book, to tell me directly what it is. In all other pu-
nishments that ever I heard of yet, till now that you
have taught the world a new method, the design of them
has been to cure the crime they are denounced against,
and so I think it ought to be here. What I beseech
you is the crime here? Dissenting? That you say not
any-where, is a fault. Besides
Besides you tell us," that the
"magistrate hath not authority to compel any one to
"his religion:" and that you do not require that
"men should have no rule but the religion of the coun-
"try." And the power you ascribe to the magistrate
is given him to bring men, " not to his own, but to the
"true religion." If dissenting be not the fault, is it
that a man does not examine his own religion, and the
grounds of it? Is that the crime your punishments are
designed to cure? Neither that dare you say; lest you
displease more than you satisfy with your new disci-
pline. And then again, as I said before, you must tell
us how far you would have them examine, before you
punish them for not doing it. And I imagine, if that
were all we required of you, it would be long enough
before you would trouble us with a law, that should
prescribe to every one how far he was to examine mat-
ters of religion; wherein if he failed and came short,
he was to be punished; if he performed, and went in
his examination to the bounds set by the law, he was
acquitted and free. Sir, when you consider it again,
you will perhaps think this a case reserved to the great
day, when the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open;
for I imagine it is beyond the power or judgment of
man, in that variety of circumstances, in respect of
parts, tempers, opportunities, helps, &c. men are in,
in this world, to determine what is every one's duty in
this great business of search, inquiry, examination; or
to know when any one has done it. That which makes
me believe you will be of this mind, is, that where you
undertake for the success of this method, if rightly used,
it is with a limitation, upon such as are not altogether
incurable. So that when your remedy is prepared ac-
cording to art, which art is yet unknown; and rightly

applied, and given in a due dose, all which are secrets; it will then infallibly cure. Whom? All that are not incurable by it. And so will a pippin posset, eating fish in Lent, or a presbyterian lecture, certainly cure all that are not incurable by them; for I am sure you do not mean it will cure all, but those who are absolutely incurable; because you yourself allow one means left of cure, when yours will not do, viz. the grace of God. Your words are, "what means is there left (except the grace of God) to reduce them, but lay thorns "and briars in their way." And here also, in the place we were considering, you tell us, "the incurable are "to be left to God." Whereby, if you mean they are to be left to those means he has ordained for men's conversion and salvation, yours must never be made use of: for he indeed has prescribed preaching and hearing of his word; but as for those who will not hear, I do not find any-where that he has commanded they should be compelled or beaten to it.

There is a third thing that you are as tender and reserved in, as either naming the criminals to be punished, or positively telling us the end for which they should be punished: and that is with what sort of penalties, what degree of punishment they should be forced. You are indeed so gracious to them, that you renounce the severities and penalties hitherto made use of. You tell us, they should be but moderate penalties. But if we ask you what are moderate penalties, you confess you cannot tell us. So that by moderate here you yet mean nothing. You tell us, "the outward force to be ap"plied should be duly tempered." But what that due temper is, you do not, or cannot say and so in effect it signifies just nothing. Yet if in this you are not plain and direct, all the rest of your design will signify nothing; for it being to have some men, and to some end, punished; yet if it cannot be found what punishment is to be used, it is, notwithstanding all you have said, utterly useless. "You tell us modestly, that to determine "precisely the just measure of the punishment, will re"quire some consideration." If the faults were pre

cisely determined, and could be proved, it would require no more consideration to determine the measure of the punishment, in this, than it would in any other case, where those were known. But where the fault is undefined, and the guilt not to be proved, as I suppose it will be found in this present business of examining; it will without doubt require consideration to proportion the force to the design. Just so much consideration as it will require to fit a coat to the moon, or proportion a shoe to the foot of those who inhabit her; for to proportion a punishment to a fault that you do not name, and so we in charity ought to think you do not yet know; and a fault that when you have named it, will be impossible to be proved who are or are not guilty of it; will I suppose require as much consideration, as to fit a shoe to feet whose size and shape are not known.

