II. Thing I propofed, which was to fhew, that this attribute of perfection doth belong to God; and that the divine nature is perfectly bleffed and happy; and this is fo univerfal an acknowledgment of natu ral light, that it would be a very fuperfluous and impertinent work, to trouble you with particular citations of heathen authors to this purpofe; nothing be ing more frequent in them, than to call the Deity, beatiffimam perfectiffimam naturam, the most happy and most perfect being, and therefore happy, becaufe felicity doth naturally refult from perfection. It fhall fuffice to take notice of these two things out of heathen writers, to my prefent purpose: 1. That they accounted happinefs fo effential to the notion of a God, that this was one of the ways which they took to find what properties were fit to attribute to God, and what not; to confider, what things are confiftent with happiness, or incon. fiftent with it; and whatever did fignify happiness, and was a perfection confiftent with it, they afcribed to God, as a fuitable property of the divine nature; and whatever was otherwife, they removed it from God, as unfit to be faid of him. 2. Whatever differences there were among the philofophers concerning the perfections of the divine nature, they all agreed in the perfect felicity of it: even Epicurus himself, who fo boldly attempted to ftrip the divine nature of moft of its perfections, by denying that God either made or governed the world; whereby he took away at once his being the firft caufe and original of all things, and his goodnefs likewife, and wildom, and power, and juftice, or at least made all thefe ufelefs, by taking away all occafion and opportunity for the exercise of them; yet this man does frequently own, and profefs to believe the happinefs of the divine nature; and then, out of an ignorant and officious kindness to the Deity, and (as he pretended) for the fecurity of his felicity, did in effect, take away his other perfections; he would by no means put God to the trouble and burden of inaking the world, or taking care of the affairs of it, left this fhould difcompofe the the Deity, or be an interruption or disturbance of his eafe and felicity. For thus Lucretius, the great difciple of Epicurus, defcribes his opinion of the di vine nature. Omnis enim, per fe, divûm natura neceffe eft, That is, "It is neceffary that the divine nature fhould "be happy, and therefore altogether unconcerned in "our affairs; free from all grief and danger, fuffi"cient for itself, and standing in need of no body, "neither pleased with our good actions, nor pro"voked by our faults." This was a very falfe notion both of God and happiness, to imagine that the care of the world should be a pain and disturbance to infinite knowledge, and power, and goodness. But this is not now my bufinefs to confider; that which is to my prefent purpofe, is, that the happinefs of the divine nature was univerfally owned; and that bleffedness is fo infeparable from the notion of a Deity, that whoever profeffes to believe a God, must acknow ledge him to be perfectly happy. As for the teftimony of fcripture, I have already told you, that there are but two texts wherein this title of panap, the happy or bleffed, is given to God: but by confequence the fcripture every where declares the happiness of the divine nature, viz. whereever it fpeaks of the excellency and perfection of his being, of his knowledge, and power, and wifdom, and goodnefs, and righteoufnefs, and of the eternity and unchangeableness of these, and of the infinite delight and complacency which he takes in the en joyment of thefe perfections. I fhall now proceed to the III. And last thing which I propofed to confider, viz. How far creatures are capable of happinefs, and by what ways and means they may be made made partakers of it. They are not capable of abfolute and perfect happiness,, because that refults from infinite perfection, which is no where to be found but in God: It remains then, that creatures are only capable of being happy in a finite and limited degree, by the refemblance of God, and by the enjoyment-of him; by being like to him, and by our likeness to him, being qualified for his favour, and for the enjoyment of him. As we are creatures of a finite power, and limited understandings, and a mutable nature, we do neceffarily want many of thefe perfections, which are the caufe and ingredients of a perfect happiness. We are far from being fufficient for our own happinefs; we are neither fo of ourfelves, nor can we make ourselves fo by our own power; for neither are we wife enough for our own direction, nor good enough for our own fatisfaction. All the happinefs that we are capable of, is by communication from him, who is the original and fountain of it; by our being made partakers of the divine nature, (as St. Peter fpeaks) by our refemblance of God in thofe perfections which are the most effential ingredients of happiness, his goodnefs and righteoufnefs, and