CONTENTS.

xvii

SEC.

43. Of the condition of freedom and its contraries,

44. Of legal persons and chattel slaves,

45. Of bondage of legal persons,

46. Use of the term slavery,

47. Different kinds of slavery distinguished,

Extent of law.

48. International law divided into two portions,

49. The first portion described, a law in the secondary sense,
50. The second portion described, a law in the primary sense,
51. Of the dominion of a state and its national law,

52. The exposition of law is always historical,

53. The national law is internal or international according to its personal

55. The law has different extent to different persons,

56. Its extent to persons depends on the will of the state,

57. Of laws of universal personal extent,

58. The extent of laws manifested in the application of international
law,

46

46

47

CHAPTER II.

FARTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE NATURE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW; ITS ORIGIN AND APPLICATION. ITS EFFECT UPON CONDITIONS
OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE.

Conceptions preliminary to the existence of private international law.
59. Connection of the subject with axioms already stated,
60. International law acts on private persons in being enforced by some

one state,

61. Private persons are distinguished by axiomatic principles of universal
jurisprudence,

62. Of the universal reception of such maxims in international law,
63. Statement of the first two of these maxims,

64. These maxims are law in the secondary sense,
65. A distinction among the relations recognized in international law,

66. A necessary difference of international cooperation in determining

these relations,

67. Statement of the third maxim,

68. Necessary identity and coexistence of these maxims,

69. The international law, how distinguishable from internal law,

B

SEC.

In what manner private international law is developed.

70. Possibility of a maxim of international law which shall be a rule of
action,

71. Difference in the power of any one state to determine one or the
other class of international relations,

72. Difficulty of finding a rule greater in respect to one class of relations
than the other,

73. Under which class of relations are those of which status or condition
is an incident,

74. The recognition of anterior subjection to a foreign law,.

75. Of rights which may and which may not continue after a change of
jurisdiction,

Duty of judicial tribunals applying international law.

76. The tribunal must ascertain the will of the state in the case,

PAGE

60

61

62

63

64

65

81. How later jurists have followed Huber,
82. Story's version of Huber's third maxim,

83. Fælix concurring with Story,

66

77. Consequence of the recognition of the jural character of the laws of

84. Practical effect of the ordinary doctrine of judicial comity,

85. Judicial measure of the allowance of foreign laws under what is call-
ed comity,

86. Laws of different origin but similar in effect,

87. Laws of different origin and dissimilar in effect,

88. The effect of foreign laws limited by laws having universal personal
extent,

89. Of exceptions to the extent.of laws otherwise known as universal in
extent,

90. Effect of such exception in the allowance of foreign law under what
is called comity,

91. Individual rights may be attributed by laws of universal personal
extent,

83

95. Universal jurisprudence, derived a posteriori, becomes applied a

priori,

87

92. Laws of universal personal extent discriminated by judicial action,
93. The juridicial action of all or many nations is a criterion of the ex-
tent of laws,

94. Universal jurisprudence cognizable from the history of the law
among all or many nations,

CONTENTS.

xix

SEC.

PAGE

96. Judicial allowance of effects ascribed to universal jurisprudence, . 87
97. But universal jurisprudence has not authority independently of the
authority of some national law,

98. Universality predicable of law with reference to different subjects of
its extent, nations, and individuals,

99. Effects of universal jurisprudence may be limited by laws of uni-
versal personal extent,

100. Justification of the recognition of a universal jurisprudence notwith-
standing this limitation,

89

90

91

101. Universal jurisprudence developed by the application of interna-

tional law,

93

102. How laws of universal personal extent may be judicially discrim-
inated,

103. Of legislation as limiting the judicial application of elementary prin-
ciples,

of international law determining status or personal condition.
104. Of international law regarded as a department of private law,
105. Impropriety of the term conflict of laws,