However, you offer some measures whereby to regulate your punishments; which when they are looked into, will be found to be just as good as none; they being impossible to be any rule in the case.

is 66

The first

so much force, or such penalties as are ordinarily "sufficient to prevail with men of common discretion, "and not desperately perverse and obstinate, to weigh "matters of religion carefully and impartially, and "without which ordinarily they will not do this." Where it is to be observed:

1. That who are these men of common discretion, is as hard to know, as to know what is a fit degree of punishment in the case; and so you do but regulate oné uncertainty by another. Some men will be apt to think, that he who will not weigh matters of religion, which are of infinite concernment to him, without punishment, cannot in reason be thought a man of common discretion. Many women of common discretion, enough to manage the ordinary affairs of their families, are not able to read a page in an ordinary author, or to understand and give an account what it means, when read to them. Many men of common discretion in their callings, are not able to judge when an argument is conclusive or no; much less to trace it through a long train

of

of consequences. What penalties shall be sufficient to prevail with such, who upon examination, I fear, will not be found to make the least part of mankind, to examine and weigh matters of religion carefully and impartially! The law allows all to have common discretion, for whom it has not provided guardians or bedlam; so that, in effect, your men of common discretion are all men, not judged idiots or madmen: and penalties sufficient to prevail with all men of common discretion, are penalties sufficient to prevail with all men, but idiots and madmen. Which what a measure is to regulate penalties by, let all men of common discretion judge.

2. You may be pleased to consider, that all men of the same degree of discretion, are not apt to be moved by the same degree of penalties. Some are of a more yielding, some of a more stiff temper; and what is sufficient to prevail on one, is not half enough to move the other; though both men of common discretion; so that common discretion will be here of no use to determine the measure of punishment: especially when in the same clause you except men desperately perverse and obstinate, who are as hard to be known, as what you seek, viz. the just proportions of punishments necessary to prevail with men to consider, examine, and weigh matters of religion; wherein, if a man tells you he has considered, he has weighed, he has examined, and so goes on in his former course; it is impossible for you ever to know whether he has done his duty, or whether he be desperately perverse and obstinate; so that this exception signifies just nothing.

There are many things in your use of force and penalties, different from any I ever met with elsewhere One of them, this clause of yours concerning the measure of punishments, now under consideration, offers me: wherein you proportion your punishments only to the yielding and corrigible, not to the perverse and obstinate; contrary to the common discretion which has hitherto made laws in other cases, which levels the punishments against refractory offenders, and never spares them because they are obstinate. This, however, I will

not

not blame as an oversight in you. Your new method, which aims at such impracticable and inconsistent things as laws cannot bear, nor penalties be useful to, forced you to it. The uselessness, absurdity, and unreasonableness of great severities, you had acknowledged in the foregoing paragraphs. Dissenters you would have brought to consider by moderate penalties. They lie under them; but whether they have considered or no, (for that you cannot tell) they still continue dissenters. What is to be done now? Why, the incurable are to be left to God, as you tell us, p. 12. Your punishments were not meant to prevail on the desperately perverse and obstinate, as you tell us here; and so whatever be the success, your punishments are however justified.

66

You have given us in another place something like another boundary to your moderate penalties: but when examined, it proves just like the rest, trifling only, in good words, so put together as to have no direct meaning; an art very much in use amongst some sort of learned men. The words are these: such penalties as may not tempt persons who have any concern for "their eternal salvation, (and those who have none, ought not to be considered) to renounce a religion "which they believe to be true, or profess one which they do not believe to be so." If by any concern, you mean a true concern for their eternal salvation, by this rule you may make your punishments as great as you please; and all the severities you have disclaimed may be brought in play again: for none of those will be able to make a man," who is truly concerned for "his eternal salvation, renounce a religion he believes

to be true, or profess one he does not believe to be "so." If by those who have any concern, you mean such who have some faint wishes for happiness hereafter, and would be glad to have things go well with them in the other world, but will venture nothing in this world for it; these the moderatest punishments you can imagine, will make change their religion. If by any concern, you mean whatever may be between these two; the degrees are so infinite, that to proportion

your