truth, and holiness; thefe do immediately qualify us for the favour and friendship of Almighty God, and for the bleffed fight and enjoyment of him; and the favour of God, and the light of his countenance lifted up upon us, and his friendship and good-will to us, fupplies all the defects of power and wifdom in us For God being our friend, we have an intereft in all his perfections, and a fecurity, that, as occafion requires, they will all be employed for our benefit and advantage; fo that though we are weak in ourselves, we are ftrong in the Lord, and in the power of his might, and are able to do all things through him ftrengthening us; and though we want wisdom, we may have free recourse to the fountain of it, and ask it of God, who gives to all liberally, and upbraideth not. And it is next to having thefe per fections in ourselves, to know where to have them for for asking, whenever we ftand in need of them, fo far as is neceffary to our happinefs. So that though our happinefs depend upon another, yet if we be careful to qualify ourselves for it, (and God is always ready to affift us by his grace to this purpose) it is really and in effect in our own power; and we are every whit as fafe and happy in God's care and protection of us, as if we were fufficient for ourselves. However, this is the highest happiness that the condition of a creature is capable of, to have all our defects fupplied in fo liberal a manner by the bounty of another, and to have a free recourfe to the fountain of happiness, and at laft to be admitted to the bleffed fight and enjoyment of him, in whose prefence is fulness of joy, and at whofe right hand are pleasures for evermore. I have done with the three things I propofed to fpeak to. But to what purpofe, may fome fay, is this long defcription and difcourfe of happiness? How are we the wifer and the better for it? I answer; Very much, in feveral respects. 1. This plainly fhews us, that Atheism is a very melancholy and mischievous thing; it would take away the fountain of happiness, and the only perfect pattern of it; endeavours at once to extinguish the being of God, and all the life and comfort of mankind, fo that we could neither form any idea of happiness, or be in any poffibility of attaining it. For it is plain, we are not fufficient for it of our felves; and if there be not a God, there is nothing that can make us fo. God is the true light of the world, and a thousand times more neceffary to the comfort and happiness of mankind, than the fun itfelf, which is but a dark fhadow of that infinitely more bright and glorious being; the happy and only potentate (as the Apoftle defcribes him in the latter end of this epiftle) who only bath immortality, dwel ling in that light which no man can approach unto, whom no man hath seen, nor can fee, meaning in this mortal ftate. So that the greatest enemies, and most injurious of all others to mankind, are those who would ba nifh the belief of a God out of the world; because this is to lay the ax to the root of the tree, and at one blow to cut off all hopes of happiness from mankind. So that he is a fool indeed, that fays in his heart, there is no God; that is, that witheth there were none; because it is not poffible for a man to wifh worfe to himfelf, and more effectually to destroy his own happiness. 2. If the divine nature be fo infinitely and compleatly happy, this is a very great confirmation of our faith and hope concerning the happiness of another life, which the fcripture defcribes to us, by the fight and enjoyment of God. As we are creatures, we are not capable of the happiness that is abfolutely and infinitely perfect; because our nature is but finite and limited; but the bleffed God, who is infinitely happy himself, can alfo make us happy according to our finite measure and capacity. For, as he that is the firft and original being, can communicate being to other things; fo he that is the fountain of happiness, can derive and convey happiness to his creatures. And we fhall the more eafily believe this, when we confider that goodnefs, as it is the prime perfetion, fo is it likewife the chief felicity of the divine nature. It is his glory and delight to communicate himself, and fhed abroad his goodnefs; and the highest expreffion of the divine goodness, is to communicate happiness to his creatures, and to be willing that they fhould share and partake with him in it. Bafe and envious natures are narrow and contracted, and love to confine their enjoyments and good things to themselves, and are loth that others Thould take part with them but the most noble and moft generous minds are moft free and enlarged, and cannot be happy themselves, unless they find or make others fo. This is the highest pitch of goodness, and confequently the highest contentment, and the fupreme delight of the divine nature. Now it is natural to every being, to be most frequent and abundant in thofe acts in which it finds the greateft pleafures; to |