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over the remainder, and give you my thoughts on every thing I shall meet with in it, that seems to need any answer. In one place you argue against the author thus: if then the author's fourth proposition, as you call it, viz. That force is of no use for promoting true religion and the salvation of souls, "be not true (as perhaps by this time it appears it is not) then the "last proposition, which is built upon it, must fall with "it;" which last proposition is this, viz. " that nobody can have any right to use any outward force or compulsion to bring men to the true religion, and so "to salvation." If this proposition were built, as you allege, upon that which you call his fourth, then indeed if the fourth fell, this built upon it would fall with it. But that not being the author's proposition, as I have showed, nor this built wholly on it, but on other reasons, as I have already proved, and any one may see in several parts of his letter, particularly p. 351, 352, what you allege falls of itself.

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The business of the next paragraph is to prove, that if "force be useful, then somebody must certainly have "a right to use it." The first argument you go about to prove it by, is this, "That usefulness is as good an "argument to prove there is somewhere a right to use

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it, as uselessness is to prove nobody has such a right.' If you consider the things of whose usefulness or uselessness we are speaking, you will perhaps be of another mind. It is punishment, or force used in punishing. Now all punishment is some evil, some inconvenience, some suffering; by taking away or abridging some good thing, which he who is punished has otherwise a right

Now to justify the bringing any such evil upon any man, two things are requisite. First, That he who does it has commission and power so to do. Secondly, That it be directly useful for the procuring some greater good. Whatever punishment one man uses to another, without these two conditions, whatever he may pretend, proves an injury and injustice, and so of right ought to have been let alone. And therefore, though usefulness, which is one of the conditions that makes punishments just, when it is away, may hinder punishments from

being lawful in any body's hands; yet usefulness, when present, being but one of those conditions, cannot give the other, which is a commission to punish; without which also punishment is unlawful. From whence it follows, That though useless punishment be unlawful from any hand, yet useful punishment from every hand is not lawful. A man may have the stone, and it may be useful, more than indirectly, and at a distance useful, to him to be cut; but yet this usefulness will not justify the most skilful surgeon in the world, by force to make him endure the pain and hazard of cutting; because he has no commission, no right without the pa tient's own consent to do so. Nor is it a good argument, cutting will be useful to him, therefore there is a right somewhere to cut him, whether he will or no. Much less will there be an argument for any right, if there be only a possibility that it may prove useful indirectly and by accident.

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For

Your other argument is this: If force or punishment be of necessary use, "then it must be acknowledged, "that there is a right somewhere to use it; unless we "will say (what without impiety cannot be said) that "the wise and benign disposer and governor of all things "has not furnished mankind with competent means for "the promoting his own honour in the world, and the good of souls." If your way of arguing be true, it is demonstration, that force is not of necessary use. I argue thus, in your form: We must acknowledge force not to be of necessary use; "unless we will say (what "without impiety cannot be said) that the wise disposer and governor of all things did not, for above "three hundred years after Christ, furnish his church "with competent means for promoting his own honour "in in the world, and the good of souls." It is for you to consider whether these arguments be conclusive or no. This I am sure, the one is as conclusive as the other. But if your supposed usefulness places a right somewhere to use it, pray tell me in whose hands it places it in Turkey, Persia, or China, or any country where christians of different churches live under a heathen or mahometan sovereign? And if you cannot tell

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me in whose hands it places it there, as I believe you will find it pretty hard to do; there are then, it seems, some places where, upon your supposition of the necessary usefulness of force," the wise and benign governor " and disposer of all things has not furnished men with "competent means for promoting his own honour and “ the good of souls; " unless you will grant that the "wise and benign disposer and governor of all things "hath, for the promoting of his honour and the good "of souls, placed a power in mahometan or heathen princes to punish christians, to bring them to consi"der reasons and arguments proper to convince them." But this is the advantage of so fine an invention, as that of force doing some service indirectly and at a distance; which usefulness, if we may believe you, places a right in mahometan or pagan princes hands, to use force upon christians; for fear lest mankind in those countries should be unfurnished with means for the promoting God's honour and the good of souls. For thus you argue: "if there be so great use of force, then there "is a right somewhere to use it. And if there be such a right somewhere, where should it be but in the civil sovereign?" Who can deny now, but that you have taken care, great care, for the promoting of truth and the christian religion? But yet it is as hard for me, I confess, and I believe for others, to conceive how you should think to do any service to truth and the christian religion, by putting a right into mahometans or heathens hands to punish christians; as it was for you to conceive how the author should think "to do any ser"vice to the truth, and the christian religion," by exempting the professors of it from punishment everywhere, since there are more pagan, mahometan, and erroneous princes in the world, than orthodox; truth, and the christian religion, taking the world as we find it, is sure to be more punished and suppressed, than errour and falsehood.

