And if this had been well considered, men would not, by being too intent upon God's sovereignty, with neglect of his other perfections, have spoken those hard things about predestination: for the sovereignty of God doth by no means set him above the eternal laws of goodness, and truth, and righteouf. ness. And if this were confidered, men would not, by poring upon the justice and severity of God, be so swallowed up in despair: for God is not so severe, but he is merciful to the penitent, and hath left a retreat for the returning sinner. If this were well confidered, it would check the presumption of those who encourage themselves in fin, by fancying to themselves a God all of mercy and goodness; and because sentence against an evil work is not speedily executed, therefore their heart is fully set in them to do evil: For it is not goodness and mercy finally to bear with and forgive obstinate offenders, but want of prudence and good government.

Thirdly, Among different opinions concerning God (as there always have been and will be in the world) choose those which are farthest from extremity; because truth as well as virtue usually lies between the extremes. And here I will instance in that controverfy, which has much disquieted the church almost in all ages, concerning the decrees of God; about which there are two extremes, the one, that God peremptorily decrees the final condition of every particular person, that is, their everlasting happiness or mifery, without any regard or confideration of the good or bad actions of men. The other, that God decrees nothing concerning any particular person, but only in general, that men found under such and such qualifications shall be happy or miferable, and puts it into their own power to qualify themselves. Now he that is doubtful in this matter, as every man must be that understands the difficulties on both fides, had best take up in the middle opinion, that God decrees the final condition of particular persons with respect to certain qualifications, which speaking absolutely, are not in every man's power, but yet under the influence of God's grace,

which is never wanting to the sincere endeavours of men, may be said to be in our power, in the same sense as St. Paul says, I am able to do all things through Christ strengthening me: For befides that this in all probability is the truth, there will be this advantage in it, that he that stands in the middle, is like to be more moderate towards the dissenters on both fides, than either of them will be to one another: because the middle is not so far from either extreme, as the extremes are from one another: At the worst, he stands fairest for an impartial enquiry after truth, and when he has fatisfied himself where the truth lies, he may more filently pass over to it, without any great imputation of inconstancy; which cannot but be remarkable in him who passeth from one extreme to another.

Fourthly and lastly, Entertain no opinion concerning God, that doth evidently contradict the praetice of religion and a good life, though never fo specious and fubtile arguments may be used to perfuade it. Truth is most easily seen and difcerned in those reasonings and opinions which tend to practice; because the abfurdity and inconvenience of them is foonest discovered: whereas we cannot so certainly find out the truth or falshood of those opinions which speculative men devise in their studies, without any confideration whether they serve any real purpose of life or not. Men indeed are very apt to form those notions, which are most remote from common sense and use; because more pains and wit are required to make them plausible: but there needs no other argument to make a wife man despise them than that they are unprofitable, and signify nothing to our practice, and to make men truly better.

This is universally true in all kind of knowledge, but most confiderable in the knowledge of God and religion; because that knowledge is of the greatest confideration. We need not scruple to admit some things not so evident to natural reason, if we be satisfied of the truth of them from an higher and VOL. VI.

Z

more cogent reason: As that God has revealed it, and said it; this general reason may perfuade us of a thing that is above and beyond natural reafon: But we may not admit any thing for a divine revelation, which evidently contradicts and weakens the practice of an holy life; because this is the main end of all divine revelation; and we know God, only in order to the service and imitation of him.

Let us then look upon all knowledge that contradicts practice, as vain and false, because it destroys its end. There are many things that seem probable enough in speculation, which yet we most pertinacioufly deny, because they are not practicable; and there are many things which seem doubtful in speculation, and would admit of great dispute, which yet because they are found true in practice and experience, are to be taken for certain and unquestionable. The ἀργὸς λόγος, the idle reasoning of the Stoicks, was a thing contemned by the wifer Philosophers, as a vain and ufeless subtilty. Zeno pretends to demonstrate there is no motion; and what is the consequence of this speculation, but that men must stand till? But so long as a man finds he can walk, all the sophistry in the world will not perfuade him that motion is impossible. In like manner, they that would perfuade us that men can do nothing, nor contribute any more to their own fanctification than stocks or stones, and upon fcripture-metaphors mifunderstood, (as our being dead in trespasses and fins, and created to good works) graft notions, which are impossible and abfurd in practice, do not confider that the natural confequence of this is, that men must do nothing at all in religion, never think of God, nor pray to him, nor read his word, nor go to church, but fit still and be wholly passive to the operations of God's grace. But however this may seem plausible, and men may think they add much to the glory of God's grace, while they deny any power in the creature; yet every confiderate man will presently apprehend, that this is by no means to be admitted, because

it contradicts practice, and makes all the commands and exhortations of God's word vain and to-no purpose, because it destroys religion, and discourages the endeavours of men; makes them floth ful and careless of working out their own salvation, than which nothing can fet a man farther from God's grace and affistance, and more immediately dispose him for ruin: And upon some such false reafoning as this, the flothful Servant in the parable hid his talent in a napkin, and buried it in the earth; but when he was called to account, his excufe was not admitted, but he was cast into utter darkness. The two other particulars, namely, how far we are to imitate the divine perfections, and particularly what those divine qualities are, which our Saviour doth here more especially propound to our imitation, and likewise to clear the true meaning of this precept, and to shew that the duty here enjoined, Be ye perfect, as your Father which is in heaven is perfect, is not impossible to us: Both these I shall refer to another opportunity.

SERMON CXXXI.

Concerning our imitation of the divine perfections.

MATTH. V. 48.

Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.

I

The second sermon on this text.

N these words we have, first, The abfolute perfection of the divinel nature supposed, not only in those before-mentioned, of goodness, and mercy, and patience; but in all other excellencies whatfoever.

Secondly, The perfection of God is propounded as a pattern for our imitation.

In the handling of these two particulars, I propounded to proceed in this method:

I. To shew how we are to conceive of the divine perfection.

II. To lay down some rules, by which we may rectify and govern our opinions concerning the attributes and perfections of God.

III. To shew how far we are to imitate the perfections of God, and particularly what those divine qualities are which our Saviour doth here more especially propound to our imitation.

IV. To clear the true meaning of this precept; and to shew that the duty here intended by our Saviour, is not impossible to us: and then to draw fome useful inferences from the whole.

The two first I have already spoken to. I now proceed to the third particular, which is, To shew how far we are to imitate the perfections of God, and particularly what those divine qualities are which our Saviour doth here more especially propound to our imitation. For though these words do suppose the abfolute perfection of the divine nature, yet because there are several perfections of God, which are incommunicable, and a creature, as fuch, is utterly incapable of them, these cannot be supposed to be intended for a pattern to us. As the necessity and independency of the divine nature; and the self-fufficiency of it to his own happiness; to be the original cause of all things; and confequently fupreme Lord and Governor; the immenfity and eternity of his being; these and perhaps several other perfections, are incommunicable to a creature; and it would be an unfufferable pride, and a kind of high treason against the divine Majesty, and a fottish ignorance of the necessary bounds and limits of our own ftate, as we are creatures, to think to resemble God in these excellencies, of which the condition of a creature is utterly incapable. This was the fin of Lucifer; an ambition to step into the throne of God, and to be like the Most High.

So