacity as a justice of the peace, and not in his ministerial one, he was not liable in this action. 2dly. That parol testimony, ought not to have been admitted to contradict the matter contained in the warrant of commitment for the contempt. The counsel, in support of the motion, on the first ground urged, that there was a wide distinction, between the ministerial, and judicial acts of a magistrate. That in his ministerial acts, in putting the laws in force, against offenders of every description, he was bound to see, that the nature of the charge alleged, was such as the party was liable to be prosecuted for; and that supported by the oath or affidavit of the party injured or aggrieved, or some other reputable person on his behalf; also in causing them to be apprehended and brought forward to answer the charges against them, he was to proceed regularly at his peril and if any person was injured by him, by any irregular or improper proceedings, he was liable in this special action on the case for damages. But in his judicial capacity, as a judge, he was liable only by indictment, at the suit of the state; and that too only in cases where he acts corruptly or oppressively. In all these cases he is liable to be punished by the court, according to the nature of the offence. 2 Comyn, 615. 2 Hawk. 85. In the present case it was said, that the magistrate had been guilty of no irregular conduct, in issuing his warrant, and causing the party accused of the assault to be brought before him; so far he acted ministerially. When the offender was brought before him, then his judicial functions commenced, by determining what was to be done with him afterwards; whether to be bailed, or committed. He, it appears, was of opinion, very properly, that being a bailable offence, he should be admitted to bail; but at the same time, when the plaintiff in this action was offered as surety for Duncan, he was further of opinion, that he was not a proper person to be accepted as security, not having the qualifications requisite by law, to qualify him for being such bail. It was therefore upon the determination of this last point, that the plaintiff got into a passion, and vilified and abused the magistrate. He was therefore most evidently, in the legal exercise of his judicial authority, when this contemptuous behaviour was offered to him, and that too for an opinion which he had but a moment before delivered on the subject. This, therefore, it was contended, brought the defendant within the rule of law laid down in the above authorities; and totally exempted him from all responsibility, in the present form of action. It was also urged, in justification of the magistrate, that it was not only lawful and proper for him to exercise the power of commitment, but that there was no other method, Lining V. Bentham. |