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The author having endeavoured to show that no-body at all, of any rank or condition, had a power to punish, torment, or use any man ill, for matters of religion ; tell us "you do not yet understand, why clergy

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men are not as capable of such power as other men.'' I do not remember that the author any-where, by excepting ecclesiastics more than others, gave you any occasion to show your concern in this point. Had he foreseen that this would have touched you so nearly, and that you set your heart so much upon the clergy's power of punishing; it is like he would have told you, he thought ecclesiastics as capable of it as any men; and that if forwardness and diligence in the exercise of such power may recommend any to it, clergymen in the opinion of the world stand fairest for it. However, you do

well to put in your claim for them, though the author excludes them no more than their neighbours. Nay, they must be allowed the pretence of the fairest title. For I never read of any severities that were to bring men to Christ, but those of the law of Moses; which is therefore called a pedagogue, (Gal. iii. 24.) And the next verse tells us, that "after that faith is come, we are no "longer under a schoolmaster." But yet if we are still to be driven to Christ by a rod, I shall not envy them the pleasure of wielding it: only I desire them, when they have got the scourge into their hands, to remember our Saviour, and follow his example, who never used it but once; and that they would, like him, employ it only to drive vile and scandalous traffickers for the things of this world, out of their church, rather than to drive whoever they can into it. Whether the latter be not a proper method to make their church what our Saviour there pronounced of the temple, they who use it were best look. For in matters of religion, none are so easy to be driven, as those who have nothing of religion at all; and next to them, the vicious, the ignorant, the worldling, and the hypocrite; who care for no more of religion but the name, nor no more of any church, but its prosperity and power: and who, not unlike those described by our Saviour, (Luke xx. 47.) for a show come to, or cry up the prayers of the church, "that they may devour widows, and other helpless people's houses." I say not this of the serious professors of any church, who are in earnest in matters of religion. Such I value, who conscientiously, and out of a

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sincere persuasion, embrace any religion, though different from mine, and in a way, I think, mistaken. But no-body can have reason to think otherwise than what I have said, of those who are wrought upon to be of any church, by secular hopes and fears. Those truly place trade above all other considerations, and merchandize with religion itself, who regulate their choice by worldly profit and loss.

You endeavour to prove, against the author, that civil society is not instituted only for civil ends, i. e. the procuring, preserving, and advancing men's civil interests: your words are, "I must say, that our author "does but beg the question, when he affirms that the "commonwealth is constituted only for the procuring,

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preserving, and advancing of the civil interests of "the members of it. That commonwealths are insti"tuted for these ends, no man will deny. But if there "be any other ends besides these, attainable by the

civil society and government, there is no reason to "affirm, that these are the only ends, for which they "are designed. Doubtless commonwealths are insti"tuted for the attaining of all the benefits which poli"tical government can yield. And therefore, if the

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spiritual and eternal interests of men may any way "be procured or advanced by political government, "the procuring and advancing those interests must in "all reason be reckoned among the ends of civil soci"eties, and so, consequently, fall within the compass "of the magistrate's jurisdiction." I have set down your words at large, to let the reader see, that you of all men had the least reason to tell the author, he does but beg the question; unless you mean to justify yourself by the pretence of his example. You argue thus,

If there be any other ends attainable by civil society, "then civil interests are not the only ends for which

commonwealths are instituted." And how do you prove there be other ends? Why thus, "Doubtless "commonwealths are instituted for the attaining of all "the benefits which political government can yield." Which is as clear a demonstration, as doubtless can make it to be. The question is, whether civil society