that it cannot be inferred from the magistrate's being obliged to promote by force the true religion, that every magistrate is obliged to promote by force his own religion. And that for the same reason you had given before, more perplexed and obscurely, viz. " Because "there is this perpetual advantage on the side of the "true religion, that it may and ought to be believed on clear and solid grounds, such as will appear the "more so, the more they are examined: whereas no "other religion can be believed so, but upon such appearances only, as will not bear a just examina❝tion."

66

This would be an answer to what have said, if it were so that all magistrates saw the preponderancy of the grounds of belief, which are on the side of the true religion; but since it is not the grounds and reasons of a truth that are not seen, that do or can set the magistrate upon doing his duty in the case; but it is the persuasion of the mind, produced by such reasons and grounds as do affect it, that alone does, or is capable to determine the magistrate in the use of force, for performing of his duty; it necessarily follows, that if two magistrates have equally strong persuasions concerning the truth of their religions respectively, they must both be set on work thereby, or neither; for though one be of a false, and the other of the true religion; yet the principle of operation, that alone which they have to determine them, being equal in both, they must both be determined by it; unless it can be said, that one of them must act according to that principle, which alone can determine; and the other must act against it: that is, do what he cannot do; be determined to one thing, by what at the same time determines him to another. From which incapacity in magistrates to perform their duty by force to promote the true religion, I think it may justly be concluded, that to use force for the promoting any religion cannot be their duty.

You tell us, it is by the law of nature magistrates are obliged to promote the true religion by force. It must be owned, that if this be an obligation of the law of nature, very few magistrates overlook it; so forward

are

are they to promote that religion by force which they
take to be true. This being the case, I beseech you tell
me what was Huaina Capac, emperor of Peru, obliged
to do? Who, being persuaded of his duty to promote
the true religion, was not yet within distance of know-
ing or so much as hearing of the christian religion,
which really is the true (so far was he from a possibility
to have his belief grounded upon the solid and clear
proofs of the true religion.) Was he to promote the true
religion by force? That he neither did nor could know
any thing of; so that was morally impossible for him to
do.
Was he to sit still in the neglect of his duty in-
cumbent on him? That is in effect to suppose it a duty
and no duty at the same time. If, upon his not know-
ing which is the true religion, you allow it not his duty
to promote it by force, the question is at an end: you
and I are agreed, that it is not the magistrate's duty by
force to promote the true religion. If you hold it in
that case to be his duty; what remains for him to do,
but to use force to promote that religion which he him-
self is strongly, nay, perhaps to the highest degree of
firmness, persuaded is the true? Which is the granting
what I contend for, that, if the magistrate be obliged
to promote by force the true religion, it will thence
follow, that he is obliged to promote by force that re-
ligion which he is persuaded is the true; since, as you
will have it, force was given him to that end, and it is
his duty to use it; and he hath nothing else to deter-
mine it to that end but his own persuasion. So that one
of these two things must follow, either that in that case
it ceases to be his duty, or else he must promote his own
religion; choose you which you please

*

*

AITH, articles of it not to be

96 Fimpofed by human laws, 39