..."there is no pain without painbehavior." But instead of answering directly, he says, "It comes to this: only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves...blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious. . . . Only of what behaves like a human being can one say that it has pains. . . . Look at a stone...

...to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behavior?" — It comes to this, only of a living human being can one say: it has sensations;...blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious. If blacks "entered" the English language with values and concepts antithetical to those of the white...

...extended to other contents of consciousness by learning from Wittgenstein's remark, quoted by Cook, that "Only of a living human being and what resembles...living human being can one say: it has sensations . . .." If Wittgenstein and Cook are right, then in one crucial way all the items of a genuinely human...

...you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviourT - It comes to this: only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves...blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious. One might say that Wittgenstein's answer to the first question is yes and no. No, because he is not...

...the body as object. It is at Investigations 281 that Wittgenstein makes the much-discussed remark: "only of a living human being, and what resembles...blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious" (cf. RPPI561). The issue of the relation of the mind to behaviour, and of behaviour and the person...

...its design and impressive its performance may be. Here we may be reminded of Wittgenstein's remark: 'Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves...it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.'1 This may suggest that what we should be talking about are robots, that this is where...

...lendings of life, of human characteristics, would thus illustrate a basic proposition of Wittgenstein's: "Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves...it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious."4 But the fictions I have been studying inhabit a more ambiguous circuit and often pointedly...

...there being natural expressions of pain. Wittgenstein generalizes this point in 281: "It comes to this: only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves...blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious." The point of these remarks is to show that our use of words for sensations is tied up with the natural...

...worrying criticism of our use of everyday words to describe how the brain works. Wittgenstein wrote: 'Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves...say: it has sensations: it sees; is blind: hears; is conscious or unconscious' (Wittgenstein1). Anthony Kenny2, in his spirited defence of The [A'IIUCII...

...say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?" — It comes to this: only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves...blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious. 283. What gives us so much as the idea that living beings, things, can feel? Is it that my education...