106. In having international recognition laws have a personal extent,
107. Their international recognition is not dependent on their personal

character,

108. Laws of personal condition or status may receive international re-
cognition,

109. Personality or legal capacity a necessary topic of private interna-
tional law,

110. Relations incident to status are internationally recognized when as-
cribed to universal jurisprudence,

111. Principles of a universal jurisprudence may be applied to a partic-
ular class of persons,

112. How far conditions of freedom or of bondage can be attributed to
universal jurisprudence,

113. Conditions supported by universal jurisprudence become conditions
under the law of the forum,

114. Conditions not so supported may still be sustained by what is called

comity,

115. The recognition of chattel slavery under comity limited by universal
attribution of personality,

103

116. The recognition of the bondage of legal persons limited by the uni-
versal attribution of individual rights,
117. Slavery created by foreign law recognized where liberty is not uni-
versally attributed,

118. May still not be recognized, though a bondage exists under the local

law,

SEC.

119. Though disallowed, slavery is not supposed to be contrary to justice
in the place of domicil,

120. Though disallowed in the forum, its incidental effects in the foreign
jurisdiction may be recognized,

121. These principles may operate as internal law, as well as interna-

tional law,

122. Action of judicial tribunals distinguished from the autonomic act
of the sovereign,

PAGE

110

.

111

112

112

CHAPTER III.

OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MUNICIPAL (NATIONAL) LAW IN THE ENG-

LISH COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA. PERSONAL EXTENT OF THE
COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND.

Political foundation of law in the colonies.

123. On a change of sovereigns the territorial law of a country con-

tinues,

124. The personal quality of laws manifested in colonization,

125. Of the extent of English law in countries acquired by the British

126. The common law of England accompanied the English colonist as
a personal law, .
127. Local laws of the colonies required not to be contrary to that law,
128. Of political authority in America derived from the compacts of the
colonists,

129. Of the force of legislative declarations by the local governments of
the rights of private persons,

130. Of the common law, having personal extent, as a political guaran-
tee of the rights of the colonists,

131. Of English common law as limiting the legislative power of the
Government,

132. The common law of England had the character of a national law
in the colonies,

.

Of personal condition as an effect of English law in the colonies.
133. Of freedom or liberty as the result of positive law, both public and

private,

129

134. Civil and political liberty, liberty by public and by private law,

distinguished,

130

135. The idea of civil freedom includes that of a political guarantee,

130

SEC.

CONTENTS.

xxi

PAGE

136. The liberties of the English colonists, rested on common law of
national character,

131

137. The entire body of common law was not, as a personal law, trans-
ferable to the colonies,

132

138. The right of property under this personal law, existed only in refer-
ence to things known to the law of England,

133

139. The English law of individual rights, and capacity for relative
rights, was the law of status for the English colonist, .

140. Of the guarantees in English law of the rights incident to free con-
dition,

141. Villenage at common law was never transferred to the colonies
under personal laws,

135

143. Of the rights of the master, incident to that relation, in respect to
third persons,

142. The relation of master and servant under the law so transferred
was one founded on consent,

137

138

144. Of universal jurisprudence, affecting personal condition, forming

a part of English common law,

145. Ordinary apprehension of the extent of the attribution of personal
liberty by English law,

146. In what sense the law of nations is said to be part of the law of
England,

CHAPTER IV.

ESTABLISHMENT OF MUNICIPAL LAW IN THE COLONIES, THE SUBJECT CON-
TINUED. OF PRINCIPLES OF UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE, RELATING
TO FREEDOM AND ITS OPPOSITES, ENTERING INTO THE COMMON LAW
OF ENGLAND.

Of the evidence of the existence of a principle of universal juris-

prudence.

147. Proposed exhibition of doctrines of universal jurisprudence affect-
ing status at the planting of the colonies,

148. Of the Roman law as an exposition of universal jurisprudence,
149. Conception of jurisprudence by the civilians, as including ethics,

pointed out,

Of the analysis of law which is made in the Institutes.

151. Analysis of jus privatum according to its supposed origin; recog-

nition of a jus naturale,

147