Futelity for 66 66 66 fourth proposition; but indeed that is not the author's 66 what In what I imagine will always hold true, whatever you or any one can say or think to the contrary. That which you say is, "Force indirectly and at a "distance may do some service." What you mean by doing service at a distance, towards the bringing men to salvation, or to embrace the truth, I confess I do not understand; unless perhaps it be what others, in propriety of speech, call by accident. But be it what it will, it is such a service as cannot be ascribed to the direct and proper efficacy of force. And so, say you, "Force, indirectly, and at a distance, may do some "service." I grant it: make your best of it. do you What conclude from thence, to your purpose? That therefore the magistrate may make use of it? That I deny, that such an indirect, and at a distance usefulness, will authorise the civil power in the use of it, that will never be proved. Loss of estate and dignities may make a proud man humble sufferings and imprisonment may make a wild and debauched man sober: and so these things may "indirectly, and at a distance, be serviceable towards the salvation of men's "souls." I doubt not but God has made some, or all of these, the occasions of good to many men. But will you therefore infer, that the magistrate may take away a man's honour, or estate, or liberty, for the salvation of his soul; or torment him in this, that he may be happy in the other world? What is otherwise unlawful in 7 itself, as it certainly is to punish a man without a fault; can never be made lawful by some good that, indirectly and at a distance, or, if you please, indirectly and by accident, may follow from it. Running a man through, may save his life, as it has done by chance, opening a lurking imposthume. But will you say therefore, that this is lawful, justifiable chirurgery? The gallies, it is like, might reduce many a vain, loose protestant to repentance, sobriety of thought, and a true sense of religion: and the torments they suffered in the late persecution might make several consider the pains of hell, and put a due estimate of vanity and contempt on all things of this world. But will you say, because those punishments might, indirectly and at a distance, serve to the salvation of men's souls, that therefore the king of France had right authority to make use of them? If your indirect and at a distance serviceableness may authorize the magistrate to use force in religion, all the cruelties used by the heathens against christians, by papists against protestants, and all the persecuting of christians one among another are all justifiable. But what if I should tell you now of other effects, contrary effects, that punishments in matters of religion may produce; and so may serve to keep men from the truth and from salvation? What then will become of your indirect and at a distance usefulness? For in all pleas for a thing because of its usefulness, it is not enough to say as you do, and is the utmost that can be said for it, that it may be serviceable: but it must be considered not only what it may, but what it is likely to produce: and the greater good or harm like to come from it, ought to determine the use of it. To show you what effects one may expect from force, of what usefulness it is to bring men to embrace the truth, be pleased to read what you yourself have writ: "I can"not but remark, say you, that these methods (viz. "depriving men of estates, corporal punishment, starv"ing and tormenting them in prisons, and in the end "even taking away their lives, to make them christians) are so very improper in respect to the design "of them, that they usually produce the quite contrary effect. For whereas all the use which force can "have for the advancing true religion, and the salva❝tion of souls, is (as has already been showed) by dis"posing men to submit to instruction, and to give a "fair hearing to the reasons which are offered for the "enlightening their minds, and discovering the truth "to them; these cruelties have the misfortune to be "commonly looked upon as so just a prejudice against any religion that uses them, as makes it needless to "look any farther into it: and to tempt men to reject "it, as both false and detestable, without ever vouch"safing to consider the rational grounds and motives of it. This effect they seldom fail to work upon the "sufferers of them. And as to the spectators, if they " be "be not beforehand well instructed in those grounds " and motives, they will be much tempted likewise, "not only to entertain the same opinion of such a religion, but withal to judge much more favourably "of that of the sufferers; who, they will be apt to "think, would not expose themselves to such extre"mities, which they might avoid by compliance, if they were not thoroughly satisfied of the justice of "their cause." Here then you allow that taking away men's estates, or liberty, and corporal punishments, are apt to drive away both sufferers and spectators from the religion that makes use of them, rather than to it. And so these you renounce. Now if you give up punishments of a man, in his person, liberty, and estate, I think we need not stand with you, for any other punishments that may be made use of. But, by what follows, it seems you shelter yourself under the name of severities. For moderate punishments, as you call them in another place, you think may be serviceable; indirectly, and at a distance serviceable, to bring men to the truth. And I say, any sort of punishments disproportioned to the offence, or where there is no fault at all, will always be severity, unjustifiable severity, and will be thought so by the sufferers and by-standers; and so will usually produce the effects you have mentioned, contrary to the design they are used for. Not to profess the national faith, whilst one believes it not to be true; not to enter into church-communion with the magistrate as long as one judges the doctrine there professed to be erroneous, or the worship not such as God has either prescribed, or will accept; this you allow, and all the world with you must allow, not to be a fault. But yet you would have men punished for not being of the national religion; that is, as you yourself confess, for no fault at all. Whether this be not severity, nay so open and avowed injustice, that it will give men a just prejudice against the religion that uses it, and produce all those ill effects you there mention, I leave you to consider. So that the name of severities, in opposition to the moderate punishments you speak for, can do you no service at all. For where there is no fault, there can be no moderate punishment: all punishment is immoderate, F 4 moderate, where there is no fault to be punished. But of your moderate punishment we shall have occasion to speak more in another place. It suffices here to have shown, that, whatever punishments you use, they are as likely to drive men from the religion that uses them, as to bring them to the truth; and much more likely, as we shall see before we have done: and so by your own confession they are not to be used. 66 One thing in this passage of the author, it seems, appears absurd to you; that he should say, "That to take away men's lives, to make them christians, was but "an ill way of expressing a design of their salvation." I grant there is great absurdity somewhere in the case. But it is in the practice of those who, persecuting men under a pretence of bringing them to salvation, suffer the temper of their good-will to betray itself, in taking away their lives. And whatever absurdities there be in this way of proceeding, there is none in the author's way of expressing it; as you would more plainly have seen, if you had looked into the Latin original, where the words are, "Vitâ denique ipsâ privant, ut "fideles, ut salvi fiant; which, though more literally, might be thus rendered, "to bring them to the faith "and to salvation;" yet the translator is not to be blamed, if he chose to express the sense of the author, in words that very livelily represented the extreme absurdity they are guilty of, who under pretence of zeal for the salvation of souls, proceed to the taking away their lives. An example whereof we have in a neighbouring country, where the prince declares he will have all his dissenting subjects saved, and pursuant thereunto has taken away the lives of many of them. For thither at last persecution must come: as I fear, notwithstanding your talk of moderate punishments, you yourself intimate in these words: "Not that I think the sword "is to be used in this business' (as I have sufficiently "declared already), but because all coactive power re"solves at last into the sword; since all (I do not say, "that will not be reformed in this matter by lesser pe nalties, but) that refuse to submit to lesser penalties "must at last fall under the stroke of it." In which words, |